Why Nawaz Sharif needs to seize the peace initiative
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s back-channel diplomacy is already on hold.
The meeting between the prime ministers of India and Pakistan in New York, even though billed as a success, is indicative of the confusing currents of diplomacy in Delhi and Islamabad that reflect the contentious political situation in the two countries.
The deliverables on the two sides were by no means easy. The Indian demand for Pakistan to deliver on the issue of terrorism concerning Mumbai and the LeT-JD leader was not going to be met anyway. Pakistan is simply too deeply engaged in the issue of safeguarding its interests in post-Nato Afghanistan to take a clear position on the non-state actors. The country is hopelessly divided on the issue of launching an operation against the Taliban and proto-Taliban groups, despite a recent nod in favour of negotiations with them from parliament.
The Indian demand enjoys a priori endorsement from the world capitals. This demand has had periodical reverberations through the media for a decade. In this context, Indian diplomacy is underscored by the legitimacy of the war against terror that has put Pakistan in the dock. Its capacity to fight back on this issue has been circumscribed by a loss of credibility because of the Abbottabad operation that unearthed Osama bin Laden’s place of hiding near the country’s strategic heartland, an unwillingness to launch a military operation in North Waziristan and its alleged procrastination in the matter of pursuit of terrorists involved in the Mumbai attacks.
As opposed to the global and regional appeal of the Indian agenda of anti-terrorism, Pakistan’s agenda is typically bilateral, i.e., Kashmir, Balochistan, Sir Creek, Siachen, and building of dams on rivers flowing into Pakistan. Unfortunately, these issues have a limited appeal for the diplomatic community. Thus, Pakistan finds itself playing on a non-level field because of the peculiar hierarchy of international issues that disfavour it. That has, in turn, led to an ideological perspective couched in conspiracy theories.
Speculations about whether the meeting will go ahead as scheduled continued to cast their shadow till the end. The two governments struggled to contain the negative fallout of the recent violations of the Line of Control (LoC). In the first round of the fallout, Manmohan Singh was clearly the loser at the hands of the opposition at home. The BJP pursued a smear campaign against him for his alleged appeasement of Pakistan and accused him of inaction in response to the killing of Indian soldiers at the border. All this was bound to rob any summit meeting of a substantive move forward. A beleaguered Congress government in Delhi was constantly on the defensive for seeking to keep the line of communication open across the border.
In Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif was an indirect beneficiary of the Indian media’s coverage of the firing across the LoC. It was claimed that his initiative to open up to India was sabotaged by the military establishment. The 2008 Mumbai attacks were mentioned in a similar vein for arguing that civilians were checkmated by the men in uniform. While the LoC firing led to a setback for the PML-N government’s policy of opening up to India, this policy had no powerful stakeholders at home anyway. The government was yet to convert the influential mavericks to its Indian initiative. Nawaz Sharif came out relatively unscathed from the LoC episode and tried to restore the momentum through the summit meeting.
However, the prime minister’s foray into New York did not bring laurels for him. His speech in the General Assembly was based on a somewhat pointless reiteration of the traditional standpoint of Islamabad on Kashmir and other issues. A person-to-person chemistry can help move to substantive nation-to-nation dialogue. It withdrew from the spirit of bilateralism — that under-girded the 1972 Simla Agreement and the 2004 Islamabad Declaration — to a sombre UN route of half a century ago. His idiom followed a textbook approach that typically carried the Foreign Office stamp. There was no resolve to start a new era.
The controversy about the prime minister’s assertion that his Indian counterpart had gone to President Obama to complain about Pakistan shortly before his meeting with the former could be avoided. Personal chemistry can help lay out the turf for understanding between nations. In the end, the post-breakfast meeting turned out to be a non-event. It seems that there was no homework done prior to the meeting. No side was in a mood to give any concession to the other. An opportunity of opening up hearts and minds to each other was lost to both countries.
The New York summit is a classic example of passive diplomacy, characterised by defensive posturing about the respective national positions and no talk about further talks. Invitations for the two prime ministers to visit each other hardly looked serious, given the hawks blowing hot and cold at home. Still, the two governments preferred to bill the meeting as a success with a view to keeping the initiative alive. Some cynical analysts also point to the maxim: know thy enemy. Their argument is that knowing who is in charge in Delhi and Islamabad, taking what position and using which idiom could be of great help for the two establishments.
Manmohan Singh is on the way out in terms of his political career. His ambition for a personal gain in diplomacy was limited. Returning from a meeting with his Pakistani counterpart without any tangible move forward on the diplomatic front is not a great personal loss. But it is certainly not good for his party. The BJP’s prime ministerial candidate, Modi, has blatantly criticised Nawaz Sharif for ‘insulting’ Manmohan Singh, while referring to his unconfirmed remarks. Has Pakistan unwittingly helped the BJP against the Congress in the context of the 2014 elections?
On the other hand, for Nawaz Sharif, who is at the beginning of his third tenure, stakes are higher. He had nothing to show back home in terms of any advance on his trade policy or putting in place a firm schedule of the next round of talks with India. Musharraf’s comprehensive dialogue with India 2004-2007 and Zardari’s move to form a Friends of Pakistan group of Western countries are already part of history. He could have taken a fresh and meaningful policy initiative that was keenly awaited in world capitals.
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s back-channel diplomacy is already on hold. He needs to take bold decisions and put the foreign policy initiative back in the hands of the elected government. This is the time to chart out a role of a grand peace-maker for himself in the whole region.
Published in The Express Tribune, October 16th, 2013.
The deliverables on the two sides were by no means easy. The Indian demand for Pakistan to deliver on the issue of terrorism concerning Mumbai and the LeT-JD leader was not going to be met anyway. Pakistan is simply too deeply engaged in the issue of safeguarding its interests in post-Nato Afghanistan to take a clear position on the non-state actors. The country is hopelessly divided on the issue of launching an operation against the Taliban and proto-Taliban groups, despite a recent nod in favour of negotiations with them from parliament.
The Indian demand enjoys a priori endorsement from the world capitals. This demand has had periodical reverberations through the media for a decade. In this context, Indian diplomacy is underscored by the legitimacy of the war against terror that has put Pakistan in the dock. Its capacity to fight back on this issue has been circumscribed by a loss of credibility because of the Abbottabad operation that unearthed Osama bin Laden’s place of hiding near the country’s strategic heartland, an unwillingness to launch a military operation in North Waziristan and its alleged procrastination in the matter of pursuit of terrorists involved in the Mumbai attacks.
As opposed to the global and regional appeal of the Indian agenda of anti-terrorism, Pakistan’s agenda is typically bilateral, i.e., Kashmir, Balochistan, Sir Creek, Siachen, and building of dams on rivers flowing into Pakistan. Unfortunately, these issues have a limited appeal for the diplomatic community. Thus, Pakistan finds itself playing on a non-level field because of the peculiar hierarchy of international issues that disfavour it. That has, in turn, led to an ideological perspective couched in conspiracy theories.
Speculations about whether the meeting will go ahead as scheduled continued to cast their shadow till the end. The two governments struggled to contain the negative fallout of the recent violations of the Line of Control (LoC). In the first round of the fallout, Manmohan Singh was clearly the loser at the hands of the opposition at home. The BJP pursued a smear campaign against him for his alleged appeasement of Pakistan and accused him of inaction in response to the killing of Indian soldiers at the border. All this was bound to rob any summit meeting of a substantive move forward. A beleaguered Congress government in Delhi was constantly on the defensive for seeking to keep the line of communication open across the border.
In Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif was an indirect beneficiary of the Indian media’s coverage of the firing across the LoC. It was claimed that his initiative to open up to India was sabotaged by the military establishment. The 2008 Mumbai attacks were mentioned in a similar vein for arguing that civilians were checkmated by the men in uniform. While the LoC firing led to a setback for the PML-N government’s policy of opening up to India, this policy had no powerful stakeholders at home anyway. The government was yet to convert the influential mavericks to its Indian initiative. Nawaz Sharif came out relatively unscathed from the LoC episode and tried to restore the momentum through the summit meeting.
However, the prime minister’s foray into New York did not bring laurels for him. His speech in the General Assembly was based on a somewhat pointless reiteration of the traditional standpoint of Islamabad on Kashmir and other issues. A person-to-person chemistry can help move to substantive nation-to-nation dialogue. It withdrew from the spirit of bilateralism — that under-girded the 1972 Simla Agreement and the 2004 Islamabad Declaration — to a sombre UN route of half a century ago. His idiom followed a textbook approach that typically carried the Foreign Office stamp. There was no resolve to start a new era.
The controversy about the prime minister’s assertion that his Indian counterpart had gone to President Obama to complain about Pakistan shortly before his meeting with the former could be avoided. Personal chemistry can help lay out the turf for understanding between nations. In the end, the post-breakfast meeting turned out to be a non-event. It seems that there was no homework done prior to the meeting. No side was in a mood to give any concession to the other. An opportunity of opening up hearts and minds to each other was lost to both countries.
The New York summit is a classic example of passive diplomacy, characterised by defensive posturing about the respective national positions and no talk about further talks. Invitations for the two prime ministers to visit each other hardly looked serious, given the hawks blowing hot and cold at home. Still, the two governments preferred to bill the meeting as a success with a view to keeping the initiative alive. Some cynical analysts also point to the maxim: know thy enemy. Their argument is that knowing who is in charge in Delhi and Islamabad, taking what position and using which idiom could be of great help for the two establishments.
Manmohan Singh is on the way out in terms of his political career. His ambition for a personal gain in diplomacy was limited. Returning from a meeting with his Pakistani counterpart without any tangible move forward on the diplomatic front is not a great personal loss. But it is certainly not good for his party. The BJP’s prime ministerial candidate, Modi, has blatantly criticised Nawaz Sharif for ‘insulting’ Manmohan Singh, while referring to his unconfirmed remarks. Has Pakistan unwittingly helped the BJP against the Congress in the context of the 2014 elections?
On the other hand, for Nawaz Sharif, who is at the beginning of his third tenure, stakes are higher. He had nothing to show back home in terms of any advance on his trade policy or putting in place a firm schedule of the next round of talks with India. Musharraf’s comprehensive dialogue with India 2004-2007 and Zardari’s move to form a Friends of Pakistan group of Western countries are already part of history. He could have taken a fresh and meaningful policy initiative that was keenly awaited in world capitals.
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s back-channel diplomacy is already on hold. He needs to take bold decisions and put the foreign policy initiative back in the hands of the elected government. This is the time to chart out a role of a grand peace-maker for himself in the whole region.
Published in The Express Tribune, October 16th, 2013.