All the president’s men
KARACHI:
With news reports indicating Pervez Musharraf is planning a return to Pakistan and active politics later this year, the WikiLeaks reports referring to the former president come at an opportune time. They reveal some of the president’s biases, the problems he had with his allies and what the US thought of him.
The role of Musharraf
Most of the reports cover the period from 2006 to 2007 when the sheen was wearing off Musharraf’s presidency and he began facing some of his biggest obstacles, from worsening relations with Afghanistan to the judicial crisis.
The Musharraf-Karzai rivalry
It is no secret that Afghan President Hamid Karzai has always been suspicious of Pakistan’s intentions with regards to the Taliban. But the WikiLeaks reports help fill some details in and also show the indefatigable optimism of the US that relations between the two leaders could improve.
One report from October 2, 2006 quotes Governor Haji Bahlul of Parwan province as criticising Musharraf’s “statement (to the effect that Karzai had his head in the sand) as a real slap in the Afghan face.” Musharraf, who had made the comment while promoting his autobiography in the US, had actually called Karzai an “ostrich with his head in the sand”
A further deterioration in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations can be seen in a report on the summit held between the two leaders in Ankara in April 2007. In mid-April, Karzai reportedly said he did not plan to travel to Ankara, and doubted that “Musharraf will survive politically until the elections”.
However, the Ankara summit did go through. While officially, the two said they held “comprehensive, cordial and useful talks”, privately Karzai said the meeting was ‘terrible’. A report from May 5, 2007 says, “Calmly and dispassionately Karzai called it a ‘terrible’ meeting dominated by an aggressive yet fearful Musharraf.”
The US, which realised the importance of having the two presidents allied in the fight against the Taliban, seems to have mistaken wishes for reality if their embassy dispatches are anything to go by. A report from May 2 quotes Turkish officials as declaring the summit was a success and goes on to say, “The first ever joint declaration issued by the leaders emphasises goodwill and confidence building, with a particular focus on anti-terrorism coordination.” A later cable, while acknowledging that the two governments “failed to resolve essential disagreements” nonetheless believed that it “enhanced ties between the two countries.”
Afghan officials had little faith in Pakistan’s political developments. The then director-general of the National Directorate of Security, Amrullah Saleh, assessed on March 8, 2008 “that Pakistan ISI and the Army will work to ensure that a weak prime minister is installed to preclude conflict with Musharraf. He described the wide-ranging control that the army had throughout the government and industry, leaving little under the responsibility of the civilian government. He noted that there would be little change until a civilian government had real control.”
Unjustified optimism
During the last two years of Musharraf’s tenure, WikiLeaks reports show few signs that his US patrons were worried. A cable from June 6, 2007 describes a March 24 meeting between Musharraf and the outgoing ambassador Ryan Crocker. This meeting took place soon after Musharraf dismissed Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry for the first time and began cracking down on the media.
The cable states in regard to a government-ordered storming of Geo TV’s offices, “Musharraf apologised. The apologies, and subsequent affirmations that the government was completely committed to press freedom, were accompanied by actions indicating the government was sincere.” In light of Musharraf’s imposition of emergency on November 3, 2007 and concurrent banning of all news channels, this assessment shows the rose-tinted glasses through which the Americans viewed Musharraf. From the report on the same meeting, the US even seems pleased that Musharraf intends to fire the head of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Agency (Pemra) and hire a public relations expert to aid then-information minister Muhammad Ali Durrani.
The US optimism proved to be premature and misguided. The Pemra chairman, Iftikhar Rashid stayed on till his term expired on February 8, 2008. More significantly, less than three months after his promise to Crocker that he was committed to press freedom, on June 4 Musharraf introduced the notorious amendments to the Pemra Ordinance of 2007 which allowed the agency to seize the equipment, shut the offices and cancel the licences of news channels without first referring it to the Council of Complaints.
The US should have guessed what was coming as an earlier report, referring to an April 2007 meeting between Musharraf and Centcom commander Admiral William Fallon described the president as becoming “highly animated when the talk turned to Afghanistan and the Pakistan media.” In typical US fashion, though, Musharraf was also considered to have been “relaxed and in command of the issues.”
Disorder in the house
While the US seemed to be confident of Musharraf’s continued rule, his allies, the Pakistan Muslim League - Quaid, were worried and strategising with the Americans to keep their patron in power. According to a WikiLeaks document, from August 31-September 3, 2007, unnamed, “key” PML-Q advisers met with various US officials, including the ambassador, to chalk out a strategy that would allow Musharraf to remain in power. At the time, there was a worry, justified as it turned out, that the Supreme Court would not allow the current parliament to grant Musharraf another term as president.
The solution proposed by the advisers was this: “An early dismissal of the National Assembly, a move that would enable Musharraf to remain as president until after parliamentary elections.” The proposal was marketed to the US by explaining that “this scenario would buy time to complete Musharraf’s negotiations with Pakistan Peoples Party leader Benazir Bhutto.” At the same time, the US clearly saw the PML-Q as expendable to its greater aim of a Musharraf-Benazir alliance. US opinion, as reflected in the contents of the report, is that “we find less credible PML’s self-serving effort to nix the Musharraf-Bhutto deal and convince Musharraf to quit as President but remain as Army Chief of Staff.”
Apparently, PML-Q leaders Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain and Chaudhry Pervez Elahi were trying a different tack. In a meeting held on September 2, they told the Principal Officer of the American Consulate in Lahore that “they were advising Musharraf to resign the Presidency but keep his position as Chief of Army Staff due to what they viewed as insurmountable Supreme Court challenges.” In the meeting the Chaudhry cousins also agreed to run a figurehead in the elections who would be “taking his directions from Musharraf.” The Chaudhrys also said they would never allow Benazir to serve a third term as prime minister or let Nawaz Sharif back into the country.
Three years after this drama played out, there have been reports that Musharraf is going to merge his political party with the PML-Q if he returns to Pakistan. This time around, the PML-Q will be sure not to place their fate in the hands of one man and the US too may have a more realistic outlook on their man in Pakistan.
Published in The Express Tribune, August 6th, 2010.
With news reports indicating Pervez Musharraf is planning a return to Pakistan and active politics later this year, the WikiLeaks reports referring to the former president come at an opportune time. They reveal some of the president’s biases, the problems he had with his allies and what the US thought of him.
The role of Musharraf
Most of the reports cover the period from 2006 to 2007 when the sheen was wearing off Musharraf’s presidency and he began facing some of his biggest obstacles, from worsening relations with Afghanistan to the judicial crisis.
The Musharraf-Karzai rivalry
It is no secret that Afghan President Hamid Karzai has always been suspicious of Pakistan’s intentions with regards to the Taliban. But the WikiLeaks reports help fill some details in and also show the indefatigable optimism of the US that relations between the two leaders could improve.
One report from October 2, 2006 quotes Governor Haji Bahlul of Parwan province as criticising Musharraf’s “statement (to the effect that Karzai had his head in the sand) as a real slap in the Afghan face.” Musharraf, who had made the comment while promoting his autobiography in the US, had actually called Karzai an “ostrich with his head in the sand”
A further deterioration in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations can be seen in a report on the summit held between the two leaders in Ankara in April 2007. In mid-April, Karzai reportedly said he did not plan to travel to Ankara, and doubted that “Musharraf will survive politically until the elections”.
However, the Ankara summit did go through. While officially, the two said they held “comprehensive, cordial and useful talks”, privately Karzai said the meeting was ‘terrible’. A report from May 5, 2007 says, “Calmly and dispassionately Karzai called it a ‘terrible’ meeting dominated by an aggressive yet fearful Musharraf.”
The US, which realised the importance of having the two presidents allied in the fight against the Taliban, seems to have mistaken wishes for reality if their embassy dispatches are anything to go by. A report from May 2 quotes Turkish officials as declaring the summit was a success and goes on to say, “The first ever joint declaration issued by the leaders emphasises goodwill and confidence building, with a particular focus on anti-terrorism coordination.” A later cable, while acknowledging that the two governments “failed to resolve essential disagreements” nonetheless believed that it “enhanced ties between the two countries.”
Afghan officials had little faith in Pakistan’s political developments. The then director-general of the National Directorate of Security, Amrullah Saleh, assessed on March 8, 2008 “that Pakistan ISI and the Army will work to ensure that a weak prime minister is installed to preclude conflict with Musharraf. He described the wide-ranging control that the army had throughout the government and industry, leaving little under the responsibility of the civilian government. He noted that there would be little change until a civilian government had real control.”
Unjustified optimism
During the last two years of Musharraf’s tenure, WikiLeaks reports show few signs that his US patrons were worried. A cable from June 6, 2007 describes a March 24 meeting between Musharraf and the outgoing ambassador Ryan Crocker. This meeting took place soon after Musharraf dismissed Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry for the first time and began cracking down on the media.
The cable states in regard to a government-ordered storming of Geo TV’s offices, “Musharraf apologised. The apologies, and subsequent affirmations that the government was completely committed to press freedom, were accompanied by actions indicating the government was sincere.” In light of Musharraf’s imposition of emergency on November 3, 2007 and concurrent banning of all news channels, this assessment shows the rose-tinted glasses through which the Americans viewed Musharraf. From the report on the same meeting, the US even seems pleased that Musharraf intends to fire the head of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Agency (Pemra) and hire a public relations expert to aid then-information minister Muhammad Ali Durrani.
The US optimism proved to be premature and misguided. The Pemra chairman, Iftikhar Rashid stayed on till his term expired on February 8, 2008. More significantly, less than three months after his promise to Crocker that he was committed to press freedom, on June 4 Musharraf introduced the notorious amendments to the Pemra Ordinance of 2007 which allowed the agency to seize the equipment, shut the offices and cancel the licences of news channels without first referring it to the Council of Complaints.
The US should have guessed what was coming as an earlier report, referring to an April 2007 meeting between Musharraf and Centcom commander Admiral William Fallon described the president as becoming “highly animated when the talk turned to Afghanistan and the Pakistan media.” In typical US fashion, though, Musharraf was also considered to have been “relaxed and in command of the issues.”
Disorder in the house
While the US seemed to be confident of Musharraf’s continued rule, his allies, the Pakistan Muslim League - Quaid, were worried and strategising with the Americans to keep their patron in power. According to a WikiLeaks document, from August 31-September 3, 2007, unnamed, “key” PML-Q advisers met with various US officials, including the ambassador, to chalk out a strategy that would allow Musharraf to remain in power. At the time, there was a worry, justified as it turned out, that the Supreme Court would not allow the current parliament to grant Musharraf another term as president.
The solution proposed by the advisers was this: “An early dismissal of the National Assembly, a move that would enable Musharraf to remain as president until after parliamentary elections.” The proposal was marketed to the US by explaining that “this scenario would buy time to complete Musharraf’s negotiations with Pakistan Peoples Party leader Benazir Bhutto.” At the same time, the US clearly saw the PML-Q as expendable to its greater aim of a Musharraf-Benazir alliance. US opinion, as reflected in the contents of the report, is that “we find less credible PML’s self-serving effort to nix the Musharraf-Bhutto deal and convince Musharraf to quit as President but remain as Army Chief of Staff.”
Apparently, PML-Q leaders Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain and Chaudhry Pervez Elahi were trying a different tack. In a meeting held on September 2, they told the Principal Officer of the American Consulate in Lahore that “they were advising Musharraf to resign the Presidency but keep his position as Chief of Army Staff due to what they viewed as insurmountable Supreme Court challenges.” In the meeting the Chaudhry cousins also agreed to run a figurehead in the elections who would be “taking his directions from Musharraf.” The Chaudhrys also said they would never allow Benazir to serve a third term as prime minister or let Nawaz Sharif back into the country.
Three years after this drama played out, there have been reports that Musharraf is going to merge his political party with the PML-Q if he returns to Pakistan. This time around, the PML-Q will be sure not to place their fate in the hands of one man and the US too may have a more realistic outlook on their man in Pakistan.
Published in The Express Tribune, August 6th, 2010.