Decisive action needed against militancy
We now have a decisive army chief and this should provide us with the opportunity to review our policies
The writer is affiliated with Express TV and is an editor at The Friday Times. Currently, he is a senior fellow at the United States Institute of Peace. Views expressed here are his own
With a decisive army chief at the helm of affairs, Pakistan may find the present moment an opportune time to end the policy of viewing the ‘illegal’ as a necessity to advance ideological ends, something which has led us to the mess we are currently in. This is highlighted by what seems to be a season of confessions erupting in the Islamic Republic. First came the candid interview of General (retd) Athar Abbas, former head of the military’s PR wing, on how his boss, the former army chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, resisted a military operation in North Waziristan. According to General Abbas, Kayani was worried about the backlash as well as his personal security. The interview was given to the BBC, and confirmed the assessments made within the country that there was reluctance to tackle the transnational ‘jihad’ zone on Pakistani territory. General (retd) Abbas confessed that the militants gained a stronger foothold in the area and the problem became “bigger”. This was a clear indictment of decision-making, which General (retd) Kayani’s successor has rectified.
Soon after these revelations, former prime minister Yousaf Raza Gilani also criticised the army chief he re-appointed on the same count. But the most hard-hitting critique came from none other than General (retd) Pervez Musharraf, who also confirmed General (retd) Kayani’s indecision. Not content with this, Musharraf also confirmed, what everyone knew anyway, that Pakistan was working against the former Afghan president’s ‘interest’ and the Afghan Taliban were, therefore, patronised by Pakistan to protect its interests. “Pakistan had its own proxies, India had its proxies,” said Musharraf, adding that proxy wars should end. He also confessed that Pakistan’s intelligence apparatus was “in touch” with the Taliban to “counter” the Indian influence in Afghanistan. Once again, this was a U-turn from the official position (ironically since Musharraf’s time) wherein this policy was denied at all levels and consistently. It does leave a huge question mark on the credibility of our former president and army chief to have said something else when he was in power. Others who said this were viewed as working against Pakistan’s interests. But not General (retd) Musharraf and his colleagues, who are the guardians of ‘patriotism’ and our (ideological) frontiers.
As if these confessions were not enough, former ISI chief Lieutenant General (retd) Asad Durrani, speaking to a foreign media outlet, made some startling comments on Pakistan-US relations. He said: “If you have someone like Osama bin Laden, you are not going to simply hand him over to the United States.” He also hinted at arriving at a “quid pro quo” on the Afghan “problem”. Bin Laden, it can be inferred, was therefore a pawn in the game to extract an agreement on Afghanistan. He defended his former institution and announced that the “admission” of “incompetence” was a political gesture that was far safer than saying that Pakistan was yielding to the US, since bin Laden was an “admired figure” in the country.
Such confessions by those who were at the helm are revealing, especially when their parent institution continues to enjoy defacto veto over security policy. In the current dyarchic system of governance, it is the army chief who seems to be in the driving seat. Therefore, such statements are unlikely to have been made without some level of consent of the military. What does this mean?
First, how is policy crafted remains a mystery. Short-term objectives are no alternative for long-term interests of nation-states. The uneasy tolerance for the TTP to operate from North Waziristan evidently led to the killings of Pakistanis in hundreds if not thousands. Who is responsible for that? And who determines accountability? Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s decision to try General (retd) Musharraf almost cost him the office of prime minister despite having a clear majority in parliament. So who can guard the guardians if public representatives cannot? Second, why were Pakistanis and the world misled in the first place? There are countless denials on issues related to the Afghan Taliban as well as bin Laden’s whereabouts by none other than the former president. Public opinion has been skewed to the extent that it takes the death of innocent children for Pakistanis to realise the menace of militancy. Do we acknowledge the impact of our policies on the country? Third, with the TTP enjoying some level of support on Afghan territory, it implies that the strategic calculations have backfired. The game of utilising proxies has been picked up by the other side and has nudged the Pakistani power centres to change their track. Was this avoidable without incurring such huge costs in terms of the Pakistani lives lost?
Fourth, based on changing regional dynamics, there is a policy review in progress within the military. The tactics have changed and the engagement with Afghanistan and the US has been rather productive. Would the much-needed policy shifts — of revising ‘jihad’ as a foreign policy tool and securing regional economic cooperation with Afghanistan — occur? Only time will tell. Fifth, China is now emerging as a regional player and wants to stabilise the region to protect its interests. In particular, the spectre of religious extremism in its Xinjiang province is something that the country wants to deal with. The US has welcomed the Chinese role and for Pakistan this is a boon. Sixth, the TTP are not a specific, discernable entity. They are a network aided by sectarian militias that operate in Punjab and elsewhere. In the absence of a coherent strategy, the National Action Plan (NAP) notwithstanding, how will we get rid of the terror bases even if the ‘Afghan problem’ is resolved? Finally, would the India policy change? The India-centric ‘jihad’ groups, officially denounced and accepted at the same time, are central to this question. Let’s forget what the Indians want. Are we willing to allow the recruitment and operations of militias by private actors? The Pakistan military would have to undertake a deeper review of its long-held policy framework and enable the civilian government to engage with the ‘enemy’.
The next few months will be a test of leadership for both the Sharifs in office. While the NAP implementation is in progress, it would be important to remind the prime minister and the army chief of their constitutional obligations, especially Article 256, which clearly states: “Private armies forbidden — No private organisation capable of functioning as a military organisation shall be formed, and any such organisation shall be illegal.” As stated previously, we now have a decisive army chief and this should provide us with the opportunity to review our policies, which have hurt us so much.
Published in The Express Tribune, March 3rd, 2015.
Soon after these revelations, former prime minister Yousaf Raza Gilani also criticised the army chief he re-appointed on the same count. But the most hard-hitting critique came from none other than General (retd) Pervez Musharraf, who also confirmed General (retd) Kayani’s indecision. Not content with this, Musharraf also confirmed, what everyone knew anyway, that Pakistan was working against the former Afghan president’s ‘interest’ and the Afghan Taliban were, therefore, patronised by Pakistan to protect its interests. “Pakistan had its own proxies, India had its proxies,” said Musharraf, adding that proxy wars should end. He also confessed that Pakistan’s intelligence apparatus was “in touch” with the Taliban to “counter” the Indian influence in Afghanistan. Once again, this was a U-turn from the official position (ironically since Musharraf’s time) wherein this policy was denied at all levels and consistently. It does leave a huge question mark on the credibility of our former president and army chief to have said something else when he was in power. Others who said this were viewed as working against Pakistan’s interests. But not General (retd) Musharraf and his colleagues, who are the guardians of ‘patriotism’ and our (ideological) frontiers.
As if these confessions were not enough, former ISI chief Lieutenant General (retd) Asad Durrani, speaking to a foreign media outlet, made some startling comments on Pakistan-US relations. He said: “If you have someone like Osama bin Laden, you are not going to simply hand him over to the United States.” He also hinted at arriving at a “quid pro quo” on the Afghan “problem”. Bin Laden, it can be inferred, was therefore a pawn in the game to extract an agreement on Afghanistan. He defended his former institution and announced that the “admission” of “incompetence” was a political gesture that was far safer than saying that Pakistan was yielding to the US, since bin Laden was an “admired figure” in the country.
Such confessions by those who were at the helm are revealing, especially when their parent institution continues to enjoy defacto veto over security policy. In the current dyarchic system of governance, it is the army chief who seems to be in the driving seat. Therefore, such statements are unlikely to have been made without some level of consent of the military. What does this mean?
First, how is policy crafted remains a mystery. Short-term objectives are no alternative for long-term interests of nation-states. The uneasy tolerance for the TTP to operate from North Waziristan evidently led to the killings of Pakistanis in hundreds if not thousands. Who is responsible for that? And who determines accountability? Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s decision to try General (retd) Musharraf almost cost him the office of prime minister despite having a clear majority in parliament. So who can guard the guardians if public representatives cannot? Second, why were Pakistanis and the world misled in the first place? There are countless denials on issues related to the Afghan Taliban as well as bin Laden’s whereabouts by none other than the former president. Public opinion has been skewed to the extent that it takes the death of innocent children for Pakistanis to realise the menace of militancy. Do we acknowledge the impact of our policies on the country? Third, with the TTP enjoying some level of support on Afghan territory, it implies that the strategic calculations have backfired. The game of utilising proxies has been picked up by the other side and has nudged the Pakistani power centres to change their track. Was this avoidable without incurring such huge costs in terms of the Pakistani lives lost?
Fourth, based on changing regional dynamics, there is a policy review in progress within the military. The tactics have changed and the engagement with Afghanistan and the US has been rather productive. Would the much-needed policy shifts — of revising ‘jihad’ as a foreign policy tool and securing regional economic cooperation with Afghanistan — occur? Only time will tell. Fifth, China is now emerging as a regional player and wants to stabilise the region to protect its interests. In particular, the spectre of religious extremism in its Xinjiang province is something that the country wants to deal with. The US has welcomed the Chinese role and for Pakistan this is a boon. Sixth, the TTP are not a specific, discernable entity. They are a network aided by sectarian militias that operate in Punjab and elsewhere. In the absence of a coherent strategy, the National Action Plan (NAP) notwithstanding, how will we get rid of the terror bases even if the ‘Afghan problem’ is resolved? Finally, would the India policy change? The India-centric ‘jihad’ groups, officially denounced and accepted at the same time, are central to this question. Let’s forget what the Indians want. Are we willing to allow the recruitment and operations of militias by private actors? The Pakistan military would have to undertake a deeper review of its long-held policy framework and enable the civilian government to engage with the ‘enemy’.
The next few months will be a test of leadership for both the Sharifs in office. While the NAP implementation is in progress, it would be important to remind the prime minister and the army chief of their constitutional obligations, especially Article 256, which clearly states: “Private armies forbidden — No private organisation capable of functioning as a military organisation shall be formed, and any such organisation shall be illegal.” As stated previously, we now have a decisive army chief and this should provide us with the opportunity to review our policies, which have hurt us so much.
Published in The Express Tribune, March 3rd, 2015.