Terror in Gilgit-Baltistan indicates more trouble
No matter how one looks at it, the government, the intelligence agencies and the army should brace for more trouble.
The writer is Editor, National Security Affairs at Capital TV and a visiting fellow at the SDPI in Islamabad
The June 23 incident at the western base camp of Nanga Parbat, in which nine foreign tourists and their local guide were gratuitously killed, raises many questions.
Reports indicate the area has been cordoned off and search parties are scouring all possible approaches to and away from the base camp. Aerial surveillance is being conducted, local community leaders have been co-opted and suspects have been rounded up. The surviving guide and a Chinese trekker are also being questioned for any clues.
So, who were the people who mounted this attack? Going by the local reaction to the terrible incident, it is difficult to assume they were locals, even as facilitation by some among the local population cannot be discounted. That said, it is clear, given the terrain and the gruelling trek that the attackers were acclimatised to operate in rarefied air conditions.
The area in and around Chilas — also some other parts of Gilgit-Baltistan (G-B) — has a history of sectarian violence. Since 2005, there have been at least three incidents of targeted sectarian killings in which Shia passengers were forced out of buses, lined up and killed. The latest attack was only last year, in much the same way as the minibus incident on a cold January evening in Northern Ireland, narrated by Seamus Heaney in his Nobel lecture, Crediting Poetry. Except that there is no Heaney here to narrate the harrowing tales that have become all too common in our beloved land.
But while sectarian terror has visited the area on many occasions, the question remains: why would sectarian terrorists target a group of foreign tourists? It can’t be because of denominational differences. Also, as it seems, mounting this attack required a long trek. Moreover, at the time of the incident, reportedly, there were other trekkers and mountaineers in the area too. Almost all have since been evacuated.
What was the attacking group’s extrication plan? The place where the attack happened is not a built-in area. No one can kill anyone and then walk over to another street to have coffee. Chances are the group split up in smaller two- to three-man teams for extrication. What did they do with the weapons? It’s unlikely they carried the weapons when extricating, except possibly handguns that can be easily concealed. Did they conceal the weapons somewhere close by? Could it be that they picked up the weapons after the trek to the point and before killing the tourists? If so, then the weapons got to the designated spot before the group did. Who carried the weapons to that point? Were there local facilitators?
Reports suggest there were 10 to 14 attackers. Why would, whoever planned the attack, need such a large group when three to four trained people with automatic weapons would be enough to kill a dozen unarmed men caught by surprise? How could such a large body of armed men go undetected in an area where there’s a large, covert and overt presence of intelligence personnel and their informers, and non-locals can be fairly easily picked up — unless they moved to a pre-designated rendezvous in small groups.
Could it be that the number of attackers was much less than what is being reported? It makes more sense, both for the purposes of attacking and extricating, to keep the group small. Detection is more difficult and concealing movement can be relatively easy. Weapons can be carried, field-stripped and then assembled before the attack. They can either be hidden after the attack or destroyed. This was not a suicide mission so it must have had an extrication plan.
Still, regardless of any theories, the issue of motive remains. Looters don’t trek long distances to pick up backpacks and money, unless they chance upon a target. According to one police report, the attackers did not touch the victims’ belongings.
Is the motive then to destroy the economy of the area? Is it to open a new front for the government and turn the relatively calm but strategically very sensitive G-B into another hotbed of extremist terrorism? If it is the latter, the former being just a spin-off of it, then we should see more attacks on both soft and hard targets. If such a scenario comes to pass, it will put terrible pressure on security forces, primarily elements of the Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA). If the FCNA troops have to get involved in an internal low-intensity conflict (LIC), the Command will be spread thin and will either have to induct more troops dealing with the LIC or take the pressure on its primary role which is to defend against India along a very difficult Line of Control as well as along the western ridges of the Saltoro Range. The Karakoram Highway could also come under threat and the Road Maintenance Battalions will either need additional troops for local protection or increase their own components for such protection to fulfil their primary role.
The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has taken responsibility for the attack and claims a group under its banner is now operating in the area. One report suggests the involvement of the Asmatullah Moavia group which, for some time, has linked up with local sectarian groups. There is a strong possibility of this and we are told the security teams are following up on these leads.
No matter how one looks at it, unless there is an off chance of this incident being an isolated aberration, which is highly unlikely, the government, the intelligence agencies and the army should brace for more trouble. This is why it is absolutely crucial that the terrorists who mounted this attack are hunted down and captured. If this was a planned operation and the beginning of more to come, getting these criminals is a must not just to show the state’s resolve in dealing with what has happened but also in unravelling any bigger strategic plan to destabilise the area.
I have said before but it bears repeating: sectarian terrorists form a major component of the TTP whose ideology is essentially sectarian and rabidly anti-Shia. Those who think that sectarian terrorism and the TTP are different phenomena, and while one must be put down and the other talked to, are either dissemblers or hopeless fools.
Published in The Express Tribune, June 26th, 2013.
Reports indicate the area has been cordoned off and search parties are scouring all possible approaches to and away from the base camp. Aerial surveillance is being conducted, local community leaders have been co-opted and suspects have been rounded up. The surviving guide and a Chinese trekker are also being questioned for any clues.
So, who were the people who mounted this attack? Going by the local reaction to the terrible incident, it is difficult to assume they were locals, even as facilitation by some among the local population cannot be discounted. That said, it is clear, given the terrain and the gruelling trek that the attackers were acclimatised to operate in rarefied air conditions.
The area in and around Chilas — also some other parts of Gilgit-Baltistan (G-B) — has a history of sectarian violence. Since 2005, there have been at least three incidents of targeted sectarian killings in which Shia passengers were forced out of buses, lined up and killed. The latest attack was only last year, in much the same way as the minibus incident on a cold January evening in Northern Ireland, narrated by Seamus Heaney in his Nobel lecture, Crediting Poetry. Except that there is no Heaney here to narrate the harrowing tales that have become all too common in our beloved land.
But while sectarian terror has visited the area on many occasions, the question remains: why would sectarian terrorists target a group of foreign tourists? It can’t be because of denominational differences. Also, as it seems, mounting this attack required a long trek. Moreover, at the time of the incident, reportedly, there were other trekkers and mountaineers in the area too. Almost all have since been evacuated.
What was the attacking group’s extrication plan? The place where the attack happened is not a built-in area. No one can kill anyone and then walk over to another street to have coffee. Chances are the group split up in smaller two- to three-man teams for extrication. What did they do with the weapons? It’s unlikely they carried the weapons when extricating, except possibly handguns that can be easily concealed. Did they conceal the weapons somewhere close by? Could it be that they picked up the weapons after the trek to the point and before killing the tourists? If so, then the weapons got to the designated spot before the group did. Who carried the weapons to that point? Were there local facilitators?
Reports suggest there were 10 to 14 attackers. Why would, whoever planned the attack, need such a large group when three to four trained people with automatic weapons would be enough to kill a dozen unarmed men caught by surprise? How could such a large body of armed men go undetected in an area where there’s a large, covert and overt presence of intelligence personnel and their informers, and non-locals can be fairly easily picked up — unless they moved to a pre-designated rendezvous in small groups.
Could it be that the number of attackers was much less than what is being reported? It makes more sense, both for the purposes of attacking and extricating, to keep the group small. Detection is more difficult and concealing movement can be relatively easy. Weapons can be carried, field-stripped and then assembled before the attack. They can either be hidden after the attack or destroyed. This was not a suicide mission so it must have had an extrication plan.
Still, regardless of any theories, the issue of motive remains. Looters don’t trek long distances to pick up backpacks and money, unless they chance upon a target. According to one police report, the attackers did not touch the victims’ belongings.
Is the motive then to destroy the economy of the area? Is it to open a new front for the government and turn the relatively calm but strategically very sensitive G-B into another hotbed of extremist terrorism? If it is the latter, the former being just a spin-off of it, then we should see more attacks on both soft and hard targets. If such a scenario comes to pass, it will put terrible pressure on security forces, primarily elements of the Force Command Northern Areas (FCNA). If the FCNA troops have to get involved in an internal low-intensity conflict (LIC), the Command will be spread thin and will either have to induct more troops dealing with the LIC or take the pressure on its primary role which is to defend against India along a very difficult Line of Control as well as along the western ridges of the Saltoro Range. The Karakoram Highway could also come under threat and the Road Maintenance Battalions will either need additional troops for local protection or increase their own components for such protection to fulfil their primary role.
The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has taken responsibility for the attack and claims a group under its banner is now operating in the area. One report suggests the involvement of the Asmatullah Moavia group which, for some time, has linked up with local sectarian groups. There is a strong possibility of this and we are told the security teams are following up on these leads.
No matter how one looks at it, unless there is an off chance of this incident being an isolated aberration, which is highly unlikely, the government, the intelligence agencies and the army should brace for more trouble. This is why it is absolutely crucial that the terrorists who mounted this attack are hunted down and captured. If this was a planned operation and the beginning of more to come, getting these criminals is a must not just to show the state’s resolve in dealing with what has happened but also in unravelling any bigger strategic plan to destabilise the area.
I have said before but it bears repeating: sectarian terrorists form a major component of the TTP whose ideology is essentially sectarian and rabidly anti-Shia. Those who think that sectarian terrorism and the TTP are different phenomena, and while one must be put down and the other talked to, are either dissemblers or hopeless fools.
Published in The Express Tribune, June 26th, 2013.