Damp squib
Nawaz, Modi were out to make history. Why did it all fall flat? Was it defeatism that once again bridled enterprise?
The writer is a defence analyst who retired as an air vice-marshal in the Pakistan Air Force
What is common between a weak Manmohan Singh –– heading a coalition that seemed to be badly fraying at the seams, in a style of leadership that was diffused at its best, in an administration that reeked with corruption and malpractices begging decisiveness that the prime minister (PM) could not offer, and a personal disposition that had long become irrelevant within his party’s power structure –– and Modi –– fresh with his overwhelming mandate, riding on a cycle of momentous success that got named as a Modi wave, someone who by the dint of his magnificent victory is expected to dominate the right-wing RSS hardline ideological arm of his party and practically rule the BJP (its political wing), someone so driven and focused on success that he is meant to and assumed to take India places, a man of vision ready to chart his own and India’s future like never before? Both are damp squibs.
Let me explain. Last week I wrote a piece for another paper, titled ‘Managing Modi’ that practically subsumed all that I have said above and a lot more on how I expected him to be different from the Modi that we have all feared. I was proven wrong. Though his move of inviting Nawaz Sharif to his inauguration, along with a clutch of other South Asian leaders, was a potent diplomatic initiative, his inability to transform the moment beyond the traditional and moribund was typically Indian and subcontinental.
There was nothing visionary about Modi as he let himself be ridden by the traditional south block mentality of restraining enterprise and initiative in a political leader by shrouding him in suspicion and misgivings, and tying him to a belabouring, non-productive, incremental process of bureaucratic oversight. All he could think of –– in turning the new chapter in India-Pakistan relationship –– was the copy-paste of the stale Indian paradigm of a unifocal insistence on terrorism as the single issue, which has kept both nations from any meaningful engagement other than at the LoC (pun intended).
Consider: someone in the Indian political hierarchy, perhaps Modi himself, thinks of this brilliant plan to invite the ‘smaller’ seven partners in Saarc to his inauguration; a la an emperor’s coronation before his subjects. If all came, which they did, it would be enough to imprint the centrality of India in its immediate neighbourhood –– a prerequisite before venturing on to seek her seat at the world’s high table. After all, an Indian prime minister has yet to honour another leader with his own presence on a similar occasion. This was thus exclusive, and special, as an Indian prime minister was heralded by the rest in Saarc. Also, by clubbing Nawaz with the others, Modi virtually avoided the risk of a rebuff if Nawaz chose to stay away. He also precluded the political risk of appearing overindulgent towards a Pakistani leader.
If Nawaz, however, passed the invitation, India would be well within its right to claim that it tried. It would also then have the opportunity to begin to question Nawaz’s credibility as someone who could not take independent decisions, indirectly bringing into question the role of the Pakistan Army as the real arbiter of power –– a point that India relishes when it wishes to trash Pakistan. Nawaz faced a Hobbesian choice. There was only one way to go. He accepted the invitation after some playful deliberation and appeared to have gained some moral ground by defying convention. The table of surprise was thus effectively returned on Modi. Thereon began the dance of how the subcontinent was now different and how the world will witness a momentous transformation. Good grace on all sides came in heaps. It all looked great till the meeting between the two principals the next morning; Modi’s first day at office.
What happened next is what history is made of between India and Pakistan. Nawaz was received warmly enough by Modi; Nawaz seemed enthused, conscious of the moment and how he stood on the anvil of something really transformational. A 35-minute meeting extended to 50; this was propitious. There was also an odd talk of the two extending their meeting into lunch. But then it all ended. Nawaz walked out, not escorted by Modi, but by his newly-appointed foreign minister. He appeared tired, haggard and forced a smile. The sprite in the steps of the delegation was missing as they staggered out behind Nawaz who hurried away from the place where he had just met India’s new prime minister.
What happened at the meeting was then detailed by Ms Sujhata Singh, India’s foreign secretary, at a press conference, which was soon followed by Nawaz’s own statement he read to the press at a separate event. Sujhata laid out the three crucial points that Modi had made to the Pakistani PM –– and all had to do with terror: Pakistan should not use its soil for terror against India nor let its soil be used to that purpose –– that inferred clear allegations against Pakistan for using terror as a policy tool and tolerating groups that used terror against India; that Pakistan must bring to book all those that were involved in the 2008 Mumbai attacks and bring about a speedy closure to the case. Hafiz Saeed or Dawood Ibrahim were not mentioned by name in the presser. If they were implied, that can be a fair guess. She made one final point: when asked to comment on Pakistan’s desire to seek peace with India, she retorted, “India too would like the same but for that to happen, terror against India by Pakistan must first be brought to a stop.” India’s foreign minister restated the same the next day. The foreign secretary only affirmed that trade, too, was discussed, when asked. She also laughed away at Pakistan’s attempt at recoining the MFN as NDMA.
This ‘to-do list’ is termed ‘deliverables’ by the more assertive part of the Indian media and has attained an informal currency when seeking measures by Pakistan as preconditions before anything else moves. ‘Deliverables’ must be seen to be ‘delivered’ before India could resume anything resembling a dialogue process. India hasn’t moved an inch beyond 2008. History between the two, thus, remains frozen at 2008.
What happened? These two men were out to make history. Why did it all fall flat? Was it defeatism that once again bridled enterprise?
(To be concluded)
Published in The Express Tribune, May 31st, 2014.
Let me explain. Last week I wrote a piece for another paper, titled ‘Managing Modi’ that practically subsumed all that I have said above and a lot more on how I expected him to be different from the Modi that we have all feared. I was proven wrong. Though his move of inviting Nawaz Sharif to his inauguration, along with a clutch of other South Asian leaders, was a potent diplomatic initiative, his inability to transform the moment beyond the traditional and moribund was typically Indian and subcontinental.
There was nothing visionary about Modi as he let himself be ridden by the traditional south block mentality of restraining enterprise and initiative in a political leader by shrouding him in suspicion and misgivings, and tying him to a belabouring, non-productive, incremental process of bureaucratic oversight. All he could think of –– in turning the new chapter in India-Pakistan relationship –– was the copy-paste of the stale Indian paradigm of a unifocal insistence on terrorism as the single issue, which has kept both nations from any meaningful engagement other than at the LoC (pun intended).
Consider: someone in the Indian political hierarchy, perhaps Modi himself, thinks of this brilliant plan to invite the ‘smaller’ seven partners in Saarc to his inauguration; a la an emperor’s coronation before his subjects. If all came, which they did, it would be enough to imprint the centrality of India in its immediate neighbourhood –– a prerequisite before venturing on to seek her seat at the world’s high table. After all, an Indian prime minister has yet to honour another leader with his own presence on a similar occasion. This was thus exclusive, and special, as an Indian prime minister was heralded by the rest in Saarc. Also, by clubbing Nawaz with the others, Modi virtually avoided the risk of a rebuff if Nawaz chose to stay away. He also precluded the political risk of appearing overindulgent towards a Pakistani leader.
If Nawaz, however, passed the invitation, India would be well within its right to claim that it tried. It would also then have the opportunity to begin to question Nawaz’s credibility as someone who could not take independent decisions, indirectly bringing into question the role of the Pakistan Army as the real arbiter of power –– a point that India relishes when it wishes to trash Pakistan. Nawaz faced a Hobbesian choice. There was only one way to go. He accepted the invitation after some playful deliberation and appeared to have gained some moral ground by defying convention. The table of surprise was thus effectively returned on Modi. Thereon began the dance of how the subcontinent was now different and how the world will witness a momentous transformation. Good grace on all sides came in heaps. It all looked great till the meeting between the two principals the next morning; Modi’s first day at office.
What happened next is what history is made of between India and Pakistan. Nawaz was received warmly enough by Modi; Nawaz seemed enthused, conscious of the moment and how he stood on the anvil of something really transformational. A 35-minute meeting extended to 50; this was propitious. There was also an odd talk of the two extending their meeting into lunch. But then it all ended. Nawaz walked out, not escorted by Modi, but by his newly-appointed foreign minister. He appeared tired, haggard and forced a smile. The sprite in the steps of the delegation was missing as they staggered out behind Nawaz who hurried away from the place where he had just met India’s new prime minister.
What happened at the meeting was then detailed by Ms Sujhata Singh, India’s foreign secretary, at a press conference, which was soon followed by Nawaz’s own statement he read to the press at a separate event. Sujhata laid out the three crucial points that Modi had made to the Pakistani PM –– and all had to do with terror: Pakistan should not use its soil for terror against India nor let its soil be used to that purpose –– that inferred clear allegations against Pakistan for using terror as a policy tool and tolerating groups that used terror against India; that Pakistan must bring to book all those that were involved in the 2008 Mumbai attacks and bring about a speedy closure to the case. Hafiz Saeed or Dawood Ibrahim were not mentioned by name in the presser. If they were implied, that can be a fair guess. She made one final point: when asked to comment on Pakistan’s desire to seek peace with India, she retorted, “India too would like the same but for that to happen, terror against India by Pakistan must first be brought to a stop.” India’s foreign minister restated the same the next day. The foreign secretary only affirmed that trade, too, was discussed, when asked. She also laughed away at Pakistan’s attempt at recoining the MFN as NDMA.
This ‘to-do list’ is termed ‘deliverables’ by the more assertive part of the Indian media and has attained an informal currency when seeking measures by Pakistan as preconditions before anything else moves. ‘Deliverables’ must be seen to be ‘delivered’ before India could resume anything resembling a dialogue process. India hasn’t moved an inch beyond 2008. History between the two, thus, remains frozen at 2008.
What happened? These two men were out to make history. Why did it all fall flat? Was it defeatism that once again bridled enterprise?
(To be concluded)
Published in The Express Tribune, May 31st, 2014.