Don’t do foreign and defence yourself
The PM is wrong in thinking that he can be more effective by holding the defence, foreign portfolio himself.
The writer is Editor, National Security Affairs at Capital TV and a visiting fellow at SDPI
A review of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s initial actions will be in order after the first 30 days of his government, but one decision already stands out for being unwise: keeping the foreign and defence portfolios instead of appointing sound, full-time ministers to handle these crucial ministries.
Consider, starting with foreign affairs.
Mr Sharif has appointed Tariq Fatemi, a seasoned former diplomat and a commentator in this newspaper, as special assistant on foreign affairs, equivalent to a minister of state. He has also appointed Sartaj Aziz, a former finance and foreign minister, as National Security Advisor (NSA) with the additional charge of Advisor on Foreign Affairs. That makes Mr Aziz a federal minister.
The presence of these two decidedly very experienced hands, it is assumed, will take care of the absence of a foreign minister. The assumption also seems to be, and it is based on conversations with those in the big tent, that Mr Sharif does not want to be constrained in making foreign policy decisions that he thinks are important for Pakistan. These two technocrats are supposed to guide him through the bureaucratic maze and institutional inertia.
The reality is slightly different. There was a fight for the turf between the two seasoned hands before matters were made clearer. It expressed itself somewhat comically during the recent visit of the German foreign minister when there was much confusion about which of the two will be the point person for the meetings with the German FM. By all indications, we will see more tension.
Similarly, combining the two positions of NSA and adviser on foreign affairs may be essential for elevating Mr Aziz to the status of federal minister but it doesn’t work when it comes to doing work. As NSA, Mr Aziz is supposed to be a PM’s Secretariat official. Will he operate from there? Which of the two positions he holds is senior? It is safe to assume that to be NSA. Mr Fatemi, as special assistant to the PM, is also a PM’s Secretariat official.
At best, it will create confusion in the PM’s dealings with the Foreign Office (FO); at worst, it will help the bureaucrats stall things, resulting in precisely that which the PM ostensibly wants to avoid. [NB: not all of the FO’s work is sexy; there’s much that the FO does which has nothing to do with big ticket issues but, nonetheless, is very important. That work — its guidance, its daily running — requires a full-time minister.]
Advisory positions are sinecures. The advisers don’t advise. If they are good, they are used to give an intellectual underpinning to what the PM (or any principal) wants. If they are bad, we have an additional problem. This could further result in two scenarios, both undesirable. One, the FO could begin to slacken and start stonewalling. Two, it becomes a post office for stamping decisions emerging from the PM’s Secretariat.
In the first scenario, the FO, by getting into turf battles, will use its energies fighting off unelected advisers rather than handling foreign policy issues. In the second, it will be forced to surrender and lose all initiative. Neither is a desirable outcome.
There is another problem too: the differential between Mr Sharif’s capacity to appreciate foreign policy nuances and his desire to do foreign policy through media interviews. Effusiveness must not be mistaken for initiative. Foreign policy, like most policymaking, must be a combination of conventional wisdom and the right initiatives. Timing is of the essence. Moreover, whether one likes it or not, it requires sitting down and working out a national security strategy. That, presumably, should be the job of Mr Aziz as NSA. But in all likelihood, that will not happen because handling the FO will hold more attraction for him and his boss.
I did a programme on this issue with former foreign minister Hina Rabbani Khar, former defence minister Naveed Qamar and the PML-N’s minister of state for science and technology, Khurrum Dastagir Khan. Everyone agreed that Mr Sharif must have full-time foreign and defence ministers. And that brings me to the defence ministry.
Mr Qamar said the defence ministry is actually run by the GHQ. Nothing new in this but it corroborates, somewhat officially, what we know. The question is: should this be reason for a civilian government to either abdicate its responsibility and throw in the towel or, as Mr Sharif has done, to keep the portfolio with the prime minister? Both reactions are poor.
Appointing a strong defence minister or attempting to improve the capacity of the civilians to understand the security sector is not anti-state activity. If anything, doing so is vital for exercising effective civilian control. Of course, this will not be achieved in a day. But a beginning has to be made. Someone asked: will the army chief come to a meeting summoned by the defence minister? Perhaps not. But if that happens, and if that is against the rules of business, the onus of responsibility for violating a legal framework will be on the army chief. And we live in a world where such things have an annoying habit of becoming public.
The point is not to challenge and wrest what legitimately belongs to the military but to make it return to the civilians what legitimately belongs to the civilians. No one does so voluntarily. The army has been taking credit for helping democracy get entrenched. But there was a quid pro quo in the previous government’s tenure: you complete your term and we will remain seized of what we consider vital to our interests. That imbalance has to be corrected.
The PM is wrong in thinking that he can be more effective by holding the defence portfolio himself. If anything, he is removing the cushion that elevates him further in the food chain. Much before the DCC, the services chiefs must be answerable to the defence minister — a real one, that is.
There are other issues here, political and structural, that require their own debates. But those debates can begin and become meaningful only if the government shows an interest in doing some serious work.
Published in The Express Tribune, June 12th, 2013.
Consider, starting with foreign affairs.
Mr Sharif has appointed Tariq Fatemi, a seasoned former diplomat and a commentator in this newspaper, as special assistant on foreign affairs, equivalent to a minister of state. He has also appointed Sartaj Aziz, a former finance and foreign minister, as National Security Advisor (NSA) with the additional charge of Advisor on Foreign Affairs. That makes Mr Aziz a federal minister.
The presence of these two decidedly very experienced hands, it is assumed, will take care of the absence of a foreign minister. The assumption also seems to be, and it is based on conversations with those in the big tent, that Mr Sharif does not want to be constrained in making foreign policy decisions that he thinks are important for Pakistan. These two technocrats are supposed to guide him through the bureaucratic maze and institutional inertia.
The reality is slightly different. There was a fight for the turf between the two seasoned hands before matters were made clearer. It expressed itself somewhat comically during the recent visit of the German foreign minister when there was much confusion about which of the two will be the point person for the meetings with the German FM. By all indications, we will see more tension.
Similarly, combining the two positions of NSA and adviser on foreign affairs may be essential for elevating Mr Aziz to the status of federal minister but it doesn’t work when it comes to doing work. As NSA, Mr Aziz is supposed to be a PM’s Secretariat official. Will he operate from there? Which of the two positions he holds is senior? It is safe to assume that to be NSA. Mr Fatemi, as special assistant to the PM, is also a PM’s Secretariat official.
At best, it will create confusion in the PM’s dealings with the Foreign Office (FO); at worst, it will help the bureaucrats stall things, resulting in precisely that which the PM ostensibly wants to avoid. [NB: not all of the FO’s work is sexy; there’s much that the FO does which has nothing to do with big ticket issues but, nonetheless, is very important. That work — its guidance, its daily running — requires a full-time minister.]
Advisory positions are sinecures. The advisers don’t advise. If they are good, they are used to give an intellectual underpinning to what the PM (or any principal) wants. If they are bad, we have an additional problem. This could further result in two scenarios, both undesirable. One, the FO could begin to slacken and start stonewalling. Two, it becomes a post office for stamping decisions emerging from the PM’s Secretariat.
In the first scenario, the FO, by getting into turf battles, will use its energies fighting off unelected advisers rather than handling foreign policy issues. In the second, it will be forced to surrender and lose all initiative. Neither is a desirable outcome.
There is another problem too: the differential between Mr Sharif’s capacity to appreciate foreign policy nuances and his desire to do foreign policy through media interviews. Effusiveness must not be mistaken for initiative. Foreign policy, like most policymaking, must be a combination of conventional wisdom and the right initiatives. Timing is of the essence. Moreover, whether one likes it or not, it requires sitting down and working out a national security strategy. That, presumably, should be the job of Mr Aziz as NSA. But in all likelihood, that will not happen because handling the FO will hold more attraction for him and his boss.
I did a programme on this issue with former foreign minister Hina Rabbani Khar, former defence minister Naveed Qamar and the PML-N’s minister of state for science and technology, Khurrum Dastagir Khan. Everyone agreed that Mr Sharif must have full-time foreign and defence ministers. And that brings me to the defence ministry.
Mr Qamar said the defence ministry is actually run by the GHQ. Nothing new in this but it corroborates, somewhat officially, what we know. The question is: should this be reason for a civilian government to either abdicate its responsibility and throw in the towel or, as Mr Sharif has done, to keep the portfolio with the prime minister? Both reactions are poor.
Appointing a strong defence minister or attempting to improve the capacity of the civilians to understand the security sector is not anti-state activity. If anything, doing so is vital for exercising effective civilian control. Of course, this will not be achieved in a day. But a beginning has to be made. Someone asked: will the army chief come to a meeting summoned by the defence minister? Perhaps not. But if that happens, and if that is against the rules of business, the onus of responsibility for violating a legal framework will be on the army chief. And we live in a world where such things have an annoying habit of becoming public.
The point is not to challenge and wrest what legitimately belongs to the military but to make it return to the civilians what legitimately belongs to the civilians. No one does so voluntarily. The army has been taking credit for helping democracy get entrenched. But there was a quid pro quo in the previous government’s tenure: you complete your term and we will remain seized of what we consider vital to our interests. That imbalance has to be corrected.
The PM is wrong in thinking that he can be more effective by holding the defence portfolio himself. If anything, he is removing the cushion that elevates him further in the food chain. Much before the DCC, the services chiefs must be answerable to the defence minister — a real one, that is.
There are other issues here, political and structural, that require their own debates. But those debates can begin and become meaningful only if the government shows an interest in doing some serious work.
Published in The Express Tribune, June 12th, 2013.