Intelligence-led policing
Without an effective invisible intelligence arm, police may be reduced to status of a mere spectator of eventualities
The writer is a senior police officer posted to Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa
In the backdrop of 9/11, international police leadership recognised the efficacy of intelligence-led policing. Countries being policed without credible intelligence are facing the major brunt of terrorism. Without credible intelligence, policing recedes to a ceremonial status and leads to wastage of resources. The price for the continued romance with a colonial, bureaucratic, autocratic, stagnant and inhuman policing model is being paid by the victims of terrorism and crime. Those who are involved in this romance derive the maximum benefits.
The idea of the Special Branch (SB) was coined in 1883 in the UK. Its prime mandate was to collect intelligence of political nature. The Pakistani police inherited the SB from its British masters. The very name indicates the special nature of functions entrusted to this vital component of police: functions which are essential to police work and require special aptitude to be performed. The SB of the Metropolitan Police has always been given high recognition and extra space to manoeuvre. The running of informer networks and undercover agents along with surveillance of suspected activities is at the heart of the SB’s functions. Organisations like the IRA have been the special focus of the SB.
In Pakistan, back in 1974, the G Ahmad Committee (the cabinet committee on intelligence) submitted its report, whose mandate was to study the intelligence set-up in Pakistan and propose the distribution of roles and functions among different intelligence agencies. The three premier intelligence agencies at the time were the IB, the ISI and the provincial special branches. The committee’s submitted findings to the cabinet, which were approved and sent to the president, gave official sanctity to the charter of these agencies.
Our fabric of the SB is primarily devoted to either political intelligence collection or law and order. Whether it was the wave of extremism in Malakand in 2008 or the Lal Masjid crisis, the coordination between the SBs and law enforcement agencies was found to be the weakest link. In many countries, SBs are playing an effective role. In Bangladesh, the SB is the key intelligence agency consisting of 12 different sections and has presence in 64 districts. The head of the SB of Bangladesh directly reports to the prime minister. In Fiji, the SB deals with matters related to national security. In 2009, it was renamed as the Fiji Police Intelligence Bureau. In 1985, the Australian SB was renamed the Special Intelligence Branch and was merged into the Security Intelligence and Diplomatic Liaison Branch in 1995. The Indian SB deals with issues of state security. The presence of detective constables at the police station level forms the backbone of the Indian SB.
In the present situation, counterterrorism is not the lone responsibility of state institutions. It is a collective responsibility, hence the situation warrants volunteerism on part of citizens. It warrants that SBs cultivate intelligence from the communities. The neglect of decades has badly hampered the sniffing capabilities of SBs; consequently, the police’s dependence on civil and military intelligence agencies has increased. There is no instant apparatus where quick interaction may convert a threat alert into an action-oriented reality. Long, bureaucratic chains of commands within the law enforcement apparatus erect barriers in intelligence-sharing and in the free flow of communication. Reduced bureaucratic formalities between intelligence agencies, the administration and the police will yield positive dividends.
The SBs in provinces and district intelligence branches need instant revamping. However, making this a reality requires dedicated professionals and the availability of latest gadgets. In the past, SB personnel were better connected to society. Presently, SBs primarily include those who do not want to be part of the operations wing of the police and hence use SBs as shelters. Owing to temptations and visibility of the operations wing, SBs often get unwilling talent.
During the last three decades, military intelligence agencies have improved the quality of their personnel and gadgets; resultantly, the quality of intelligence has improved. This has also resulted in the dependence of the police on military intelligence agencies to increase manifold. Military intelligence agencies have a wider scope, including the prime mandate to keep an eye out for anti-state elements. Owing to the well-entrenched presence of the police within communities, SB operators actually have ample opportunities to collect credible information, something which is missing.
In the scenario we are facing, the enemy is invisible and hence, the mere enhancement of police capabilities will not solve matters. Invisible enemies can be traced better by invisible operators of SBs.
SBs were once considered the eyes and ears of provincial governments. Heads of SBs directly interacted with provincial chief executives. This helped chief ministers to make appropriate decisions. In the recent past, there have been instances where SBs have not provided specific intelligence to the authorities, consequently reducing their status to that of being mere reporting agencies.
While SB personnel are supposed to operate under cover, due to lack of training and the urge for acknowledgment and recognition in society, the majority of them do not care about concealing their identities. Consequently, during the last few years in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Karachi, a number of SB officials have been targeted.
It often seems that political considerations are the top priorities for SBs. The situation warrants that there is a more detailed mandate of SBs, with educational institutions, madrassas, NGOs, public places, government departments and key installations being strictly monitored. Without an effective invisible intelligence arm, the police may be reduced to the status of a mere spectator of eventualities.
The rudimentary analytical abilities of SBs have badly affected their effectiveness. Since they are primarily reliant on police officials and traditional practices, there is a lack of analytical approach and technical capabilities. The authorities should realise that there is difference between compilation and analysis, hence, professionals carrying relevant experience need to be inducted.
Unfortunately, a great majority of the senior police leadership has failed to appreciate the true spirit and purpose of SBs and is ignorant about how they should work. Information in the intelligence world is a commodity with a price tag. This requires liberal disbursement of secret funds. The SBs in Pakistan have largely given up their core areas of human intelligence collection and resultantly are presenting an incomplete picture to the decision-makers. The need of the hour is to go back to the basics and re-learn the art of operational intelligence work.
Published in The Express Tribune, May 8th, 2015.
The idea of the Special Branch (SB) was coined in 1883 in the UK. Its prime mandate was to collect intelligence of political nature. The Pakistani police inherited the SB from its British masters. The very name indicates the special nature of functions entrusted to this vital component of police: functions which are essential to police work and require special aptitude to be performed. The SB of the Metropolitan Police has always been given high recognition and extra space to manoeuvre. The running of informer networks and undercover agents along with surveillance of suspected activities is at the heart of the SB’s functions. Organisations like the IRA have been the special focus of the SB.
In Pakistan, back in 1974, the G Ahmad Committee (the cabinet committee on intelligence) submitted its report, whose mandate was to study the intelligence set-up in Pakistan and propose the distribution of roles and functions among different intelligence agencies. The three premier intelligence agencies at the time were the IB, the ISI and the provincial special branches. The committee’s submitted findings to the cabinet, which were approved and sent to the president, gave official sanctity to the charter of these agencies.
Our fabric of the SB is primarily devoted to either political intelligence collection or law and order. Whether it was the wave of extremism in Malakand in 2008 or the Lal Masjid crisis, the coordination between the SBs and law enforcement agencies was found to be the weakest link. In many countries, SBs are playing an effective role. In Bangladesh, the SB is the key intelligence agency consisting of 12 different sections and has presence in 64 districts. The head of the SB of Bangladesh directly reports to the prime minister. In Fiji, the SB deals with matters related to national security. In 2009, it was renamed as the Fiji Police Intelligence Bureau. In 1985, the Australian SB was renamed the Special Intelligence Branch and was merged into the Security Intelligence and Diplomatic Liaison Branch in 1995. The Indian SB deals with issues of state security. The presence of detective constables at the police station level forms the backbone of the Indian SB.
In the present situation, counterterrorism is not the lone responsibility of state institutions. It is a collective responsibility, hence the situation warrants volunteerism on part of citizens. It warrants that SBs cultivate intelligence from the communities. The neglect of decades has badly hampered the sniffing capabilities of SBs; consequently, the police’s dependence on civil and military intelligence agencies has increased. There is no instant apparatus where quick interaction may convert a threat alert into an action-oriented reality. Long, bureaucratic chains of commands within the law enforcement apparatus erect barriers in intelligence-sharing and in the free flow of communication. Reduced bureaucratic formalities between intelligence agencies, the administration and the police will yield positive dividends.
The SBs in provinces and district intelligence branches need instant revamping. However, making this a reality requires dedicated professionals and the availability of latest gadgets. In the past, SB personnel were better connected to society. Presently, SBs primarily include those who do not want to be part of the operations wing of the police and hence use SBs as shelters. Owing to temptations and visibility of the operations wing, SBs often get unwilling talent.
During the last three decades, military intelligence agencies have improved the quality of their personnel and gadgets; resultantly, the quality of intelligence has improved. This has also resulted in the dependence of the police on military intelligence agencies to increase manifold. Military intelligence agencies have a wider scope, including the prime mandate to keep an eye out for anti-state elements. Owing to the well-entrenched presence of the police within communities, SB operators actually have ample opportunities to collect credible information, something which is missing.
In the scenario we are facing, the enemy is invisible and hence, the mere enhancement of police capabilities will not solve matters. Invisible enemies can be traced better by invisible operators of SBs.
SBs were once considered the eyes and ears of provincial governments. Heads of SBs directly interacted with provincial chief executives. This helped chief ministers to make appropriate decisions. In the recent past, there have been instances where SBs have not provided specific intelligence to the authorities, consequently reducing their status to that of being mere reporting agencies.
While SB personnel are supposed to operate under cover, due to lack of training and the urge for acknowledgment and recognition in society, the majority of them do not care about concealing their identities. Consequently, during the last few years in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Karachi, a number of SB officials have been targeted.
It often seems that political considerations are the top priorities for SBs. The situation warrants that there is a more detailed mandate of SBs, with educational institutions, madrassas, NGOs, public places, government departments and key installations being strictly monitored. Without an effective invisible intelligence arm, the police may be reduced to the status of a mere spectator of eventualities.
The rudimentary analytical abilities of SBs have badly affected their effectiveness. Since they are primarily reliant on police officials and traditional practices, there is a lack of analytical approach and technical capabilities. The authorities should realise that there is difference between compilation and analysis, hence, professionals carrying relevant experience need to be inducted.
Unfortunately, a great majority of the senior police leadership has failed to appreciate the true spirit and purpose of SBs and is ignorant about how they should work. Information in the intelligence world is a commodity with a price tag. This requires liberal disbursement of secret funds. The SBs in Pakistan have largely given up their core areas of human intelligence collection and resultantly are presenting an incomplete picture to the decision-makers. The need of the hour is to go back to the basics and re-learn the art of operational intelligence work.
Published in The Express Tribune, May 8th, 2015.