ADR in Pakistan: the gap between law and practice

Pakistan's justice crisis will not be solved by courtrooms alone. For years, the response to judicial delay has followed a familiar script: appoint more judges, improve case management, dispose of more cases. These steps matter. But they do not answer the deeper problem. Too many disputes that could and should be resolved outside full-scale litigation still end up in court, feeding a culture of delay, cost and procedural fatigue. Pakistan's courts are not merely overburdened; they are burdened with matters the system should have learned to resolve differently.

That is why Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) must be treated as more than a slogan. Mediation, arbitration, conciliation and negotiated settlement are established tools for delivering faster, more practical outcomes, often with less cost and less damage to relationships than prolonged litigation. Pakistan, too, has begun to take ADR seriously.

But from the standpoint of legal practice, the harder truth is this: ADR in Pakistan is often discussed at the top far more confidently than it is understood on the ground.

In principle, reform is moving. In practice, implementation remains uneven, shallow and, in some places, almost performative.

In larger cities, there is some awareness of arbitration, mediation and settlement-oriented dispute resolution. But beyond the major urban centres, the picture becomes less reassuring. In many district-level settings, ADR is still not always appreciated in its proper legal and commercial sense. Arbitration clauses are inserted into agreements without much thought. Mediation is treated as a procedural ritual.

A system cannot implement what it does not understand. That is precisely where one of Pakistan's most serious ADR weaknesses lies. We do not face a shortage of laws but a shortage of specialised understanding. Pakistan already has a patchwork of legal provisions relating to arbitration, mediation and pre-trial settlement, yet the problem remains one of weak implementation, institutional fragmentation and cultural reluctance. The issue is not whether ADR exists in the rulebook but whether it exists meaningfully in practice.

Even where parties are referred to arbitration or mediation, the process does not always inspire confidence. Too often, appointed arbitrators or mediators do not appear to have the training, discipline or procedural command needed to conduct it effectively. Mediation can become little more than informal persuasion without structure, technique or neutrality. Arbitration, meanwhile, can drift into the worst possible position: neither efficient enough to justify avoiding court, nor disciplined enough to command confidence as a serious adjudicatory process.

When that happens, ADR does not solve delay. It merely relocates it.

Cost presents another uncomfortable reality. Arbitration is often praised as a quicker and more efficient alternative to litigation. But in practice, arbitral costs can become so high that the process rivals and, at times, exceeds the expense of court litigation. Professional fees and procedural inefficiencies can turn what should have been a practical alternative into an elite mechanism accessible only to those who can afford private justice.

That is why Pakistan needs a more serious second phase of ADR reform.

The first requirement is professionalisation. Training for arbitrators and mediators cannot remain a superficial exercise aimed only at accreditation or certification. It must be rigorous, practical and continuing. Those entrusted with these roles should understand not only theory, but also case management, ethics, neutrality, commercial realities, settlement technique and enforceability. Without that depth, accreditation becomes decoration.

The second requirement is institutional specialisation. If ADR is to be taken seriously, there is a strong case for dedicated judicial forums, or at least specialised benches or designated courts, to oversee arbitration-related and mediation-related matters across the country. Pakistan cannot expect coherent outcomes in complex commercial ADR disputes if these issues continue to be handled in a fragmented and inconsistent way.

The third requirement is procedural incentive. In England, the civil procedure regime has steadily moved toward requiring parties to engage seriously with settlement and ADR. Courts may take an unreasonable refusal to consider ADR into account when dealing with costs, and recent case law has confirmed that courts can, in appropriate cases, order parties to engage in ADR-focused processes. Pakistan does not need to copy another jurisdiction mechanically, but it should draw the lesson. If parties can frustrate settlement efforts with no meaningful procedural consequence, ADR will remain optional in the weakest sense of the word.

Our procedural framework should therefore do more than simply permit ADR in abstract terms. It should encourage genuine pre-trial engagement and allow courts, where appropriate, to reflect unreasonable refusal to explore settlement in costs or case-management consequences. That would not weaken adjudication. It would strengthen rational dispute resolution.

None of this means that courts matter less. They remain the guardians of constitutional rights and the final arbiters of serious disputes. But that is precisely why they must be protected from avoidable overload. Courts should spend more time on matters that require judicial determination, not every dispute that might have been resolved earlier and more sensibly elsewhere.

Ultimately, the challenge is cultural as much as legal. In Pakistan, litigation is still often seen as a contest to be fought to the bitter end. ADR demands a different instinct: not every dispute must be won through attrition, and settlement is not surrender. In family matters, that mindset can preserve dignity. In commercial matters, it can preserve business relationships. In public law and regulatory settings, it can save time, money and institutional energy.

From where I stand as a practitioner, the promise of ADR in Pakistan is real. But so are its present weaknesses. Reform will mean little if it remains concentrated in policy papers, judicial speeches and urban legal circles. It must reach the district courts, the smaller bars, the commercial litigants, the arbitrators, the mediators and the litigants who deal with institutional weakness not in theory, but in everyday life.

Pakistan does not need more ceremonial commitment to ADR. It needs competence, credibility and consequences. Until reform reaches the ground, ADR will remain what it too often is today: a sound idea, unevenly understood, and too often poorly delivered.