Playing policy
The proposed policy fails magnificently. It has no neat division, accompaniments to ensure its complete nature.
The writer is a defence analyst who retired as an air vice-marshal in the Pakistan Air Force
Pakistan’s first response to terror has always constituted recourse to the military; ‘hand over the problem to the army and they will force them down’, a la the American disposition to poor or incomplete conception to their usual policy faux pas the world over, and then a fall back to their overwhelming military prowess to bail them out. The famous Churchillian quip, “the Americans will always do the right thing, after they have exhausted all the alternatives” is too well known to explain any further. Pakistan’s predicament, however, is far deeper; neither its leaders have the commitment nor the means to conceive fully, nor is Pakistan’s might as overwhelming to make up for poor policy.
Pakistan has been run till date without an internal security policy, or a national security policy, ever. That in itself is a colossal miracle. But then, perhaps not. Without it, and with internal security somehow delegated to the pale of the military because of its implied nature — where, too, it has always lain unattended simply because it did not belong there — Pakistan today is a repository of all things vile, save minor exceptions such as Afridi. But then we dwell into the supernatural.
Pakistan’s first National Internal Security Policy has been presented to parliament for debate. The difficulty: since no one has ever seen or been presented a policy before, they don’t know how to recognise one, much less debate one. Pakistan’s parliament doesn’t have a tradition of inducting policy experts in its midst, nor has a government ever delved into anything sublime. Exceptions: Sartaj Aziz or some notable economic czars at a few times in Pakistan’s short history. Most governance is seat-of-the-pant adhocism and firefighting in every part of the government where one may visit. In the current dispensation, energy is one area where a number of studies had existed in the private sector before this government was sworn in. Revamping one or two has given them a blueprint of options. And since it is a vote-getter, it is also seeing some follow-up. For the rest, there are only cliches.
Except now, when after years of lackadaisical neglect in the Pakistani policy tradition, words like existential and pervasive have begun to define the terror that now knocks at every door of this hapless nation’s inhabitants. And there remains no other way than to harness every mind and soul to the task of fighting the challenge. Enter the ministry of interior and the much-awaited policy document.
When you look at it, the portion of it that has been made public, it seems like a perfect preamble to something substantive. The only trouble is that this is the ‘operational’ part of the document; around which things are meant to be done. The other two parts, ‘strategic’ and ‘secret’, remain exactly that, secret and hence unsaid. If ‘operational’ is preambulary, and the ‘substantive’ non-palpable, chances are we already are dealing in the stratospherical.
A policy has a distinct structure: an aim or an intent; clearly derived objectives; indication of structures if those may be needed; identification of responsibilities for each of those structures and other affiliated partners relevant to achievement of policy objectives; allocation of resource — human, financial and material — suitable to the needs of those structures and in pursuit of the intended objectives; timelines when each of the interim milestones and policy milestones are meant to be achieved; a system of accountability and monitoring to ensure adherence to the timelines and progress towards achievement of the objectives; and a system of periodic executive review at the highest levels to ensure that a desired direction of the political bosses is indeed being attended to.
On all counts, the proposed policy fails magnificently. It has no such neat division, nor the accompaniments to ensure its complete nature. It also does not have a clear action-item detail on what part of the government is to do what all to ensure that all comes together seamlessly to achieve what to Pakistan is existentially threatening. An internal security policy remains an interdepartmental effort where parts come together to form a synergistic security paradigm. In the absence of such detail, the document remains a piece of creative writing.
If it sounds too academic or idealistic, here is an example from the neighbourhood: post-war Sri Lanka wishes to revive its tourism sector as a sustainable and a sizeable money-earner. It identifies, that given the current trends, there remains a potential to increase Chinese tourists from its existing number of 1.5 million every year to 2.5 million. That caused various roadshows to be placed in China with local partners to widely introduce the island-state to the Chinese along with other inducements. They plan to achieve the numbers in the next two years. Next, Sri Lanka desires that by 2016, every tourist, on the average, should be spending $200 a day. A special focus then is to track and record spending trends among various nationalities to particularly focus on the high-spenders. That has in parallel necessitated the upgradation of all related tourism infrastructure to ensure luxury hotels and shopping places. Travel into and out of Sri Lanka, and within is being made comfortable.
There are many more examples, all over, in most nations of policy guiding actions, synergistically; except us, who thrive in chaos and enjoy the proclivity of finding glory through un-canniness in everything that we do. Again, Afridi comes to mind. But then, we can lose at cricket that often, but not afford to lose the state.
Pakistan’s security predicament, TTP et al, is rooted as much in absent governing structures and an administrative dysfunction as in fallacious policies of the past. Normally, a culture of law abidance and enforcement followed by prosecution, if violated, remains the key to normal societal existence. In Pakistan, though, the decay is deep. Policing is no more a function but existence. Civil bureaucracy abdicated long ago, now serves at the pleasure of its political masters and in their service alone. Religion remains the only thriving business, whether supporting the Taliban or expounding against them. Education has regressed and is only a perfunctory activity. Leadership is disconnected and fearful of upsetting the apple cart; they, therefore, exist only in perpetual fear of shadows and the unseen. Even if there are some isolated capacities to fight strife, there is no one to tap them and use them.
Pakistan’s proposed Internal Security Policy doesn’t even touch these.
Published in The Express Tribune, March 8th, 2014.
Pakistan has been run till date without an internal security policy, or a national security policy, ever. That in itself is a colossal miracle. But then, perhaps not. Without it, and with internal security somehow delegated to the pale of the military because of its implied nature — where, too, it has always lain unattended simply because it did not belong there — Pakistan today is a repository of all things vile, save minor exceptions such as Afridi. But then we dwell into the supernatural.
Pakistan’s first National Internal Security Policy has been presented to parliament for debate. The difficulty: since no one has ever seen or been presented a policy before, they don’t know how to recognise one, much less debate one. Pakistan’s parliament doesn’t have a tradition of inducting policy experts in its midst, nor has a government ever delved into anything sublime. Exceptions: Sartaj Aziz or some notable economic czars at a few times in Pakistan’s short history. Most governance is seat-of-the-pant adhocism and firefighting in every part of the government where one may visit. In the current dispensation, energy is one area where a number of studies had existed in the private sector before this government was sworn in. Revamping one or two has given them a blueprint of options. And since it is a vote-getter, it is also seeing some follow-up. For the rest, there are only cliches.
Except now, when after years of lackadaisical neglect in the Pakistani policy tradition, words like existential and pervasive have begun to define the terror that now knocks at every door of this hapless nation’s inhabitants. And there remains no other way than to harness every mind and soul to the task of fighting the challenge. Enter the ministry of interior and the much-awaited policy document.
When you look at it, the portion of it that has been made public, it seems like a perfect preamble to something substantive. The only trouble is that this is the ‘operational’ part of the document; around which things are meant to be done. The other two parts, ‘strategic’ and ‘secret’, remain exactly that, secret and hence unsaid. If ‘operational’ is preambulary, and the ‘substantive’ non-palpable, chances are we already are dealing in the stratospherical.
A policy has a distinct structure: an aim or an intent; clearly derived objectives; indication of structures if those may be needed; identification of responsibilities for each of those structures and other affiliated partners relevant to achievement of policy objectives; allocation of resource — human, financial and material — suitable to the needs of those structures and in pursuit of the intended objectives; timelines when each of the interim milestones and policy milestones are meant to be achieved; a system of accountability and monitoring to ensure adherence to the timelines and progress towards achievement of the objectives; and a system of periodic executive review at the highest levels to ensure that a desired direction of the political bosses is indeed being attended to.
On all counts, the proposed policy fails magnificently. It has no such neat division, nor the accompaniments to ensure its complete nature. It also does not have a clear action-item detail on what part of the government is to do what all to ensure that all comes together seamlessly to achieve what to Pakistan is existentially threatening. An internal security policy remains an interdepartmental effort where parts come together to form a synergistic security paradigm. In the absence of such detail, the document remains a piece of creative writing.
If it sounds too academic or idealistic, here is an example from the neighbourhood: post-war Sri Lanka wishes to revive its tourism sector as a sustainable and a sizeable money-earner. It identifies, that given the current trends, there remains a potential to increase Chinese tourists from its existing number of 1.5 million every year to 2.5 million. That caused various roadshows to be placed in China with local partners to widely introduce the island-state to the Chinese along with other inducements. They plan to achieve the numbers in the next two years. Next, Sri Lanka desires that by 2016, every tourist, on the average, should be spending $200 a day. A special focus then is to track and record spending trends among various nationalities to particularly focus on the high-spenders. That has in parallel necessitated the upgradation of all related tourism infrastructure to ensure luxury hotels and shopping places. Travel into and out of Sri Lanka, and within is being made comfortable.
There are many more examples, all over, in most nations of policy guiding actions, synergistically; except us, who thrive in chaos and enjoy the proclivity of finding glory through un-canniness in everything that we do. Again, Afridi comes to mind. But then, we can lose at cricket that often, but not afford to lose the state.
Pakistan’s security predicament, TTP et al, is rooted as much in absent governing structures and an administrative dysfunction as in fallacious policies of the past. Normally, a culture of law abidance and enforcement followed by prosecution, if violated, remains the key to normal societal existence. In Pakistan, though, the decay is deep. Policing is no more a function but existence. Civil bureaucracy abdicated long ago, now serves at the pleasure of its political masters and in their service alone. Religion remains the only thriving business, whether supporting the Taliban or expounding against them. Education has regressed and is only a perfunctory activity. Leadership is disconnected and fearful of upsetting the apple cart; they, therefore, exist only in perpetual fear of shadows and the unseen. Even if there are some isolated capacities to fight strife, there is no one to tap them and use them.
Pakistan’s proposed Internal Security Policy doesn’t even touch these.
Published in The Express Tribune, March 8th, 2014.