Making it less easy to kill
A winning strategy would involve defining a desired end state and orienting the government’s behaviour towards it.
The writer is an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC and president of Vizier Consulting, LLC. He tweets @ArifCRafiq
The World Bank produces an annual ease of doing business ranking. It’s an index of the regulatory environments in 185 countries. Were one done for the ease of doing violence, Pakistan would certainly be at or near the top.
It is far too easy to kill in Pakistan. And it is far too easy to be killed. The country has become one of the world’s most hospitable locations for violent entrepreneurs — both native and foreign-born. A seemingly countless number of individuals and groups feel that exercising violence — mainly, the murder of other human beings — serves their interests more than it is detrimental to them.
It would be a mistake to simply frame the challenge as one coming from religious militants. Terror has come from the pant-shirt walla, as well as the bearded and clean-shaven ones wearing the shalwar kameez. In Karachi, the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is only the newest band of killers to join the fray.
During the election campaign, the bearded Ehsanullah Ehsan of the TTP pledged that his group would attack Pakistan’s three largest secular parties. And it followed through on those threats, murdering dozens of Pakistanis. They were just too easy to kill.
The present-day ugliness is three decades in the making. It is the result of the stunting of the political process. And it is the result of state policy that has not only given incubator space to many violent entrepreneurs, but has also provided them with access to capital, training and immunity from the law.
Closing this awful chapter in Pakistan’s history will not be easy. The country’s many security challenges are interlinked. Fata and Swat will not be stable until there is a political solution to the conflict in Afghanistan. And Karachi will not see peace without stability in Fata and Swat. Normalising ties with India is an economic imperative. But it could result in more disgruntled militants attacking Pakistan.
A winning strategy would involve defining a desired end state for Pakistan and orienting the government’s behaviour towards it. The goal should be a state that has a monopoly on the use of legitimate violence. A state that does not use illegitimate violence within its territory and without. A state that has the will and capacity to deter foreign aggression. A state that has the will and capacity to prevent illegitimate violence within its domain and lawfully punish all those who attempt such acts. And a state that protects the lives and liberties of all citizens — without exception — and orients its resources towards giving them the opportunity to thrive.
Toward this, Nawaz Sharif should develop a comprehensive national security strategy in consultation with military and intelligence officials, economic advisors, provincial chief ministers and members of parliamentary committees. He should appoint a national security advisor who leads a thorough review process that, for example, produces a consensus on what the state would be willing to concede to militants in Fata and Balochistan in return for peace, and prepares contingency plans in the event Afghanistan descends into civil war.
Implementing the strategy would require developing state capacity. The Defence Committee of the Cabinet needs a permanent secretariat that produces high-level analysis and policy prescriptions. The National Counter-Terrorism Authority should serve as a vehicle for intelligence sharing between the agencies and provinces. The provincial police forces and lower courts, desperately in need of reform, would benefit from witness protection programmes and more forensic investigations units. All this costs money. So, taxes will have to be paid.
Finally, militants in Pakistan and the surrounding region should be channeled toward the political process. Those who continue to fight must be held to account. It mustn’t be so easy to kill.
Published in The Express Tribune, May 30th, 2013.
It is far too easy to kill in Pakistan. And it is far too easy to be killed. The country has become one of the world’s most hospitable locations for violent entrepreneurs — both native and foreign-born. A seemingly countless number of individuals and groups feel that exercising violence — mainly, the murder of other human beings — serves their interests more than it is detrimental to them.
It would be a mistake to simply frame the challenge as one coming from religious militants. Terror has come from the pant-shirt walla, as well as the bearded and clean-shaven ones wearing the shalwar kameez. In Karachi, the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is only the newest band of killers to join the fray.
During the election campaign, the bearded Ehsanullah Ehsan of the TTP pledged that his group would attack Pakistan’s three largest secular parties. And it followed through on those threats, murdering dozens of Pakistanis. They were just too easy to kill.
The present-day ugliness is three decades in the making. It is the result of the stunting of the political process. And it is the result of state policy that has not only given incubator space to many violent entrepreneurs, but has also provided them with access to capital, training and immunity from the law.
Closing this awful chapter in Pakistan’s history will not be easy. The country’s many security challenges are interlinked. Fata and Swat will not be stable until there is a political solution to the conflict in Afghanistan. And Karachi will not see peace without stability in Fata and Swat. Normalising ties with India is an economic imperative. But it could result in more disgruntled militants attacking Pakistan.
A winning strategy would involve defining a desired end state for Pakistan and orienting the government’s behaviour towards it. The goal should be a state that has a monopoly on the use of legitimate violence. A state that does not use illegitimate violence within its territory and without. A state that has the will and capacity to deter foreign aggression. A state that has the will and capacity to prevent illegitimate violence within its domain and lawfully punish all those who attempt such acts. And a state that protects the lives and liberties of all citizens — without exception — and orients its resources towards giving them the opportunity to thrive.
Toward this, Nawaz Sharif should develop a comprehensive national security strategy in consultation with military and intelligence officials, economic advisors, provincial chief ministers and members of parliamentary committees. He should appoint a national security advisor who leads a thorough review process that, for example, produces a consensus on what the state would be willing to concede to militants in Fata and Balochistan in return for peace, and prepares contingency plans in the event Afghanistan descends into civil war.
Implementing the strategy would require developing state capacity. The Defence Committee of the Cabinet needs a permanent secretariat that produces high-level analysis and policy prescriptions. The National Counter-Terrorism Authority should serve as a vehicle for intelligence sharing between the agencies and provinces. The provincial police forces and lower courts, desperately in need of reform, would benefit from witness protection programmes and more forensic investigations units. All this costs money. So, taxes will have to be paid.
Finally, militants in Pakistan and the surrounding region should be channeled toward the political process. Those who continue to fight must be held to account. It mustn’t be so easy to kill.
Published in The Express Tribune, May 30th, 2013.