A general’s apology

Are there other reasons for preferring to prosecute Musharraf for his actions of 2007 rather than those of 1999?

The author is a Barrister of Lincoln’s Inn and has a degree in English Literature and Economics from Bryn Mawr College, USA

Let me first clarify, that I am not, and have never been, a fan of our erstwhile president, General (retd) Pervez Musharraf: for me, he was an usurper who had assumed power by flouting not only the Constitution but his very own oath to uphold it; a self-proclaimed leader who, despite the mandate given to him to set the country on the path of progress, failed to deliver on his promise and a mere man who, despite his avowed aspirations to serve and protect the nation, ultimately became embroiled in an unseemly struggle to retain power irrespective of the national cost at which it came. Despite my personal opinion of him, however, I was sufficiently intrigued by the news of his apology to the nation, to seek out the footage of his recent interview to the Pakistani media.



The change in the retired general was palpable. Whilst his body language was humbled, his speech measured, more thoughtful and certainly less arrogant, I was most struck by his evident courage and sincerity.

His apology, however, was conditional: my intentions were always sincere, he said, and if anyone feels I have hurt the country in carrying out my intentions, then I apologise! Whilst I am convinced that General (retd) Musharraf’s apology does not merit serious, or indeed any, consideration, because an apology is only meaningful if it comes from an acceptance of the accusations against a person, it did make me feel sorry to see this much-reduced, more human version of his previous self. The apology also made me take a closer look at the accusations against him and I was surprised to note that according to the PML-N leadership, the greatest wrong on the former general’s part was not the military takeover of October 12, 1999 — which had ousted the democratically-elected government of Mian Nawaz Sharif — but the emergency of November 3, 2007!


Is the PML-N leadership being magnanimous? Or are there other reasons for preferring to prosecute the former general for his actions of 2007 rather than those of 1999? The only major difference I could find in the two scenarios was that whilst in 1999 the Supreme Court, in its judgment in the Zafar Ali Shah Case (to which our former chief justice Iftikhar Chaudhry was a party), had endorsed the takeover and had, in fact, conferred upon the general the authority to amend the Constitution, it had in 2007 exercised its new-found independence and had resisted and reviled the emergency. This, however, does not derogate from the fact that 2007 would not have been possible had it not been for 1999 and any investigation into the former, must, of necessity, warrant an investigation into the latter.

Why, then, has the PML-N leadership preferred to prosecute the former general for one and not both? Is it an attempt on its part to keep the judiciary out of controversy and especially the former CJ who was the last of the authors of the Zafar Ali Shah judgment to remain on the bench? The PML-N, however, should be aware that not only are such attempts most likely to fail, but also that they would prevent a complete picture of events from emerging and, therefore, not only prevent complete justice but also ultimately discredit the government itself. It is also imperative for the post-Zafar Ali Shah judiciary to take this trial as an opportunity to take a reflective look at its own participation in endorsing dictators rather than resisting it on the pretext of protecting the institution, for an institution that cannot be judicious towards itself, is perhaps not fit to render justice in any other circumstances either.

Published in The Express Tribune, January 3rd, 2014.

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