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The five per cent serpent
Conflicts end because of either a negative or positive incentive for both sides to end it. Taliban have no incentive.
The writer was a Ford Scholar at the Programme in Arms Control, Disarmament and International Security at UIUC (1997) and a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Foreign Policy Studies Programme
US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has come and gone. While here, during multiple meetings, she told us that the United States and Pakistan are now in agreement on 90 to 95 per cent of the agenda on Afghanistan. Should we raise a glass to this?
No. One, between 90 and 95 per cent there is five per cent and one doesn’t need to be a statistician to know that that can be a big difference; two, whether five or 10 per cent, the devil resides precisely in that differential, not in areas of ‘convergence’.
So, what are we looking at?
Cutting through the niceties of diplomatese, the US agenda boils down to the following salient points (I rely for my reading on transcripts of Mrs Clinton’s public meetings as provided by the US Department of State):
• We are amenable to talking but talking doesn’t mean we will not fight; we will, wherever and whenever necessary.
• At this stage there is no guarantee that talking will “result in anything that will move us toward a peaceful resolution [of the conflict]”.
• We are talking about “a potential negotiation, not negotiation”.
• Any group wanting to negotiate should (1) renounce violence; (2) break away from al Qaeda and (3) must accept the current constitution of Afghanistan which, among other things, seeks to protect women and minorities.
Corollary: the onus for negotiating lies on the other side and while there may be no overt preconditions, they are already implied in two ways — renunciation by the Taliban of violence and acceptance of the current Afghan power configuration. Taliban can share power but they will be one of many groups vying for power in Afghanistan, not a dominant group.
In all this, one crucial piece of information that is missing is the US role post-2014. Are we looking at total withdrawal by the US or some kind of strategic partnership between Kabul (as currently configured) and Washington which results, among other areas of cooperation, in a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)?
This is a crucial question because even if we agree that the Taliban could be brought to the negotiating table and forced to drop the earlier demand that the only negotiating point is immediate and total withdrawal of US forces, how well would any such process, potential or real, fare if the US entered into a SOFA with Kabul?
Given the situation on the ground, it would be safe to say that the Taliban would not accept any US military presence in Afghanistan post-2014, or whatever time it takes for any negotiations to reach fruition.
But perhaps we are jumping ahead of the curve.
Let’s go back to what is on the table: potential negotiations. The US is demanding that in the run-up (perhaps beyond) to negotiations, while it retains the right to use force, it will not allow that luxury to the Taliban. Put another way, while the US will jaw-jaw and war-war, the Taliban must only jaw-jaw by renouncing violence. Why would they?
The history of such conflicts shows that it takes roughly a decade for warring sides to start negotiating. But in the absence of a formal declaration of ceasefire, both or all sides will talk and fight simultaneously. In fact, this is what I would define as the period between potential and preliminary negotiations and the time when adversaries reach the point where they have a positive incentive to advance the process.
Conflicts end because there is either a negative or a positive incentive for fighting sides to end it. The first relates to fatigue or an understanding that further fighting will not add value to anything, the second to the fact that peace proffers better chances to advance respective interests than continuing conflict. On the ground the two types of incentives generally come in a sequence.
Since the US is the superior force in Afghanistan, the onus for making negotiations meaningful is on Washington, not the Taliban. It is important that a ceasefire be declared, but Washington is still divided on which option to exercise. The White House and the State Department lean more towards talking; the Pentagon and the CIA towards fighting. The compromise: talking and fighting, the Petraeus formula in Iraq. Secretary Clinton mentioned it, though she added the qualifier that Afghanistan is not Iraq.
She also let slip the fact that she is one of the voices in the system, not the sole voice. When she goes before the US Congress, she will be making a sales pitch, not issuing an executive order. This then means that the US wants Pakistan to (a) facilitate the talks with the Taliban, including the Haqqani network and (b) ensure that the Taliban, especially the Haqqanis, do not mount the kind of audacious attacks they have on Isaf troops in the past three months. The not-so-hidden threat here is that if the Taliban-Haqqani Network do not desist from operations against US-Nato troops, Pakistan must ‘act’ to prevent that and if it can’t, Islamabad will be held accountable, if not overtly responsible.
The trouble with this formulation is that the Taliban, presently, have no incentive to negotiate and sans any incentive to negotiate they have no reason to lay down arms. The ‘act’ part has been nuanced, as Clinton’s statements show, but even when it is no more about a crude, ‘you-go-into-North Waziristan’ refrain, the bottom line stays the same: they should not hurt us and if they do, you are not doing your part.
Clearly, the US wants to keep information on the strategic hidden while wanting to get the benefits of the operational. That is unlikely to happen. Pakistan does not have the means to ensure that, and relations could become rocky again if there are spectacular attacks on US military and other assets in Afghanistan.
What is ironic is that the US wants to tag relations with Pakistan as strategic but insists on the operational. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, the nature of US-Pakistan relations remain transactional. What good is the 95 per cent if it’s building up to that very five per cent that the two sides haven’t agreed on for so many years? There is also no indication that the US appreciates Pakistan’s interests and concerns as this game cycle moves to the next. The five to 10 per cent differential thus is the serpent in Eden. What’s interesting is that we haven’t even talked about other variables so far!
Published in The Express Tribune, October 26th, 2011.
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Reader Comments (23)
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Russia took ten years to reallized the ground fact america gonna five more years to realize
same thing before that hope is dope.
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“There is also no indication that the US appreciates Pakistan’s interests and concerns as this game cycle moves to the next”
And Pakistan’s interests and concerns are?
If nothing transpires by Nov of 2012 US elections, overt military actions on Waziristan is likely and PAK has to content with it. Unlike Iraq, US will have seizable troop presence in Afghanistan post 2014.
Clintons position and Malik position are the same on Taliban- they have to lay down the arms. Only in Haqqani they differ.
As far as the US is concerned, if Taliban and Haqqani are boxed in Waziristan, it can move forward in Afghanistan for now. But PAK is apprehensive that these gangs will move eastward instead and PAK will loose its say in Afghanistan.
PAK will likely loose in this equation and will pay a heavy price for Afghanistan, not from US but from Taliban.
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Guess Umrika can’t figure why if Pakistan wants the strategic, Pakistan is condoning interference with the operational via attacks on US troops from Pakistani sanctuaries. There is no incentive for Umrika to negotiate in that position.
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Depth sir, strategic depth.
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Ejaz Sb you are giving too much credit by overanalyzing these simpletons. Expect them to shoot themselves in the foot, just like they did in Iraq, where they tried to shove troops immunity down Iraqi throats, only for them to be shown the door. Just hang in there and watch, in another 3-6months they will be negotiating for whatever bread crumbs they can get. You are right about the WH being the more negotiating power though, except they have been constantly undermined by the own military. Patreaus is Obama’s poisoned chalice and not the brilliant strategist that many mistake him to be.
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Conflicts don’t end because of negative or positive incentives but sadly because one side accepts defeat and renounces its political objectives and the victor imposes its will. For the US this means killing enough Taliban so that they accept defeat but this also means killing civilians. For the Taliban this means to kill enough US and NATO troops so that the domestic pressure against the war forces them to disengage from the region.
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@Babloo
You should add…..”Dig deeper for more depth, till we reach the nadir.”
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“while the US will jaw-jaw and war-war, the Taliban must only jaw-jaw by renouncing violence” –Mr. Haider, you are overemphasizing this fact and it is also being misinterpreted. The US will jaw-jaw if the Taliban Jaw-Jaws. And they will war-war if the adversary does the same.
Simple as that. If you attack us, we will attack you. If you are willing to talk, so are we. Recommend
@johnb
neither the usa nor pakistan are in a position to dictate to taliban to negotiate unless there is something meaningful for them on the table to negotiate about. but i don’t expect u to wake up and smell the coffee. attack waziristan by all means – now or in 2012 or any other time thereafter – if u will. clearly u seem convinced that the law of “actions having consequences” applies to pakistan alone or, at the very least, usa is exempt from it, so there is little point in suggesting anything remotely sane to people with your kind of thinking.
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Well written Ejaz sb,
The only way out of this mess is for the US to withdraw from the region, till the time they are present things will only get worse, we deride our military for deciding foreign policy unfortunately the same practice is alive and kicking in the US as well, Obama’s Generals have got him stuck in this quagmire and are now continuing with their hawkish rhetoric to further complicate the issue. One just needs to read Stanley McChrystal’s views on the Afghan war to understand the folly of this invasion and mindless 10 year old war without objectives.Recommend
Strategic is a nice term to use for describing any alliance. Pakistan has never acted on any Foreign policy measure without adequate monetary incentive. Therefore there is a valid question of trade off. Whether the Taliban and Haqqani network are of greater importance to the Establishment or American aid and support, must really be decided by the people as represented by Parliament. The very idea that the misogynist, medieval, anti minority and violent Taliban are being backed by Pakistan for a role in power is repugnant to all non Muslims and the International community. If the Taliban comes to power in Kabul, Pakistan’s goose will be cooked. A strategic blunder of colossal proportions, like cutting ones nose to spite ones face..
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@Ali Tanoli
Russia took ten years to reallized the ground fact america gonna five more years to realize
So it took Russia 10 years and it will take USA 10+5= 15 years to realise the futility of ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan. For Pakistan it has been 30 years and counting.
Now draw an intelligence scale with the most intelligent taking the least time.
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Talking as if the Taliban are some “reasonable” oppositional force is downright laughable. The only language they understand is one of power, strength, violence and advantage.
Treating them like some defeated professional military force who will negotiate and surrender is ludicrous and any honest person knows this. The only solution is to beat them into submission and then keep your foot on their neck for good measure.
Afghan tribals are notoriously treacherous and add the extremist, fascist religious element to the mix and we all know that as soon as they smell any slight opportunity to gain the upper hand, no previous agreement, surrender or “negotiated settlement” will have any relevance.
So, stop treating them as a “respectable” enemy force. They are not. They have a clear agenda that has no room for compromise, which is really hard for “reasonable” Western minds to appreciate and understand.
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Even before the other side agrees to negotiate,; the three preconditions *(1) renounce violence; (2) break away from al Qaeda and (3) must accept the current constitution of Afghanistan . are a non starter.
Firstly, Violence renunciation is a catch 22 scenario in Afghanistan. The Taliban refuse to stop violence as long as Foreign Troops are in Afghanistan. so it has to be Fight and Talk simultaneously strategy on both sides
Secondly, breakaway from al Qaeda,has no real meaning after OBL’s episode of 2 May 2011. No body has identified Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. The remnants may be on Pakistan’s frontier regions.
Thirdly, The agreement to accept current constitution is the most tricky thing. Peace or relative Peace in Afghanistan is only possible when there is a weak Central government in Kabul and the peripheral forces/ tribal/ ethnic groups have greater power and autonomy. The central Government shud not even interfere in the intra/inter- tribal/ethenic strife till the time the warring factions tire themselves and ask the Central government to broker a peace deal. The present constitution is for a strong central Government in Kabul through a power sharing formula. That has never succeeded in Afghanistan. we know the fate of such accords signed in front of Kaaba in the past.
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Whereas, the US withdrawal is the first step to stabilize Afghanistan, a complete and immediate exit policy would replay the classic hostility within among ethnic and militant forces of Afghanistan. The burden of failure in Afghanistan will formally be placed on Pakistan. Strategic, strategy, depth or width of any nature can never redress the system of trust of Afghan people in the intentions of foreign forces. Reconstruction efforts and policies just remain outside the reach of a real progress. Without a shadow of doubt, the application of “American Generals’” Iraq OR Libyan methodology is just not the logical response to 10 years old war in Afghanistan, that is why military objectives have been achieved. The Taliban forces with which no compromise was proposed, is now being discussed. The fuzzy and incomplete picture of US AfPak policy in fact has destroyed the remaining traditional ways of resolution of socio-political problems in Afghanistan. We must not exaggerate strategic and operational, these are terminologies and cannot be addressed in isolation. Sharing of intelligence for example is both strategic and operation and so on. Pakistan should remain focus on both and pre-and-post US factors. The 9/11, the Osama Bin Laden, the Raymond syndrome, all are chained together into both strategic and operational features of US-Pak framework of relationship.
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@pakpinoy:
I agree with your logical analysis. Americans would find it extremely difficult to negotiate with these die hard tribals who may not like to share power with NA. However, if they did agree, would betray them at the first opportunity and civil war would continue in Afghanistan.
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ok. i read the article. its good. now tell me, what will become of those thousand who were killed mercilessly and those who lost their families, their home and everything … did they die in vain? what is the outcome of their sacrifices? will they continue to sacrifice while people like you and us continue to sit in the comfort of our homes and comment on articles like these and take pride in it … while numerous other die on account of amreeka’s drone attacks?
can anybody answer that?
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@EH
Any group wanting to negotiate should (1) renounce violence; (2) break away from al Qaeda and (3) must accept the current constitution of Afghanistan which, among other things, seeks to protect women and minorities.
So far so good. The devil starts bobbing up when you start interpreting the implications.
A. acceptance of the current Afghan power configuration.
I understand the ‘constitution’ provides for power through elections and the Taliban/Pushtun are absent from the power structure on account of having shunned the elections. That being the case your insistence that it means ‘acceptance of current Afghan power configuration’ is not readily understandable. I hope the objection is not to treating ‘minorities and women’ as human beings.
B. Taliban can share power but they will be one of many groups vying for power in Afghanistan, not a dominant group
Given the fact that ethnic groups like Hazras and Tajiks are nor very keen on being represented by the Taliban, the Taliban can at best represent the Pushtun who comprise 40% of the population. Further, we are repeatedly educated by you that the Taliban are not a ‘monolith’. Now, obviously this means that the various factions of the non-monolithic Taliban (Haqqanis and Quetta come immediately to mind) represent only a fraction of the Afghan population, therefore, the question of treating them as ‘a dominant group’ does not arise. Again the objection is not very clear.
C. it would be safe to say that the Taliban would not accept any US military presence in Afghanistan post-2014, or whatever time it takes for any negotiations to reach fruition.
It is equally clear that 60% of the (non Pushtun) Afghan population is not going to stand for Taliban domination. So the writing on the wall seems to suggest a division of Afghanistan along Taliban/non-Taliban lines, unless the Taliban climb down from their position.Recommend
@ Usmani,
What are u talking about all these burgers nothing have to say sitting front of 50 inches plasma T,V enjoying hot cocoa in the cold nights
of winter… come on man what they know just blaming pakistan
for every thing all this mess and we know why we have to engaged with mess because
we dont want any balony pukhtunistan by our door step.Recommend
America will leave Afghanistan only then when it’s economy deteriorates further down the line.No supper power will voluntarily surrender it’s strategic advantage.Presently they are sitting on the top of Himalaya,having everybody’s throat in it’s hands.
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negotiating with Taleban/Haqanni is no different than negotiating with TTP. So whats the point ? Its a futile exercise.
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If you study the Geography of the region – we know that US ISAF forces need to move goods from Karachi to Kabul (and elsewhere) so Pakistan is needed & will extract a price.
US wants to leave but leave in place something that will be sustainable. That government with the smallest possible role for Taliban (including Haqqani group) will also need Pakistan to sustain itself. America knows that if Pakistan continues to support “it’s own race horse” (saying friendly relations which is the new mouthing of strategic depth) – the government left behind in Kabul will be wobbly & America will twitch in nervousness.
America is aware of the huge logistical efforts it needs to equip it’s troops in Afghanistan – it is therefore not buying the story that the Taliban being sons of the soil have the upper hand – yes they are sons of the soil but even sons of soil need help to get ammunition which must come from somewhere that somewhere America knows is Pakistan. It is precisely this geographic advantage that Pakistan has that is now behind the tensions Pak wants to exploit it US wants to minimize it therefore the negotiations.
At the end of the day the preferred outcome for both countries will be monetary compensations.
If Pakistan can not stop the H group from attacks like the one on US embassy I am afraid there will be too much pressure on Obama (a year remains for elections in US) to not act.Recommend
basically the author wants Americans to negotiate with Pakistani deep state.
if Americans had some brains and really good intentions they would have known the only good taliban is dead taliban.
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