Conflict resolution — I

Disputes may be settled through negotiations, but only after the belligerents have exhausted all other options.


Lt-gen R Asad Durrani November 04, 2010

It would be nice if we could resolve our conflicts without recourse to war. The problem is that hardly ever have warring parties, out of the goodness of their heart, sat down face-to-face and left in abiding friendship. Disputes may indeed ultimately be settled through negotiations, but only after the belligerents have exhausted all other options, or concluded that the price of conflict was exceeding that of peace. To secure the best possible position on the table, the adversaries should use all elements of national power to their optimum advantage.

India and Pakistan tried that for 50 years. During this period, they developed internal strength and sought external support, acquired unconventional capabilities and used sub-conventional means and fought wars. Finally in 1997, in the belief that they were now well-positioned, the two countries evolved a framework for peace.

The first challenge was to create the right conditions for a dialogue on Kashmir, the bone of contention between them right from their inception. It had now become so complex that a meaningful discourse seemed nearly impossible. In Pakistan, securing the right of self-determination for the Kashmiris is a national passion. It could not, therefore, embark upon a dialogue that was not seen to be addressing Kashmir. India, on the other hand, having declared the disputed state as its integral part, could not be seen negotiating its status. The foreign secretaries meeting of June 1997 found an ingenuous method to circumvent the dilemma.

The recipe, now known as the “composite dialogue”, was to form a number of working groups to discuss bilateral issues more or less concurrently. Peace, security and Kashmir were to be dealt with by foreign secretaries; others like trade, terrorism, and some territorial disputes by ministries or departments concerned. Pakistan could now claim that its “core issue” would be handled at an appropriately high level, and the Indians were free to explain that the forum was primarily to redress matters like cross-border infiltration. A clause in the agreement, however, could cease the process in its tracks.

A good number of people in Pakistan have always believed that if the two countries settled peripheral disputes before addressing Kashmir, India would have no incentive in its resolution. To assuage that concern, a clause in the joint communiqué (4.2) stated that the dialogue would be conducted as an “integrated” whole — implying that progress on all issues would have to be in tandem. That sounded fine — except for the problem that if there was little or no movement on one track, one would have to slow down on all the others. The favourable environment needed to deal with the more complex problems was thus contingent upon progress on all. This was exactly the catch-22 situation that the authors of the formula had set out to avoid.

The “integrated” part was, therefore, quietly dropped (though not from the official text). The process was now more like moving with our disputes on parallel tracks and settling them according to their degree of difficulty. No longer “composite”, the dialogue retained its politically correct adjective. What we now had was a “multiple-track, multiple-speed” formula.

Evolution of this concept was purely a civilian sector enterprise. However, since it is the military that prides itself in the study and development of strategic wisdom, it may be gratifying to note that a military strategist too would have supported the model. When operating along multiple axes, forces that meet less resistance continue their momentum, thus creating a synergetic effect. In due course, some critical fronts can be reinforced to achieve a breakthrough and capture the main objective — in this case, durable peace in the subcontinent.

Good concepts and sound strategies are indeed not enough. Execution and oversight is the real thing. How the composite dialogue fared on that account will be discussed in subsequent serials.

Published in The Express Tribune, November 5th, 2010.

COMMENTS (8)

Anoop | 13 years ago | Reply The problem with Pakistan is the expectation. The term solution to Kashmir means that it gets complete control, if not partial. That is NEVER going to happen. No country in the history of mankind, as stable and economically strong as India, will voluntarily give up control of any part of neighbouring land,filled with precious resources, to another rival, who can barely manage to stand on its feet without outside help. Add to this the dangerous precedence it is going to set, Constitutional changes to be approved by the Parliament and Supreme Court, the status of 150+ million Muslims in India, etc and this becomes a straight forward analysis. But, I suppose only the Military from Pakistan fix this. Musharaff when he came to power wanted Kashmir at any cost and foolishly undertook the Kargil misadventure. But, at the end of his time in power he had come to realize the above and settled for "making boders irrelevant" or "Soft Borders" thereby giving into India's traditional stand but sugar coating it for Pakistan's consumption. India and Pakistan missed a golden opportunity to solve Kashmir. I hope a Musharaff like figure comes up and settles this issue soon from Pakistani side.
Ali Sina | 13 years ago | Reply Conflict avoidance is a wiser alternative to conflict resolution. This is something no one has talked about. We have to closely look at why are there so many peripheral disputes in addition to core disputes. As I look at history from an unbiased perspective, I've to bite the bullet and state an observation that it was unnecessary bellicosity and unfettered aggression, not on part of India, but us. Why not just accept it to begin with? From a philosophical perspective, temperance is better than avarice. Good concepts and sound strategies are indeed not enough. What was missing before and even today is strong leadership, long-term vision, and futuristic planning i.e. strategies have to be forward-looking and can't be lagging after the fact. Greed in national interest is perhaps good, but mindless greed leading up to a catch-22 situation can be self-destructive, especially with a conflict that is unsustainable by any and all means possible, exceeding the harvests of peace by multiples. What's worse is in the bigger picture of the great game, conflict resolution that was supposed to reap dividends ends up as a strategic mistake of the previous century. The 21st century undoubtedly begins with a clash between superpowers, the US and China. The outcome from misplaced greed can be used to their advantage to play out stakes on the grand chessboard. The subcontinent gets trapped. I'd also like to point out that despite Mao's extreme left posturing earlier, Deng Xiaoping made a bold move into capitalism in the early 80s. China is the second-largest economy in the world today and will displace the US from the top spot within a few years. As for Pakistan, pointlessly going in circles around the cul de sac of composite dialogs with India is going to be of no signifiance. What's required is radical changes and bold leadership in Pakistan, after reviewing your excellent statement:
Disputes may indeed ultimately be settled through negotiations, but only after the belligerents have exhausted all other options, or concluded that the price of conflict was exceeding that of peace.
Here's a must read by Shabir Choudhary: Can Pakistan produce one Roy to speak truth?
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