Simplistic solutions to Balochistan won’t work
The crisis is not Baloch versus Baloch or Baloch versus Pashtun. It’s a conflict between the Baloch and the centre.
The writer was a member of the Senate from 2003 to 2008 and of the National Assembly from 1997 to 1999. He tweets @Senator_Baloch
The much-talked about All Parties Conference (APC) concluded without a clear framework to end Pakistan’s two major conflicts — the Taliban crisis and the politico-nationalist conflict in Balochistan. Talks with the Taliban received overwhelming attention in sharp contrast to the multifaceted conflict in Balochistan.
This disregard shown towards Balochistan is understandable. The deep state considers politically mature, moderate and rights-seeking Baloch nationalists as strategic threats to their decades-old, colonial-style rule; however, the same establishment seemingly considers the Taliban a long-term strategic partner in the regional geopolitical context despite these militants being utterly lethal. By deleting Balochistan from the APC deliberations, Islamabad has attempted to downgrade the importance of the subject and rebrand it as a mere local, provincial matter rather than a national crisis.
Nevertheless, Balochistan’s burning scenario preoccupies Pakistan’s policymakers in all international forums. Nawaz Sharif’s recent mention of Balochistan when meeting with Manmohan Singh is a clear indication that the scale and impact of the Balochistan crisis cannot be ignored.
The APC’s tactic to give ‘permission’ to the Balochistan chief minister, concerning talks with Baloch nationalists, further signifies Islamabad’s unwillingness to understand and resolve this crisis. The conflict in Balochistan has nothing to do with the provincial government. The Baloch nationalists’ demands and struggle are directed towards the central government and the non-Baloch security apparatus. It’s a conflict between two ideas — one that believes in over-centralisation, Talibanisation and the depoliticisation of Balochistan and the other that believes in political freedom, fair development, modernisation, equity and equality. The crisis in the province is neither Baloch versus Baloch nor Baloch versus Pashtun; it’s a conflict between the Baloch and the centre. Human rights issues, i.e., disappearances, torture, political assassinations and economic exploitation — are all related to Islamabad and not linked with the provincial administration. Demands surrounding the political revolt — ranging from self-determination to greater autonomy and restructuring of the security structure, are all directed towards the centre. Downgrading the intensity of the crisis may suit some elements within the security and political establishment but it’s a bitter reality that this is a conflict of great magnitude. Its genesis dates back to 1948 — caused by a flawed political structure and the centre’s policies — and it has subsequently resulted in repeated political revolts from the Baloch parties.
A proper understanding of the root causes of the conflict is critical. Islamabad’s simplistic approach, of branding the Balochistan crisis as being foreign-sponsored or as a societal crisis of tribalism and local competition, has done a lot of damage. Pakistan is a multi-ethnic society with an outdated colonial structure. Ethnic emotions, rooted in historical memories of grievances, together with unabated rights violations, discrimination, underdevelopment, insecurity are at the core of the conflict between the powerful centre and the powerless Baloch.
In order to devise effective peace-building strategies, it is necessary to recognise the multiple factors that are causing animosity and strife. The Pakistani elite have little time to ponder over the grief the families of the missing Baloch youth, daily abductions, killings and the worsening economic situation. Such acts are supplementing the crisis and pushing the Baloch towards morphing into a more radical and unmanageable society. A peaceful resolution of this conflict lies in politically-tested conflict resolution mechanisms. A comprehensive framework along with a peace agreement on the lines of peace accords in Aceh, Ireland and the Kurdish region in Iraq are some of the options that provide a context for peaceful coexistence within the territorial framework.
Published in The Express Tribune, October 4th, 2013.
This disregard shown towards Balochistan is understandable. The deep state considers politically mature, moderate and rights-seeking Baloch nationalists as strategic threats to their decades-old, colonial-style rule; however, the same establishment seemingly considers the Taliban a long-term strategic partner in the regional geopolitical context despite these militants being utterly lethal. By deleting Balochistan from the APC deliberations, Islamabad has attempted to downgrade the importance of the subject and rebrand it as a mere local, provincial matter rather than a national crisis.
Nevertheless, Balochistan’s burning scenario preoccupies Pakistan’s policymakers in all international forums. Nawaz Sharif’s recent mention of Balochistan when meeting with Manmohan Singh is a clear indication that the scale and impact of the Balochistan crisis cannot be ignored.
The APC’s tactic to give ‘permission’ to the Balochistan chief minister, concerning talks with Baloch nationalists, further signifies Islamabad’s unwillingness to understand and resolve this crisis. The conflict in Balochistan has nothing to do with the provincial government. The Baloch nationalists’ demands and struggle are directed towards the central government and the non-Baloch security apparatus. It’s a conflict between two ideas — one that believes in over-centralisation, Talibanisation and the depoliticisation of Balochistan and the other that believes in political freedom, fair development, modernisation, equity and equality. The crisis in the province is neither Baloch versus Baloch nor Baloch versus Pashtun; it’s a conflict between the Baloch and the centre. Human rights issues, i.e., disappearances, torture, political assassinations and economic exploitation — are all related to Islamabad and not linked with the provincial administration. Demands surrounding the political revolt — ranging from self-determination to greater autonomy and restructuring of the security structure, are all directed towards the centre. Downgrading the intensity of the crisis may suit some elements within the security and political establishment but it’s a bitter reality that this is a conflict of great magnitude. Its genesis dates back to 1948 — caused by a flawed political structure and the centre’s policies — and it has subsequently resulted in repeated political revolts from the Baloch parties.
A proper understanding of the root causes of the conflict is critical. Islamabad’s simplistic approach, of branding the Balochistan crisis as being foreign-sponsored or as a societal crisis of tribalism and local competition, has done a lot of damage. Pakistan is a multi-ethnic society with an outdated colonial structure. Ethnic emotions, rooted in historical memories of grievances, together with unabated rights violations, discrimination, underdevelopment, insecurity are at the core of the conflict between the powerful centre and the powerless Baloch.
In order to devise effective peace-building strategies, it is necessary to recognise the multiple factors that are causing animosity and strife. The Pakistani elite have little time to ponder over the grief the families of the missing Baloch youth, daily abductions, killings and the worsening economic situation. Such acts are supplementing the crisis and pushing the Baloch towards morphing into a more radical and unmanageable society. A peaceful resolution of this conflict lies in politically-tested conflict resolution mechanisms. A comprehensive framework along with a peace agreement on the lines of peace accords in Aceh, Ireland and the Kurdish region in Iraq are some of the options that provide a context for peaceful coexistence within the territorial framework.
Published in The Express Tribune, October 4th, 2013.