The crisis is not over yet!
Instead of cool dispassion, clinical objectivity, government’s ‘heroic’ claims could lead to later disappointments.
That Pakistan’s relations with the US are in state of crisis is undeniable. What is debatable is whether the current spat will lead to rupture or reconciliation in the coming months. Since equally powerful arguments can be advanced in favour of either of the assessments, it may be useful to recall that while no two engagements are identical, there is a certain pattern to the cyclical nature of Pakistan-US relations.
All three decade-long engagements between the two countries have been initiated primarily by the super power — coincidentally by Republican administrations, reaching out to military regimes — evaluating our usefulness primarily through the prism of its global interests, rather than because of common perceptions or shared values. Even when relationships were packaged as moral undertakings, they were essentially transactional. Consequently, they have had a limited shelf life.
Nevertheless, since we found it convenient to portray these engagements as ‘strategic’, rather than ‘tactical’, each break-up has been contentious and painful, prompting us to accuse the US of abandonment even of perfidious behavior! It would therefore not be an exaggeration to state that the latest flurry of accusations emanating from Washington follows a well-established pattern, familiar to those who were witnesses to or involved in enactments of similar dramas in the past.
Whatever the reasons for current American anger — most likely a combination of multiple factors — ranging from White House’s frustration with its setbacks in Afghanistan, to the refusal of US generals to share Obama’s desire to pull out combat troops by the end of 2014. It could even be genuine concern about the likelihood of groups such as Haqqani’s making American exit messy. Whatever the truth, shifting the blame on Pakistan and placing the onus on us for its own shortcomings is both convenient and popular across the American political spectrum. In such a scenario, what is primarily relevant is not American ‘perfidy’, but our own failures to read the writing on the wall. Instead of reacting with cool dispassion and clinical objectivity, the government’s ‘heroic’ claims have whipped national sentiments, which could lead to conclusions that can only add to later disappointments.
Even the APC was primarily a public relations exercise, to cover up the government’s failure to carry out a review of commitments made to the US by the previous military regime. Even later, had its intentions been honest, it could have taken advantage of parliament’s unanimously approved resolution of October 2008, to reason with the US for a reconsideration of inherited obligations, on the strong moral argument that as a democratic government, it could not be expected to honour the onerous burdens left on its fragile shoulders by an illegitimate regime.
Had this been done and parliament taken into confidence, government would have not only avoided the setbacks and embarrassments it has been regularly confronted with, but also brought the country’s foreign and security policies more in tune with national interests and in accordance with popular aspirations. But having been facilitated to come to power by the active involvement of American and British diplomats, who engineered such dubious arrangements as the NRO, the government has preferred to maintain the status quo. In any case, whatever doubts there may have been, about its intentions were more than adequately set at rest by the WikiLeaks disclosures, which revealed the national leadership as both dishonest and duplicitous.
Published in The Express Tribune, October 5th, 2011.
All three decade-long engagements between the two countries have been initiated primarily by the super power — coincidentally by Republican administrations, reaching out to military regimes — evaluating our usefulness primarily through the prism of its global interests, rather than because of common perceptions or shared values. Even when relationships were packaged as moral undertakings, they were essentially transactional. Consequently, they have had a limited shelf life.
Nevertheless, since we found it convenient to portray these engagements as ‘strategic’, rather than ‘tactical’, each break-up has been contentious and painful, prompting us to accuse the US of abandonment even of perfidious behavior! It would therefore not be an exaggeration to state that the latest flurry of accusations emanating from Washington follows a well-established pattern, familiar to those who were witnesses to or involved in enactments of similar dramas in the past.
Whatever the reasons for current American anger — most likely a combination of multiple factors — ranging from White House’s frustration with its setbacks in Afghanistan, to the refusal of US generals to share Obama’s desire to pull out combat troops by the end of 2014. It could even be genuine concern about the likelihood of groups such as Haqqani’s making American exit messy. Whatever the truth, shifting the blame on Pakistan and placing the onus on us for its own shortcomings is both convenient and popular across the American political spectrum. In such a scenario, what is primarily relevant is not American ‘perfidy’, but our own failures to read the writing on the wall. Instead of reacting with cool dispassion and clinical objectivity, the government’s ‘heroic’ claims have whipped national sentiments, which could lead to conclusions that can only add to later disappointments.
Even the APC was primarily a public relations exercise, to cover up the government’s failure to carry out a review of commitments made to the US by the previous military regime. Even later, had its intentions been honest, it could have taken advantage of parliament’s unanimously approved resolution of October 2008, to reason with the US for a reconsideration of inherited obligations, on the strong moral argument that as a democratic government, it could not be expected to honour the onerous burdens left on its fragile shoulders by an illegitimate regime.
Had this been done and parliament taken into confidence, government would have not only avoided the setbacks and embarrassments it has been regularly confronted with, but also brought the country’s foreign and security policies more in tune with national interests and in accordance with popular aspirations. But having been facilitated to come to power by the active involvement of American and British diplomats, who engineered such dubious arrangements as the NRO, the government has preferred to maintain the status quo. In any case, whatever doubts there may have been, about its intentions were more than adequately set at rest by the WikiLeaks disclosures, which revealed the national leadership as both dishonest and duplicitous.
The crisis is far from over. President Barack Obama’s latest comments do not represent a change in strategy, only a modification in tactical approach. If anything, Kabul’s allegation of our involvement in Rabbani’s assassination will be used to ratchet up pressure on us. We need to develop a strategy beyond denial, which no longer carries any credibility. Something more effective and visible will have to be devised, one that rules out the risk of confrontation, while avoiding the humiliation of submission, dangers that are not as far-fetched as they may sound.
Published in The Express Tribune, October 5th, 2011.