The army and parliament
No one can be happy over the confrontation Pakistan is embarking upon with the US and its Nato allies.
During a briefing to the defence committees of the Senate and the National Assembly at General Headquarters (GHQ), Army Chief General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani has talked of certain aspects of the crisis of relations with the US and its Nato allies and explained Pakistan’s foreign policy on Afghanistan, commonly known as ‘strategic depth’. On the latest menacing concentration of US-Nato forces along the Durand Line, he said: “They might do it [might attack North Waziristan] but they will have to think 10 times because Pakistan is not Iraq or Afghanistan”.
On Pakistan’s own Afghanistan policy he said: “We cannot leave both our eastern and western borders insecure. It is wishful thinking to achieve strategic depth in Afghanistan. The Russians tried, the Brits tried, the Americans are trying. We don’t have a magic wand.” But he insisted that Pakistan had special strategic interest in the country nonetheless: “We have long-term interests in Afghanistan; others might have short [terms ones]… for short-term gains; we cannot lose [sight of] our long-term interests”. About the pressure being put on the Pakistan Army for going after the Haqqani network in North Waziristan, General Kayani was forthright and honest, describing his position as realistic and not necessarily a legal one: “We have made it clear to the US that we will decide the timing of any such action according to our situation and capabilities. We have also told them that the problem lies within Afghanistan. If anyone convinces me that everything will be sorted out if we act in North Waziristan, I will take immediate action.”
As articulated by General Kayani, it is clearly a military-oriented policy focused on a war on two fronts founded on the thesis of permanent confrontation. And the general is right because Pakistan’s parliament has taken charge of foreign policy with the consent of the PPP-led government and an all-parties conference (APC) has endorsed it. Looking at the content of the number of APCs and subsequent parliamentary resolutions, the allocation of the foreign policy portfolio to the Pakistan Army is completely constitutional as endorsed by the elected representatives of the people. Not only that, the Pakistani media and the opinion of the common man as reflected in polls are fully behind the aggressive albeit isolationist stance adopted by the Pakistan Army. In democracies, foreign policy and diplomacy are the domain of the party in power because countries are normally required to deal with situations abroad, which are not subject to any settled law guiding state conduct. Conduct of foreign policy requires flexibility of response and reaching of prudent understandings to guard state interests topped by considerations of economic interest. (The only definition of ‘national interest’ that stands the test of practice is the one attached to the national economy.) Even accords signed with other states don’t require endorsement of parliament — as in the case of India and Pakistan — but if the government is weak it may devolve the conduct of foreign policy to parliament to draw strength from democratic consensus. In the case of Pakistan, foreign policy has been devolved to the Pakistan Army by government and parliament both. Hence no one should complain that Pakistan’s foreign policy is in the hands of GHQ.
No one can be happy over the confrontation Pakistan is embarking upon with the US and its Nato allies. The idea of leaning on the ‘prediction’ that the US will fail in this confrontation is unsettling, given the internal conditions of Pakistan. Even if Pakistan ‘wins’ in this confrontation, it will have to contend with a much bigger problem of dealing with local and foreign non-state actors trespassing on the writ of the Pakistani state. General Kayani says his army will clear the terrorists but the subsequent control of the pacified areas is the job of the civilians. The ‘realistic’ fact is that the army will not tackle the terrorists of a given region unless — as General Kayani explains — it suits “our situation and capabilities”. Pakistan’s ‘long-term’ interest in Afghanistan is not only challenged by the US and its allies but also by other regional states. The Pakistani narrative is not the only valid narrative. It is flawed because it is introverted and presumes the kind of economic muscle Pakistan doesn’t have.
Published in The Express Tribune, October 20th, 2011.
On Pakistan’s own Afghanistan policy he said: “We cannot leave both our eastern and western borders insecure. It is wishful thinking to achieve strategic depth in Afghanistan. The Russians tried, the Brits tried, the Americans are trying. We don’t have a magic wand.” But he insisted that Pakistan had special strategic interest in the country nonetheless: “We have long-term interests in Afghanistan; others might have short [terms ones]… for short-term gains; we cannot lose [sight of] our long-term interests”. About the pressure being put on the Pakistan Army for going after the Haqqani network in North Waziristan, General Kayani was forthright and honest, describing his position as realistic and not necessarily a legal one: “We have made it clear to the US that we will decide the timing of any such action according to our situation and capabilities. We have also told them that the problem lies within Afghanistan. If anyone convinces me that everything will be sorted out if we act in North Waziristan, I will take immediate action.”
As articulated by General Kayani, it is clearly a military-oriented policy focused on a war on two fronts founded on the thesis of permanent confrontation. And the general is right because Pakistan’s parliament has taken charge of foreign policy with the consent of the PPP-led government and an all-parties conference (APC) has endorsed it. Looking at the content of the number of APCs and subsequent parliamentary resolutions, the allocation of the foreign policy portfolio to the Pakistan Army is completely constitutional as endorsed by the elected representatives of the people. Not only that, the Pakistani media and the opinion of the common man as reflected in polls are fully behind the aggressive albeit isolationist stance adopted by the Pakistan Army. In democracies, foreign policy and diplomacy are the domain of the party in power because countries are normally required to deal with situations abroad, which are not subject to any settled law guiding state conduct. Conduct of foreign policy requires flexibility of response and reaching of prudent understandings to guard state interests topped by considerations of economic interest. (The only definition of ‘national interest’ that stands the test of practice is the one attached to the national economy.) Even accords signed with other states don’t require endorsement of parliament — as in the case of India and Pakistan — but if the government is weak it may devolve the conduct of foreign policy to parliament to draw strength from democratic consensus. In the case of Pakistan, foreign policy has been devolved to the Pakistan Army by government and parliament both. Hence no one should complain that Pakistan’s foreign policy is in the hands of GHQ.
No one can be happy over the confrontation Pakistan is embarking upon with the US and its Nato allies. The idea of leaning on the ‘prediction’ that the US will fail in this confrontation is unsettling, given the internal conditions of Pakistan. Even if Pakistan ‘wins’ in this confrontation, it will have to contend with a much bigger problem of dealing with local and foreign non-state actors trespassing on the writ of the Pakistani state. General Kayani says his army will clear the terrorists but the subsequent control of the pacified areas is the job of the civilians. The ‘realistic’ fact is that the army will not tackle the terrorists of a given region unless — as General Kayani explains — it suits “our situation and capabilities”. Pakistan’s ‘long-term’ interest in Afghanistan is not only challenged by the US and its allies but also by other regional states. The Pakistani narrative is not the only valid narrative. It is flawed because it is introverted and presumes the kind of economic muscle Pakistan doesn’t have.
Published in The Express Tribune, October 20th, 2011.