Low Expectations
General Kayani was no democrat, he was a general first and last, any evaluation has to be based on that count alone.
The writer is a lawyer and partner at Ijaz and Ijaz Co in Lahore saroop.ijaz@ tribune.com.pk
You know you have low expectations when you uncritically praise someone for not breaking the law. If one cuts through all the hubris surrounding General Kayani’s retirement and the flattering comments, it basically boils down to that he did all of us a favour by not mounting a coup. It is the appropriate time to remind us that he is not supposed to do that and also, it is illegal.
The discourse on General Kayani’s departure brings to light the confusion on national interest and the interest of the armed forces. General Kayani was not a national leader; he was the head of the army and that should be the framework of analysis. Whereas the General jealously guarded the territory traditionally governed by the army, and in doing so, helped the armed forces, the progress on the national front is a more complex result card. Let us start from the beginning. General Kayani took over power after nine years of military rule (with the last portion being particularly unpopular). His first order of business was to get rid of the unpleasantness surrounding the army and start afresh. And start afresh he did, in the operational sense. However, did he change anything at the doctrinal or institutional level? Short answer: no
Traditionally, there are two areas of policymaking that the army seeks to control, namely, foreign policy and security policy. The first inkling of the army asserting itself was in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks. However, the clear intention of not ceding any space on the foreign policy front came in the Kerry-Lugar Bill. The army and the ISPR took public and unambiguous positions on the issue and left no doubt on the question that they will not accept any civilian oversight or supremacy in foreign policy, in general, and in military aid, in particular. General Kayani was acutely aware of the fragile political coalition and arrangement that held that nascent democratic structure together and was prepared to exploit it to defend territory. And defend territory he did. In doing so, he made it clear to the federal government and the world (particularly the US) what the real deal was. The federal government did not (perhaps, rightly so) want a confrontation at that point of time.
The second seminal example was the Memo affair. The Memo affair was, perhaps, even more significant because in that episode, the military took on a direct fight with the civilian government and came out with all guns blazing. It was also, perhaps, the only time that Mian Sahib played ball with the military (at least, initially). The judiciary, the army and Mian Sahib converged on the issue, with the army/ISI defining what national interest was. Most importantly, it failed. President Zardari stood his ground and at a later stage, Mian Sahib also realised that his interest lay in the system functioning democratically. The Memo fiasco was the establishment and General Kayani’s way of asserting control; and while they, perhaps, failed in the ultimate aim of the civilian government committing suicide, they nevertheless succeeded in defending the military as the party in charge when it came to foreign and security policy.
Balochistan remained and remains a policy area controlled wholly and solely by the armed forces. The enforced disappearances problem has only grown worse in magnitude. General Kayani showed defiance after the OBL raid, and the attacks on PNS Mehran and the GHQ happened in his tenure.
So, what exactly are we grateful for? The overthrow of a civilian government is seen by many as a choice that the army (or the army chief) can make whenever it wills. The talk of 111 brigade and only two trucks needed to secure Islamabad (and by extension, the rest of the country) remains in vogue. And the fact that General Kayani did not yield to the temptation is lauded. All of this overlooks the complex political and social rational calculation that drives an army takeover. If one were to be reductionist, they are two primary variables, a public appetite/desire for an army coup and political support to back that. Neither of them was present. General Musharraf had just left and the public was still recovering from one military general and hence was in no way ready for another one. The primary opposition leader, Mian Nawaz Sharif, had learnt his lessons from the school of hard knocks and realised his chances lay in the electoral process. Hence, General Kayani did not impose a coup because he couldn’t. Short of that, he defended his turf as aggressively as any of his predecessors.
There are too many examples of General Kayani trying to make things difficult for the democratic dispensation to retain the space that the military occupies in the power grid, the most desperate probably being Maulana Tahirul Qadri. The fact that they failed in achieving the ultimate aim is small grounds for celebration. The democratic forces had enough foresight and hindsight to know that united they stand.
However, there is another side to General Kayani’s tenure, namely, the harshest conflict that the Pakistan Army has seen. The number of soldiers and officers killed is unprecedented. General Kayani did see the Swat operation happening in his tenure. And particularly towards the end, emphasised the resolve to fight the existential battle for Pakistan’s soul, the battle against militancy. It was a very tough time to be the army chief in the operational sense of fighting the most intense battle of our history. General Kayani deserves our respect for fighting the good fight. Yet, were any major paradigms shifted? Unfortunately, we still do not know yet.
There is a distinction in order between General Kayani as a general and as a national leader. He was only a general. All those praising him for not violating the Constitution and taking over and hence proving him to be a democrat have to reconsider. If anyone deserves praise, it is the previous federal government along with Mian Sahib (barring one major failing). General Kayani was no democrat, he was a general first and last, and any evaluation has to be based on that count alone.
Published in The Express Tribune, December 1st, 2013.
The discourse on General Kayani’s departure brings to light the confusion on national interest and the interest of the armed forces. General Kayani was not a national leader; he was the head of the army and that should be the framework of analysis. Whereas the General jealously guarded the territory traditionally governed by the army, and in doing so, helped the armed forces, the progress on the national front is a more complex result card. Let us start from the beginning. General Kayani took over power after nine years of military rule (with the last portion being particularly unpopular). His first order of business was to get rid of the unpleasantness surrounding the army and start afresh. And start afresh he did, in the operational sense. However, did he change anything at the doctrinal or institutional level? Short answer: no
Traditionally, there are two areas of policymaking that the army seeks to control, namely, foreign policy and security policy. The first inkling of the army asserting itself was in the aftermath of the Mumbai attacks. However, the clear intention of not ceding any space on the foreign policy front came in the Kerry-Lugar Bill. The army and the ISPR took public and unambiguous positions on the issue and left no doubt on the question that they will not accept any civilian oversight or supremacy in foreign policy, in general, and in military aid, in particular. General Kayani was acutely aware of the fragile political coalition and arrangement that held that nascent democratic structure together and was prepared to exploit it to defend territory. And defend territory he did. In doing so, he made it clear to the federal government and the world (particularly the US) what the real deal was. The federal government did not (perhaps, rightly so) want a confrontation at that point of time.
The second seminal example was the Memo affair. The Memo affair was, perhaps, even more significant because in that episode, the military took on a direct fight with the civilian government and came out with all guns blazing. It was also, perhaps, the only time that Mian Sahib played ball with the military (at least, initially). The judiciary, the army and Mian Sahib converged on the issue, with the army/ISI defining what national interest was. Most importantly, it failed. President Zardari stood his ground and at a later stage, Mian Sahib also realised that his interest lay in the system functioning democratically. The Memo fiasco was the establishment and General Kayani’s way of asserting control; and while they, perhaps, failed in the ultimate aim of the civilian government committing suicide, they nevertheless succeeded in defending the military as the party in charge when it came to foreign and security policy.
Balochistan remained and remains a policy area controlled wholly and solely by the armed forces. The enforced disappearances problem has only grown worse in magnitude. General Kayani showed defiance after the OBL raid, and the attacks on PNS Mehran and the GHQ happened in his tenure.
So, what exactly are we grateful for? The overthrow of a civilian government is seen by many as a choice that the army (or the army chief) can make whenever it wills. The talk of 111 brigade and only two trucks needed to secure Islamabad (and by extension, the rest of the country) remains in vogue. And the fact that General Kayani did not yield to the temptation is lauded. All of this overlooks the complex political and social rational calculation that drives an army takeover. If one were to be reductionist, they are two primary variables, a public appetite/desire for an army coup and political support to back that. Neither of them was present. General Musharraf had just left and the public was still recovering from one military general and hence was in no way ready for another one. The primary opposition leader, Mian Nawaz Sharif, had learnt his lessons from the school of hard knocks and realised his chances lay in the electoral process. Hence, General Kayani did not impose a coup because he couldn’t. Short of that, he defended his turf as aggressively as any of his predecessors.
There are too many examples of General Kayani trying to make things difficult for the democratic dispensation to retain the space that the military occupies in the power grid, the most desperate probably being Maulana Tahirul Qadri. The fact that they failed in achieving the ultimate aim is small grounds for celebration. The democratic forces had enough foresight and hindsight to know that united they stand.
However, there is another side to General Kayani’s tenure, namely, the harshest conflict that the Pakistan Army has seen. The number of soldiers and officers killed is unprecedented. General Kayani did see the Swat operation happening in his tenure. And particularly towards the end, emphasised the resolve to fight the existential battle for Pakistan’s soul, the battle against militancy. It was a very tough time to be the army chief in the operational sense of fighting the most intense battle of our history. General Kayani deserves our respect for fighting the good fight. Yet, were any major paradigms shifted? Unfortunately, we still do not know yet.
There is a distinction in order between General Kayani as a general and as a national leader. He was only a general. All those praising him for not violating the Constitution and taking over and hence proving him to be a democrat have to reconsider. If anyone deserves praise, it is the previous federal government along with Mian Sahib (barring one major failing). General Kayani was no democrat, he was a general first and last, and any evaluation has to be based on that count alone.
Published in The Express Tribune, December 1st, 2013.