Can coercive diplomacy work?
Current escalation on LoC is futile if India wants to be a player of significance in Asia and pursue its global agenda
The writer is an independent political and defence analyst. He is also the author of several books, monographs and articles on Pakistan and South Asian affairs
The relations between India and Pakistan are currently at their lowest point. Even in the worst periods in the past, the situation did not deteriorate to such a level that the two countries exchanged fire at the Line of Control (LoC) every other day. The Pakistan Rangers-Indian Border Security Force (BSF) meeting in New Delhi ended on a positive note on September 12, engendering the hope that there will now be peace and stability at the LoC. This hope did not materialise. It was all quiet at the LoC while the Pakistan Rangers and the BSF were holding meetings. The violent action resumed after the return of the Pakistani delegation. This means the firing is not an accidental development, but part of a carefully crafted policy. There is hardly any incentive for the Pakistan Rangers and the military to initiate firing on the LoC or the Working Boundary. Pakistan’s security forces are fully engaged in counterterrorism operations in North Waziristan and other tribal areas, which is their highest priority. The Rangers are busy undertaking a counterterrorism operation in Karachi and they have to deal with terrorist incidents in other parts of Pakistan from time to time, the latest being the terrorist attack on the Badhaber Air Base in Peshawar. The security of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border is another priority. There is hardly any reason for the Pakistan Army to open a new front at the LoC.
Keeping in mind India’s global aspirations, including the desire to get a permanent seat in the expanded UN Security Council, it makes no sense for India to escalate conflict with Pakistan. A good number of people in that country recognise that the current escalation of tension at the LoC is an exercise in futility if India wants to be a player of significance in Asia and pursue its global agenda. Peaceful relations with Pakistan can facilitate India’s global diplomacy. However, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his foreign policy and national security team have developed an erroneous notion of putting Pakistan under military pressure, while keeping this issue out of sight of the international community. This may provide the Modi government some immediate gains in the domestic context by strengthening its support in the political far-right circles and among Hindu hard line and extremists groups that traditionally have a strong anti-Pakistan disposition.
Since the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008, India’s defence establishment has been exploring ways to bring Pakistan under military pressure without provoking an all-out war due mainly to the nuclear factor. They explored different options such as a limited war, surgical air strike or ground operation on the alleged camps of militant groups in Pakistani Kashmir, the resort to what was described as the ‘Cold Start’ and financial support to terrorists and other dissident groups in Pakistan. None of these ideas were put to practice because of the fear of escalation. However, from January 2013, India began to resort to frequent firing across the LoC, which was responded to sharply by Pakistan.
It was after the assumption of power by Modi in May 2014 that the plan to keep Pakistan under military pressure was put into action in a persistent manner and India adopted a tougher stance on India-Pakistan problems. Though the dialogue between the two countries got suspended during the days of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, it was the Modi government that refused to revive the composite dialogue and demanded that Pakistan first satisfy India on terrorism related issues. India, thus, reduced its relations with Pakistan to one based on a single issue. It also placed the condition that Pakistani officials visiting India could not meet Hurriyat leaders. Furthermore, India returned to its classical position on Kashmir, declaring that no talks were possible on Kashmir as it was an integral part of India. Pakistan, too, has returned to its traditional stand on Kashmir, that the future of the state be determined by a plebiscite on the basis of the 1948-49 UN resolutions. There is a consensus in Pakistan on the part of the civilian and military authorities and political circles that there is little chance of improvement of bilateral relations as long as Modi is in power. It is also widely believed that if Pakistan did not have nuclear weapons, the Modi government would have gone for a major military action. Pakistan plans to counter India’s military pressure by embarking on tough diplomacy by raising the major India-Pakistan conflicts at various international forums and in its bilateral interaction with the states that maintain close relations with India. The issues include the Kashmir dispute, India’s coercive diplomacy that adversely affects Pakistan’s effort to control terrorism and stabilise the situation in Afghanistan, and India’s funding to some Pakistani Taliban factions and other terrorists groups, and financial support to dissident groups in Balochistan.
India is expected to reject these charges and frame counter-charges against Pakistan. This means that bilateral disputes will figure prominently at the international level on a regular basis. Pakistan and India need to revisit the 2004-07 composite dialogue between the two countries, with the objective of reviving it on all contentious issues. Pakistan’s then foreign minister, Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, in his recent book Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove provides step-by-step details of the India-Pakistan dialogue process and its difficulties. His discussion of Pakistan’s interaction with India for evolving a framework for a workable resolution of the Kashmir dispute can help the two countries break the current stalemate in their relations.
India needs to take the initiative in starting the dialogue process on a mutually-agreed agenda. Otherwise, both countries will soon be engaged in a diplomatic war of words against each other at the global level. This will hurt India’s interest more than that of Pakistan. By pursuing this strident approach, India also strengthens Pakistan’s hardline Islamic groups. Such an approach is counter-productive to India’s policy of controlling terrorism. A meaningful and sustained dialogue between the two countries offers a better hope for peace as opposed to India’s current policy of coercive diplomacy.
Published in The Express Tribune, September 21st, 2015.
Keeping in mind India’s global aspirations, including the desire to get a permanent seat in the expanded UN Security Council, it makes no sense for India to escalate conflict with Pakistan. A good number of people in that country recognise that the current escalation of tension at the LoC is an exercise in futility if India wants to be a player of significance in Asia and pursue its global agenda. Peaceful relations with Pakistan can facilitate India’s global diplomacy. However, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and his foreign policy and national security team have developed an erroneous notion of putting Pakistan under military pressure, while keeping this issue out of sight of the international community. This may provide the Modi government some immediate gains in the domestic context by strengthening its support in the political far-right circles and among Hindu hard line and extremists groups that traditionally have a strong anti-Pakistan disposition.
Since the terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008, India’s defence establishment has been exploring ways to bring Pakistan under military pressure without provoking an all-out war due mainly to the nuclear factor. They explored different options such as a limited war, surgical air strike or ground operation on the alleged camps of militant groups in Pakistani Kashmir, the resort to what was described as the ‘Cold Start’ and financial support to terrorists and other dissident groups in Pakistan. None of these ideas were put to practice because of the fear of escalation. However, from January 2013, India began to resort to frequent firing across the LoC, which was responded to sharply by Pakistan.
It was after the assumption of power by Modi in May 2014 that the plan to keep Pakistan under military pressure was put into action in a persistent manner and India adopted a tougher stance on India-Pakistan problems. Though the dialogue between the two countries got suspended during the days of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, it was the Modi government that refused to revive the composite dialogue and demanded that Pakistan first satisfy India on terrorism related issues. India, thus, reduced its relations with Pakistan to one based on a single issue. It also placed the condition that Pakistani officials visiting India could not meet Hurriyat leaders. Furthermore, India returned to its classical position on Kashmir, declaring that no talks were possible on Kashmir as it was an integral part of India. Pakistan, too, has returned to its traditional stand on Kashmir, that the future of the state be determined by a plebiscite on the basis of the 1948-49 UN resolutions. There is a consensus in Pakistan on the part of the civilian and military authorities and political circles that there is little chance of improvement of bilateral relations as long as Modi is in power. It is also widely believed that if Pakistan did not have nuclear weapons, the Modi government would have gone for a major military action. Pakistan plans to counter India’s military pressure by embarking on tough diplomacy by raising the major India-Pakistan conflicts at various international forums and in its bilateral interaction with the states that maintain close relations with India. The issues include the Kashmir dispute, India’s coercive diplomacy that adversely affects Pakistan’s effort to control terrorism and stabilise the situation in Afghanistan, and India’s funding to some Pakistani Taliban factions and other terrorists groups, and financial support to dissident groups in Balochistan.
India is expected to reject these charges and frame counter-charges against Pakistan. This means that bilateral disputes will figure prominently at the international level on a regular basis. Pakistan and India need to revisit the 2004-07 composite dialogue between the two countries, with the objective of reviving it on all contentious issues. Pakistan’s then foreign minister, Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, in his recent book Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove provides step-by-step details of the India-Pakistan dialogue process and its difficulties. His discussion of Pakistan’s interaction with India for evolving a framework for a workable resolution of the Kashmir dispute can help the two countries break the current stalemate in their relations.
India needs to take the initiative in starting the dialogue process on a mutually-agreed agenda. Otherwise, both countries will soon be engaged in a diplomatic war of words against each other at the global level. This will hurt India’s interest more than that of Pakistan. By pursuing this strident approach, India also strengthens Pakistan’s hardline Islamic groups. Such an approach is counter-productive to India’s policy of controlling terrorism. A meaningful and sustained dialogue between the two countries offers a better hope for peace as opposed to India’s current policy of coercive diplomacy.
Published in The Express Tribune, September 21st, 2015.