Afghan Taliban predicament and way out

Pakistan's October 15, 2025 retaliatory precision strikes in Kabul and Qandahar against TTP leadership on Afghan soil, created a 'deterrence'. It caused unease bordering panic among Afghan Taliban. Therefore, after the November 11 suicide attack outside the Islamabad judicial complex, Taliban quietly reached out to Pakistan, assuring non-involvement, and requested to de-escalate. The second attack on FC HQ in Peshawar on November 24 was owned by Jammat-ul-Ahraar, a TTP splinter group. So, on Qatar's request, Pakistan postponed the planned retaliatory strikes inside Afghanistan.

Other than the cited attacks by 'renegade' elements, there is noticeable decline in terrorist attacks. Pakistan's air and missile strike demonstrated Islamabad's resolve to chase the TTP/any other group even inside Kabul. This had the desired psychological impact on Taliban leadership and security apparatus. In earlier incidents, they would dismiss Pakistan's concerns, spinning the blame towards TTP factions. This time, they pleaded behind the scenes after seeing Islamabad's reach, lethality, capacity and unmistakable willingness to hit high-value targets deeper inside Afghanistan.

Pakistan' tough message loudly established deterrence, stipulating, if attacked by Afghan proxies, Islamabad will not "wait for protracted diplomatic exchanges", but "will act [militarily and] immediately". In Islamabad's reckoning, global environment does not inhibit such retaliation, given that the Kabul regime does not espouse any optimism and international sympathy for its track record on exclusivity, women apartheid and terror-sponsorship. Islamabad's pressure is expected to compel Afghan Talibs to reassess their longstanding support to TTP. The new doctrine specifies that Pakistan would act, if Afghanistan failed to act.

So, on December 10, around 1,000 Afghan scholars, jurists and mashayikh issued a declaration/edict at the end of deliberations in Kabul, eulogising the Islamists' rule and Afghan citizenry's obligation to support it. The five-point edict reiterated that: a) Afghan Islamic Emirate is a righteous and legitimate system, making people's obedience and defence of the system obligatory; b) defending the system against foreign aggression and the ensuing jihad is an individual obligation (fard 'ayn); c) the Islamic Emirate pledges not to allow the use of Afghan soil against 'any other country', making it obligatory upon 'all Muslims' (indirectly including TTP) not to do so; implementation of this pledge is mandatory upon 'every Muslim'; and the Emirate is empowered to take necessary measures against violators; d) no Afghan 'has been allowed' to travel abroad for military activity, and the Emirate shall take necessary measures to prevent [any] such people; and e) all Muslims and Islamic countries will have good, fraternal and constructive ties.

That clergy was directed to widely circulate the cited iterations. A careful reading of the Pashto, English and Urdu translations of the declaration reveals that it is, at best, an effort to consolidate the Taliban rule, and rally Afghans to a common standpoint against any aggression [by Pakistan]. TTP is just deductively referred to as 'all Muslims', without being mentioned by its name or more clearly. Under Taliban's proclivity to twist things, and their expertise in semantics, like advising Pakistan during the recent Doha/Istanbul parleys to approach dar-al-fatawah (the edict-issuing entity) for any anti-TTP edict, rather than pleading with Amir-ul-Momineen; not much is expected, unless tangible steps are taken. Otherwise, it remains an exercise for domestic consumption, which is also aimed at ISKP, for example.

Even if the intended purpose of the edict, on the face value, is taken as peace with Pakistan, religious proclamation will not be sufficient. A roadmap will be needed, given complexity of the TTP issue, and factors like Qandahar (TTA) versus Paktia (Haqqani) dynamics. Following are some random thoughts for possible resolution.

First, the concept of peace. Both countries must negotiate directly, as brotherly Türkiye and Qatar have limited understanding of Pak-Afghan bilateralism. TTP issue is central, and if Afghanistan skirts around this main issue, no headway is possible. All other issues (Pakistan warming up to former Northern Alliance, trade blockade, visas, etc), which Taliban bring to the table in their effort to make a case, are secondary, subsidiary and tied to the main issue. These are resolvable, once the main issue is settled.

Second, possible roadmap. After welcome support to the cited declaration by important Afghan leaders — endorsement by venerable Haibatullah Akhundzada awaited — TTP must be restrained from conducting attacks against Pakistan for at least six months, as 'confidence building measure'. Thereafter, conflict resolution be orchestrated under Pashtunwali, riwaj and Pashto laar, as applicable. Pakistan will likely relent if TTP leadership is nudged by Afghan side to pursue nanawatee (suing for peace). In the meantime, political, diplomatic, sociological and traders' pressure is likely to work on both sides, who should desist from incendiary rhetoric, not to vitiate the environment.

Third, the settlement. After acceptance of nanawatee by Pakistan, TTP be categorised in Black, Grey and White cadres, disposing their cases as per riwaj, Pukhtu laar, law and shariah, as applicable. Kabul, meanwhile, to avoid Islamabad's redline i.e. visible bonhomie with India, which can be ill-timed and construed as anti-Pakistan. Thereafter, normal relations to resume including possible aid, as needed by Kabul.

Fourth, failing the above roadmap, Pakistan's only alternative remains military action. Besides, Pakistan likely will be compelled to work for Kabul's isolation, and possible regime change. The ensuing military standoff and Afghanistan's politico-economic and diplomatic coercion may result into continued instability.

Many Afghanologists are of the view that Kabul is buying time and is not serious and able to resolve the sticking TTP issue. These analysts cite that Afghanistan and TTP believe they have an upper hand. Buoyed by their Pakistan-enabled defeat of the Soviet Union and the US-NATO Combine, they, erroneously, think that Pakistan can be brow-beaten and destabilised. That TTA considers it their religious obligation to support TTP tooth and nail, and earn domestic political brownie points as well as 'a place in heaven'. That standing up to Pakistan makes a powerful domestic political pitch with Afghans of all political affiliations. That TTA prefers domestic peace over relations with Pakistan. Therefore, prolonging conflict with Pakistan, bleeding it through 'a thousand cuts' and enjoying unbridled power makes sense. Allah will take care of the rest.

So, fingers are crossed!