Rethinking ‘counterterrorism’ strategy

The govt should engage tribal insurgents in talks and bring them into the mainstream in order to isolate the jihadists

Before US President Barack Obama announced his new Afghan strategy last year, Victor Yermakov, one of the top Russian generals who commanded the Soviet’s 40th Army in Afghanistan, reminded him what the first man to unite Afghan tribes, Czar Babur had said: “Afghanistan has not been and will never be conquered, and will never surrender to anyone."

But the advice of a "defeated" general could have little meaning for a leader riding the crest of his newfound popularity. Obama went ahead, announced his hyphenated Af-Pak policy, promising a turnaround in the Afghan war, but with little success, so far. His goal of beating back the Taliban, building Afghan security forces and eliminating corruption by 2011 before pulling out troops is proving too ambitious. Support for the war is dwindling as is the appeal of the new US strategy.

The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), in its latest survey, called it "too ambiguous" a strategy which needs a "major rethink". The revised approach, it says, should involve pursuing talks with the Taliban, targeting al Qaeda and fostering a more federal Afghanistan, representative of the ethnic mix of the country. And if this doesn't happen, the IISS fears, western states will be "pinned down militarily and psychologically" in the war-torn country. This is what the Afghan people want: a recent survey shows 74 per cent Afghans favour talks with the Taliban. And this is what the war-weary coalition troops want: General David Petraeus hinted in a recent interview that talks were possible with the Taliban with "blood on their hands". I believe this is perhaps the only way out of the Afghan quagmire.

While extensive brainstorming is going on in western capitals on how to deal with the Afghan Taliban, there seems little or no effort in Pakistan to try new approaches to quell the tribal insurgency. Pakistan doesn’t have a counterinsurgency policy, not at least to my knowledge. The current democratic setup had come up with a well-choreographed "Dialogue, Development and Deterrence, or 3Ds policy". But little is known of it now.

Military might seems to be the only policy the government is following. We saw it in Waziristan, in Khyber, in Bajaur, in Orakzai and in Malakand division. The result:  insurgents disappear only to regroup elsewhere and mount reprisal attacks in major cities. The tribal insurgency is like a half-inflated balloon, you press it on one side and it will bulge out at another.

Every time the militants strike, our leaders come out with their oft-repeated "we'll-not-be-cowed-down" statements.  But for how long will this game of death go on? They don't have the answer.

I think it is about time policymakers reviewed their approach. If the Americans can talk to the Taliban with "blood on their hands", why can't we? Use of force is not the solution. I believe the government should engage the tribal insurgents in talks and bring them into the mainstream in order to isolate al Qaeda and other jihadists who have successfully exploited anti-American sentiments in the region which are growing as the frequency of US drone attacks grows. The government's running-with-the-hare-and-hunting-with-the-hound policy is alienating the tribal people. And anti-Americanism is translating into an anti-Pakistan sentiment. This is very alarming.

But think of a more distressful scenario: if the Hamid Karzai government manages to cut a deal with the Taliban and the coalition troops withdraw from Afghanistan, where would we stand? I think we would never like to be sandwiched between two hostile neighbours. And we would never like to have more than three million "alienated" tribesmen along the border with a hostile country.

Published in The Express Tribune September 21^st, 2010.