Iran war: winners and losers

Regardless, when the war concludes, the winners and losers stand clear. The purpose of any war is to modify the behaviour of the enemy or to overwhelm it into submission. The ultimate expression of victory in war has been the overrunning of opposing forces and the occupation of territories. Alexander expressed it best in history. Or, how the Mongols destroyed cultures and civilisations with their ruthless marauding of nations. The World Wars were another kind of expression where, militarily, the opposing sides were fully vanquished and had no option but to submit. The Iran war was different. A lot different from the four-year-old Ukraine-Russia war, or the short skirmish between Pakistan and India last year.

To distinguish the winners from the losers, it is important to know the war in Iran. There were three separate wars fought in Iran – each different in its intent, structure and execution. The US military is designed to overwhelm, eliminate and annihilate an enemy in the manner Alexander would have fought. Built on its exclusivity after WWII, it survived the challenge posed by the Soviet Union and is now poised to take on China. When pitched against any other, it becomes disproportionately overmatched. The 1991 US war in Iraq reflected this correlation. Iran, however, was hugely different. The US wasn't looking to win territory. It aimed to decimate Iran as a system and win concessions to serve its interests. There were no advancing columns of land forces to overrun territory. Technology serves as an exciting tool, but rarely changes the way nations conceive war. Raised on the notion of annihilation, the overwhelming US force did not seem to have delivered compatible returns. Victory would, thus, be measured through relative gains. Absolute domination remains a fleeting notion. In time, the US will need to resolve this mismatch of intent and construct.

Compare this to the Israeli concept of war. Much smaller, but with clearly identifiable goals, it is structured, trained, and led in a kinesis-driven aim to eliminate a threat. Israel's recent military undertakings stand as testimony to such a national purpose. If Israel wants control of some ten kilometres inside Southern Lebanon, it will get it. If it must neutralise Hamas, weaken Hezbollah or contend and threaten Houthis, it will do so employing its exceptional intelligence assets, special forces, making inroads into the opposing system of forces, and use the military to that end. Having effectively neutralised Iran's alleged proxies, it now had Iran in its crosshairs. It aimed to weaken, degrade and destroy Iran's capacity to be a factor against it. Combined with the short war in June last year, Israel has been engaged in an ongoing effort to harry an enemy 2,500 kilometres away. Where it lacked in range or destructive ability, it cleverly induced the US to fill in.

We may demean and disparage Israel for its villainous ways, but it has always been able to achieve that for which it aimed. In its war objective against Iran, Israel may only be halfway there, but it will keep going back to 'mow the grass' – surreptitiously, if not in an open assault on its own. Iran will need decades to rebuild from its current losses, affording Israel significant freedom to pursue its agenda. Its 'Greater Israel' plan, though, would find push-back in the wider Middle East because of its illegitimate and immoral excesses in Gaza and now in Iran, and in how Israel is losing friends all around the world. In the meantime, it will go back to fighting 'Iranian proxies'. A ceasefire at this time is fortuitous in helping Iran escape the gauntlet intended to shackle it. In the war, though, Israel was able to persistently pursue the destruction of Iran's state structure, its military strength, economic infrastructure and its cultural and civilisational anchors in a targeted campaign.

Iran, on the other hand, was constrained in its means against the two most powerful militaries with what it had at hand. Years of sanctions may have inspired her to be self-reliant, but when it came to squaring the conventional forces military assault, Iran found itself deficient and inadequate. The war testified to it. In response, Iran could muster drones and missiles of varying capabilities with restrictions in range and effect. When it could not effectively defend against the persistent US-Israeli aggression, it resorted to its own offensive, limited in reach and effect. Iran's strategy was driven largely by its limitations. It divided the weight of its attack between Israel and US assets in the Gulf region. The neighbouring Gulf nations were, unfortunately, badly hit when Iran – to horizontally expand the conflict, and spread the pain – targeted their indigenous energy infrastructure.

The closure of Hormuz by Iran was another blow to the Gulf nations. It surely did not win Iran many friends. That Iran, too, has stood battered is obvious. It may not be fully out, but it is severely degraded and affected. How it will impact its society, economy and politics remains moot, but Iran's ruling set-up will have to step gingerly through the maze of challenges this war will leave in its wake. What choices Iran makes post-war will also determine how long peace lasts. Iran's opposition remains a strong and viable entity in its intent, structure and capacity. Post-war, Iran must mitigate the weight of its opposition through suave diplomacy and mending fences with its neighbours. The combined opposition to Iran will remain watchful and wary of any attempt by it to pursue and acquire threatening proportions of capability, nuclear or conventional. What Iran needs is time off from this repeated aggression. It must pursue strategic peace.

Iran is bruised and bleeding, but still standing. Israel is peripherally disturbed; its core strength remains viable and in place. The state remains robust, and any US administration will be its underlying strength. The US has only been marginally affected. It will stock up its used inventory and be ready to follow up on its global agenda, whether to our liking or otherwise. The purpose of war on all three sides has only been partially served within the resources available to each – either a qualified success, relative success, or enabling transitional gains. The two clear winners from the war are Israel and the Iranian regime. Both have sustained their positions, the regime for the moment. The US has been a passenger with a possible domestic fallout within its processes and norms. It is unlikely to materially change the USA's global standing. The losers in the war are the Iranian people, who have paid with their blood for the intransigence of the two military superpowers and the consequences of decisions made by their leadership. The war failed to modify state behaviours on all sides. States preserved themselves, and people paid the price.