Attempts to keep Pakistan on the toes

In my previous article, on the similar concerns flagged by the then US National Security Advisor Jon Finer on Pakistan's 'potential' ICBM capability posing a threat to US homeland, I had argued that "the needless alarmism regarding Pakistan's strategic capability was aimed at leaving a bitter after-taste for the incumbent government to deal with." However, this misplaced narrative on Pakistan's missile capability appears to be deeply entrenched in the US bureaucracy and is not isolated to a single Administration. It reflects a deep and persistent bias in how Pakistan's strategic posture is viewed and assessed regardless of who holds the Oval office.

More recently, Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, in a Senate hearing, made specific references to Pakistan's missile programme saying, "Pakistan's long-range ballistic missile development potentially could include ICBMs with the range capable of striking the Homeland."

Although these baseless apprehensions coming from the US are not new; their frequent recurrence hints at two scenarios – putting pressure on Pakistan and serving the interests of its regional allies, while also highlighting a fundamental flaw in the USA's homeland threat assessment by clubbing Pakistan with North Korea, Russia and China.

Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability, was, and is solely aimed at addressing the intensifying security dilemma vis-à-vis India shaped by its growing asymmetric and unhinged capability development. Pakistan's longest-range missile, Shaheen-III (2,750km), is barely capable of reaching India's farthest end – Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Development of missiles beyond ranges that exceed India doesn't serve Pakistan's deterrence requirements. In the absence of any technical evidence and official statements that suggest Pakistan's desire to develop longer-range missiles, propagating such false narrative is counterproductive and discounts Pakistan's genuine security concerns and rationale behind developing strategic capabilities which are aimed at "safeguarding national sovereignty and maintaining peace and stability in South Asia".

The US appears to be grasping at the weaker options while ignoring the obvious problem. The more alarming scenario is the Indian development of ICBMs with ranges exceeding 10,000kms and well beyond what is required to maintain credible deterrence vis-à-vis it nuclear neighbours – Pakistan and China. India's existing ICBM capability includes Agni-V tested at a range of 5400km and an under-development Agni-VI which will reportedly be capable of hitting targets at a range of 12,000km, projecting India's global strike range capability – covering Europe and some parts of the US. Logically, a 12,000km range missile would be excessive for use against China. In 1997, an article based on information from officials in India's Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) categorically stated that the Indian ICBMs (Saurya/Agni-VI) were tailored to target Europe and the US. Despite the supporting evidence, India is missing from US threat assessments, which continue to assume that India is unlikely to pursue deterrent capabilities beyond China.

This highlights US double standards in its dealings with India and Pakistan where the stated Indian intent is overlooked while fabricating false narratives to portray Pakistan's modest India-centric nuclear and missile capability as a global threat. The selective US scrutiny ignores the pressure that Pakistan faces in terms of India's expanding nuclear triad and advanced conventional force buildup which include simultaneous development of counter-force and counter-value targeting capabilities, ballistic missile defence (BMD) system, MIRVed missiles, hypersonic weapon systems and SSBNs. These destabilising developments, coupled with an increase in the frequency and intensity of crises, necessitate Pakistan to continually enhance and strengthen its strategic capability. This would enable Pakistan to deny India the space for testing Pakistan's thresholds through strategic misadventures carrying the potential of escalation to dangerous levels – like the one witnessed in May 2025.