Extending US military powers in Afghanistan
Only in an Afghanistan that is free of foreign forces can a viable, sustainable, inclusive dispensation be founded
Under a presidential order, the US military operating in Afghanistan has now been authorised to engage in combat operations without seeking the involvement of the Afghan security forces. In other words, the US military would confront and attack the resistance, i.e., the Afghan Taliban volunteers whenever and wherever it would consider such an action to be necessary. This decision comes in the wake of a previous presidential decree, which made it obligatory on the US forces to get clearance from their Afghan counterparts before launching an attack against insurgents. That advice was violated by the American military whenever it was felt that no time should be lost in attacking the resistance. But Hamid Karzai, then Afghan president, wanted to earn a degree of respect amongst his countrymen, who regarded him as a protege of the US occupation forces.
Karzai had a genuine grouse against the unrestrained use of force by the foreign forces. Two developments created a situation, which tested the patience of the Afghan population. One was the notorious system of night raids initiated by General McChrystal, then commander of Isaf. The US military would, acting on the basis of an intelligence report, dispatch a small contingent of ground forces to the house of a sympathiser or financier of the local Taliban, knock on his door at midnight and kill him as soon as he would appear. Thousands of such supporters were killed in these raids, including many who were innocent. Two, the Americans recruited local militias, called arbakis in the Afghan parlance, from the villages where the Taliban had roots. These militias or arbakis would pin down a Taliban activist or supporter and would in a brief encounter, kill him. The arbakis proved to be the most effective weapon that was used against the insurgents. But this weapon created panic and terror, and produced countless number of enmities in the villages.
Taking notice of the growing resentment in the population, Karzai belatedly woke up to apply some brakes on the indiscriminate use of disproportionate force by the US military and put in place measures which would go some way in bringing a little sanity to the killing machines let loose on his hapless people. Foreign forces were placed under some restrictions that required them to seek clearance from the Afghan military before launching any operation. Now that restrictions have been lifted, the Afghan government has ‘welcomed’ this decision. This decision reflects a lack of trust in the ability of the Afghan forces to take on the resistance on their own. Furthermore, there is concern about the rate of desertion in the Afghan security forces.
The decision also makes ordinary Afghans more vulnerable to night-time attacks. One direct consequence would be that the resistance will no longer be motivated to begin reconciliation talks with Kabul. Secondly, it will provide fuel for a more deadly insurgency. Thirdly, night raids would damage the credentials of the new government in the context of its authority and independence. Afghans would begin to lose faith in their government’s ability to bring peace.
The important point to note is that if the insurgency could not be defeated with the deployment of 150,000 foreign forces, supported by 80,000 contracted security forces, how could a residual of forces of up to 10,000 (other than contractors’ security forces of 21,000) overcome the resistance? The situation could become critical if the desertion rate from the Afghan Army and police goes up.
The regime change in Kabul will have no impact on the situation in Afghanistan unless goals and strategies are reset by acknowledging objective realities. The goal should be the establishment of a multi-ethnic, broad-based government, which is inclusive in terms of its governance style, content, as well as in terms of the many diverse ethnicities and political factions it represents. The strategy would be to mainstream the resistance in order to create a climate for a truly pluralistic, inclusive arrangement. A consensus will have to be developed on the structures and institutions of the government recognising that the unity of Afghanistan is more important than its decrepit institutions. All this will only be possible if the main stumbling block to unity — the presence of foreign forces — is addressed. Only in an Afghanistan that is free of foreign forces or external interference can a viable, sustainable, pluralistic and inclusive dispensation be founded and nurtured.
Published in The Express Tribune, December 4th, 2014.
Karzai had a genuine grouse against the unrestrained use of force by the foreign forces. Two developments created a situation, which tested the patience of the Afghan population. One was the notorious system of night raids initiated by General McChrystal, then commander of Isaf. The US military would, acting on the basis of an intelligence report, dispatch a small contingent of ground forces to the house of a sympathiser or financier of the local Taliban, knock on his door at midnight and kill him as soon as he would appear. Thousands of such supporters were killed in these raids, including many who were innocent. Two, the Americans recruited local militias, called arbakis in the Afghan parlance, from the villages where the Taliban had roots. These militias or arbakis would pin down a Taliban activist or supporter and would in a brief encounter, kill him. The arbakis proved to be the most effective weapon that was used against the insurgents. But this weapon created panic and terror, and produced countless number of enmities in the villages.
Taking notice of the growing resentment in the population, Karzai belatedly woke up to apply some brakes on the indiscriminate use of disproportionate force by the US military and put in place measures which would go some way in bringing a little sanity to the killing machines let loose on his hapless people. Foreign forces were placed under some restrictions that required them to seek clearance from the Afghan military before launching any operation. Now that restrictions have been lifted, the Afghan government has ‘welcomed’ this decision. This decision reflects a lack of trust in the ability of the Afghan forces to take on the resistance on their own. Furthermore, there is concern about the rate of desertion in the Afghan security forces.
The decision also makes ordinary Afghans more vulnerable to night-time attacks. One direct consequence would be that the resistance will no longer be motivated to begin reconciliation talks with Kabul. Secondly, it will provide fuel for a more deadly insurgency. Thirdly, night raids would damage the credentials of the new government in the context of its authority and independence. Afghans would begin to lose faith in their government’s ability to bring peace.
The important point to note is that if the insurgency could not be defeated with the deployment of 150,000 foreign forces, supported by 80,000 contracted security forces, how could a residual of forces of up to 10,000 (other than contractors’ security forces of 21,000) overcome the resistance? The situation could become critical if the desertion rate from the Afghan Army and police goes up.
The regime change in Kabul will have no impact on the situation in Afghanistan unless goals and strategies are reset by acknowledging objective realities. The goal should be the establishment of a multi-ethnic, broad-based government, which is inclusive in terms of its governance style, content, as well as in terms of the many diverse ethnicities and political factions it represents. The strategy would be to mainstream the resistance in order to create a climate for a truly pluralistic, inclusive arrangement. A consensus will have to be developed on the structures and institutions of the government recognising that the unity of Afghanistan is more important than its decrepit institutions. All this will only be possible if the main stumbling block to unity — the presence of foreign forces — is addressed. Only in an Afghanistan that is free of foreign forces or external interference can a viable, sustainable, pluralistic and inclusive dispensation be founded and nurtured.
Published in The Express Tribune, December 4th, 2014.