Pakistan-Afghanistan posturings
Afghanistan getting support from regional, international partners gives it a position of strength vis-à-vis Pakistan.
After good atmospherics with India at the Saarc summit in the Maldives, Pakistan’s prime minister has had to face discord during his meeting with the Afghan president on the sidelines. Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani brought up the matter of the assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani in a plaintive mode, regretting “the blame game initiated by Afghanistan following the assassination”. This was perhaps the wrong expression to use because it made President Hamid Karzai shoot back that Afghanistan “would not move forward until Islamabad fully cooperates in the murder probe”.
The Afghans — and several other foreign powers — think that Pakistani intelligence was behind the killing of former Afghan president Rabbani and allege that the suicide bomber was a Pakistani citizen linked with the so-called Quetta Shura. After this exchange, both sides took an hour holding each other responsible for the current impasse in the relationship. Pakistan said that the Quetta Shura does not exist, for which unfortunately there are few takers in foreign capitals. Pakistan also denies the existence of the Haqqani network, but the world — again — believes otherwise, thinking that the Afghan warlord linked to al Qaeda is based in North Waziristan.
President Karzai is increasingly appearing two-faced, saying kind things like Pakistan is Afghanistan’s “twin brother” while writhing with anger inside. This is the best posture to take for the leader of a weak state with hardly any writ of his own at home. As for Pakistan, it is difficult to deny that it has, by and large, thought of Afghanistan as a next-door weakling dependent on its transit trade through Pakistan for economic survival. There was a time when Islamabad could even ‘punish’ Kabul for such disobedience but that is not possible these days because of the presence of US and Nato troops in Afghanistan. President Karzai therefore could afford to face up to the Pakistan prime minister to tell him that he, to put it mildly, was not being very truthful.
Pakistan itself is a weak state known and believed by most to be ruled indirectly by its military. Even if there is an elected government, most major decisions relating to foreign policy and even domestic matters are decided by the military, such is public perception. There are other weaknesses similar to those suffered by Afghanistan. Pakistan is without a writ of the state in many parts of its territory. It has ‘foreigners’ ensconced in parts of its territory who are determined to overthrow the system in Pakistan and replace it with a rigid theocracy and its security structure is contaminated by the ideology of foreign terrorists. Afghanistan seems to be heading towards another paradigm of dealing with Pakistan. And President Karzai simply presages the lineaments of it: and this is that Afghanistan will now rely on regional and international actors to prevent Pakistan from bringing about changes inside Afghanistan. Kabul would want to do this, presumably because it wishes to avoid what is happening in Pakistan: political instability accompanied by the killing of its leaders, which many Pakistanis think is being done by the very terrorists that it pretends to fight. Weak states are required to develop flexibility of response, and President Karzai is now giving evidence of using it selectively with Pakistan. The reason is the weakening of Pakistan’s position vis-à-vis Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover in 1996 when it demonstrated to the world that its interference in Afghanistan can threaten world peace.
But a recent change of policy by Pakistan vis-à-vis India promises to bring Islamabad back to a credible position of influence and strength. It has unblocked the process of normalisation with India by awarding it the much delayed — and much criticised, internationally — Most Favoured Nation status, and has additionally given it rights to send its exports to Afghanistan and Central Asia through Pakistani territory. This will enable it to also improve its ties with the offended US and EU community and improve its traction on Kabul. Till the time this new policy takes hold, Islamabad should tread carefully on the basis of a foreign policy not made by the elected government.
Published in The Express Tribune, November 13th, 2011.
The Afghans — and several other foreign powers — think that Pakistani intelligence was behind the killing of former Afghan president Rabbani and allege that the suicide bomber was a Pakistani citizen linked with the so-called Quetta Shura. After this exchange, both sides took an hour holding each other responsible for the current impasse in the relationship. Pakistan said that the Quetta Shura does not exist, for which unfortunately there are few takers in foreign capitals. Pakistan also denies the existence of the Haqqani network, but the world — again — believes otherwise, thinking that the Afghan warlord linked to al Qaeda is based in North Waziristan.
President Karzai is increasingly appearing two-faced, saying kind things like Pakistan is Afghanistan’s “twin brother” while writhing with anger inside. This is the best posture to take for the leader of a weak state with hardly any writ of his own at home. As for Pakistan, it is difficult to deny that it has, by and large, thought of Afghanistan as a next-door weakling dependent on its transit trade through Pakistan for economic survival. There was a time when Islamabad could even ‘punish’ Kabul for such disobedience but that is not possible these days because of the presence of US and Nato troops in Afghanistan. President Karzai therefore could afford to face up to the Pakistan prime minister to tell him that he, to put it mildly, was not being very truthful.
Pakistan itself is a weak state known and believed by most to be ruled indirectly by its military. Even if there is an elected government, most major decisions relating to foreign policy and even domestic matters are decided by the military, such is public perception. There are other weaknesses similar to those suffered by Afghanistan. Pakistan is without a writ of the state in many parts of its territory. It has ‘foreigners’ ensconced in parts of its territory who are determined to overthrow the system in Pakistan and replace it with a rigid theocracy and its security structure is contaminated by the ideology of foreign terrorists. Afghanistan seems to be heading towards another paradigm of dealing with Pakistan. And President Karzai simply presages the lineaments of it: and this is that Afghanistan will now rely on regional and international actors to prevent Pakistan from bringing about changes inside Afghanistan. Kabul would want to do this, presumably because it wishes to avoid what is happening in Pakistan: political instability accompanied by the killing of its leaders, which many Pakistanis think is being done by the very terrorists that it pretends to fight. Weak states are required to develop flexibility of response, and President Karzai is now giving evidence of using it selectively with Pakistan. The reason is the weakening of Pakistan’s position vis-à-vis Afghanistan since the Taliban takeover in 1996 when it demonstrated to the world that its interference in Afghanistan can threaten world peace.
But a recent change of policy by Pakistan vis-à-vis India promises to bring Islamabad back to a credible position of influence and strength. It has unblocked the process of normalisation with India by awarding it the much delayed — and much criticised, internationally — Most Favoured Nation status, and has additionally given it rights to send its exports to Afghanistan and Central Asia through Pakistani territory. This will enable it to also improve its ties with the offended US and EU community and improve its traction on Kabul. Till the time this new policy takes hold, Islamabad should tread carefully on the basis of a foreign policy not made by the elected government.
Published in The Express Tribune, November 13th, 2011.