Governance by committees
Equipping the law enforcement agencies with requisite teeth is a step in the right direction.
The writer is a former federal finance secretary and a former home secretary of Sindh
On September 4, the federal cabinet, in consultation with the Sindh government, constituted four committees to restore normalcy in Karachi: a supervisory committee headed by the chief minister to manage action against criminals; an operational committee headed by DG Rangers; a legal committee and a monitoring committee comprising non-partisan stakeholders to oversee and monitor the objectivity of action.
Back in 1998, a similar committees model was espoused — the chief minister heading the political committee and the chief secretary leading the operational committee. It failed to yield results. A breakdown of communication between the top executives and inaction of the administrative machinery led to the exit of the latter, the IG buckled down, and the situation deteriorated to the extent that the federal government had to impose governor’s rule in November 1998 and establish military courts to restore the writ of the government. A large number of terrorists/criminals were arrested and prosecuted through an elaborate system of scrutiny and prosecution laid out by the government. Within weeks, Karachi was quiet. Carjacking dropped drastically, target killings terminated and criminal activities declined. During late June 1999, when the government appeared to be restoring peacefully in Karachi, two things happened: the appointment of adviser for Sindh affairs, prompting political discontentment and a divergent agenda of ‘support elements’ cultivating rival groups. Within days, the situation started deteriorating.
Governance by committees has neither worked in the past nor shall it deliver in the future, as it runs contrary to unity of command. It would generate more tensions amongst various stakeholders and institutional commands. Either our threat perception is tainted or we are only posturing to signal our concerns to calm the critics. Recognising that it is critical not to sidetrack the larger national security matter, it is imperative to sustain the sting nabbing the criminals.
Equipping the law enforcement agencies with requisite teeth is a step in the right direction. Arrest of criminals and killers has brought a temporary hiatus in criminal activities. However, the vital test would be the prosecution and conviction of arrested elements based on incriminating evidence rather than detention which can invoke writ jurisdiction and a strong accountability mechanism to avoid the abuse of powers. Else, we will soon see a resurge. Statements that the ‘police has arrested hundreds of criminals and now the onus is on the Courts’ reflect a frothy attitude and are inconsistent with the principles of criminal justice.
In parallel, it is essential to rebuild the state apparatus: purging the criminal and corrupt from the police and civil service, reconstructing the police force and constructing police lines in each area; strengthening the investigation arm which the ‘so-called reformers’ separated from the thana police with great enthusiasm to eliminate the ‘culture of live off the land’ but failed to deliver; refurbishing prosecution with qualified and professional people well compensated; eliminate informal power centres without discrimination; end to political interference in the police Command; instituting a police complaint authority and accountability system (an independent Provincial Ehtesab Commission); improving officers-to-men and policemen-to-population ratios; equipping them with modern gadgetry; reforming the jail system; establishing halfway home reformatories; executing deweaponisation requiring ingenuity (enforce arms census under Arms Act) and eradicating sources of supply; introducing right to information and right to public service legislation; strengthening a subordinate judiciary with the introduction of judicial standards and accountability and right to justice legislation; transparent management of public assets and a judicial scrutiny of development funds spent and allotments over the last 10 years; reconstituting the provincial public service commission manned by well-reputed, credible people and scrutiny of all recruitments since 2000 in all provincial and local institutions; starting an urban renewal programme; beefing up provincial and local taxation systems and cost recovery; and a plan to bust refuge centres of crime syndicates overseas. Delimitation and electoral reform will be key in transforming the politics of Sindh. Much of that is in the domain of the provincial government. Nevertheless, the federal government needs to sustain its pressure within the framework of the Constitution.
We must be cognisant of the fact that the Sindh Rangers were raised in 1994 as a second line of defence. Its failure to sustain the administrative writ of the government permanently could lead to induction of the army as happened in 1992, 1994 and 1998. Police, therefore, should be reconstructed as the first line of defence. Siege and search operations may trigger Stockholm syndrome as happened during the previous three operations. The next 12 months are critical for Pakistan in view of the expected escalation of international moves in our neighbourhood within the framework of the much debated ‘New Great Game’. Utmost care is needed not to get trapped in any international plot. Natural resources and south of Pakistan hold the key for future moves.
Published in The Express Tribune, November 11th, 2013.
Back in 1998, a similar committees model was espoused — the chief minister heading the political committee and the chief secretary leading the operational committee. It failed to yield results. A breakdown of communication between the top executives and inaction of the administrative machinery led to the exit of the latter, the IG buckled down, and the situation deteriorated to the extent that the federal government had to impose governor’s rule in November 1998 and establish military courts to restore the writ of the government. A large number of terrorists/criminals were arrested and prosecuted through an elaborate system of scrutiny and prosecution laid out by the government. Within weeks, Karachi was quiet. Carjacking dropped drastically, target killings terminated and criminal activities declined. During late June 1999, when the government appeared to be restoring peacefully in Karachi, two things happened: the appointment of adviser for Sindh affairs, prompting political discontentment and a divergent agenda of ‘support elements’ cultivating rival groups. Within days, the situation started deteriorating.
Governance by committees has neither worked in the past nor shall it deliver in the future, as it runs contrary to unity of command. It would generate more tensions amongst various stakeholders and institutional commands. Either our threat perception is tainted or we are only posturing to signal our concerns to calm the critics. Recognising that it is critical not to sidetrack the larger national security matter, it is imperative to sustain the sting nabbing the criminals.
Equipping the law enforcement agencies with requisite teeth is a step in the right direction. Arrest of criminals and killers has brought a temporary hiatus in criminal activities. However, the vital test would be the prosecution and conviction of arrested elements based on incriminating evidence rather than detention which can invoke writ jurisdiction and a strong accountability mechanism to avoid the abuse of powers. Else, we will soon see a resurge. Statements that the ‘police has arrested hundreds of criminals and now the onus is on the Courts’ reflect a frothy attitude and are inconsistent with the principles of criminal justice.
In parallel, it is essential to rebuild the state apparatus: purging the criminal and corrupt from the police and civil service, reconstructing the police force and constructing police lines in each area; strengthening the investigation arm which the ‘so-called reformers’ separated from the thana police with great enthusiasm to eliminate the ‘culture of live off the land’ but failed to deliver; refurbishing prosecution with qualified and professional people well compensated; eliminate informal power centres without discrimination; end to political interference in the police Command; instituting a police complaint authority and accountability system (an independent Provincial Ehtesab Commission); improving officers-to-men and policemen-to-population ratios; equipping them with modern gadgetry; reforming the jail system; establishing halfway home reformatories; executing deweaponisation requiring ingenuity (enforce arms census under Arms Act) and eradicating sources of supply; introducing right to information and right to public service legislation; strengthening a subordinate judiciary with the introduction of judicial standards and accountability and right to justice legislation; transparent management of public assets and a judicial scrutiny of development funds spent and allotments over the last 10 years; reconstituting the provincial public service commission manned by well-reputed, credible people and scrutiny of all recruitments since 2000 in all provincial and local institutions; starting an urban renewal programme; beefing up provincial and local taxation systems and cost recovery; and a plan to bust refuge centres of crime syndicates overseas. Delimitation and electoral reform will be key in transforming the politics of Sindh. Much of that is in the domain of the provincial government. Nevertheless, the federal government needs to sustain its pressure within the framework of the Constitution.
We must be cognisant of the fact that the Sindh Rangers were raised in 1994 as a second line of defence. Its failure to sustain the administrative writ of the government permanently could lead to induction of the army as happened in 1992, 1994 and 1998. Police, therefore, should be reconstructed as the first line of defence. Siege and search operations may trigger Stockholm syndrome as happened during the previous three operations. The next 12 months are critical for Pakistan in view of the expected escalation of international moves in our neighbourhood within the framework of the much debated ‘New Great Game’. Utmost care is needed not to get trapped in any international plot. Natural resources and south of Pakistan hold the key for future moves.
Published in The Express Tribune, November 11th, 2013.