A strategic neglect

The global contest for power is being redefined, not by oil, nor by traditional trade routes, but by control over critical minerals. Copper, lithium and rare earth elements now underpin everything from electric vehicles and renewable energy systems to advanced defence technologies. These are not just economic inputs; they are strategic assets. In the emerging order, access to these resources determines technological leadership, industrial resilience and military capability.

This is where China has built a decisive edge. Over the past two decades, Beijing has secured dominance not only in mining but, more importantly, in processing and refining. Today, a significant portion of the world's critical minerals passes through Chinese-controlled supply chains.

The US response has been to push for "supply chain diversification". The logic is clear: reduce reliance on China by developing alternative sources and routes. Yet, while this strategy is frequently articulated, its execution remains uneven. The search for alternatives often overlooks regions that are not only resource-rich but also geographically central to emerging trade networks.

Pakistan is one such case. From a mineral perspective, Pakistan's relevance begins with Reko Diq, one of the largest undeveloped copper and gold deposits in the world. At a time when global copper demand is expected to surge, driven by electrification and the green transition, such reserves are not peripheral; they are central to the future supply equation.

But Pakistan's importance cannot be understood through minerals alone. Its geographic position elevates its strategic value. Sitting at the intersection of South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East, Pakistan offers a rare combination: resource potential and connectivity. It provides the most direct access to the Arabian Sea for landlocked Central Asian states and serves as a natural corridor linking inland resource zones to global markets.

In supply chain terms, this dual role, as both source and transit route is difficult to replicate.

This is precisely why China has moved decisively to anchor its presence in Pakistan. Through CPEC, Beijing has invested in infrastructure, ports and connectivity networks that integrate Pakistan into its broader BRI. Gwadar port, in particular, is envisioned not merely as a commercial hub but as a strategic outlet, linking western China and potentially Central Asia to maritime trade routes.

For China, Pakistan is not an isolated investment. It is part of a larger architecture designed to secure long-term access to resources, diversify transport routes and reduce vulnerability to chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca.

The US, by contrast, has approached Pakistan with caution. This caution is often framed in terms of regional instability, but the strategic consequence is more significant: it has created space for China to consolidate its position with minimal competition. While Washington seeks to counter Beijing's dominance in mineral supply chains, its limited engagement in countries like Pakistan weakens its own diversification strategy.

This is not simply a missed opportunity; it is a structural inconsistency.

If supply chain resilience is a strategic priority, then engagement cannot be confined to low-risk environments alone. Critical minerals are often located in complex regions, and the infrastructure required to move them is inherently geopolitical. Avoiding such spaces does not eliminate risk; it redistributes advantage.

Pakistan's location further complicates this equation in ways that are often underappreciated in Western strategic thinking.

It sits at the convergence point of multiple regional dynamics: Central Asia's resource potential, the Middle East's energy corridors and South Asia's economic markets. Any serious attempt to build alternative supply routes, whether for minerals, energy or trade, inevitably intersects with Pakistan's geography.

Moreover, as global supply chains evolve, redundancy and diversification will depend not only on where resources are extracted, but also on how they are transported. Overland corridors linking Central Asia to warm-water ports are increasingly important, particularly in a context where maritime routes face both congestion and geopolitical risk. Pakistan offers one of the most direct and scalable pathways in this regard.

This makes its role less optional than often assumed.

At the same time, regional competition has intensified around these very advantages. India's opposition to CPEC reflects broader concerns about shifting connectivity patterns and strategic encirclement. Similarly, the expansion of Chinese influence through infrastructure and port development has raised alarms in Washington and among its allies. Pakistan, therefore, is not merely a participant in this evolving landscape, it is a central arena where competing visions of regional order are playing out.

The implications extend beyond bilateral rivalries.

For the US, integrating Pakistan into a broader mineral and connectivity framework would align directly with its stated goals: reducing dependence on China, expanding access to Central Asian markets and supporting alternative trade corridors. Yet, this requires a shift from a reactive to a proactive approach, one that recognises geography as a strategic asset rather than a complication.

China has already internalised this logic. Its investments in Pakistan are not short-term calculations; they are part of a long-term positioning strategy. By embedding itself within Pakistan's infrastructure and connectivity networks, Beijing is effectively shaping the routes through which future supply chains will operate.

The longer this dynamic continues unchallenged, the more difficult it becomes to rebalance.

This is why Pakistan's relevance in the global mineral economy cannot be treated as incidental. It is not just another resource holder; it is a geographic pivot. Its mineral reserves, when combined with its location, create a strategic proposition that directly intersects with great-power competition.

The current trajectory, however, suggests a widening gap. China is consolidating, the US is recalibrating and Pakistan remains under-leveraged in Western strategy despite its obvious advantages.

In this context, the real question is not whether Pakistan matters, it clearly does. The question is whether global powers, particularly the US, are willing to align their strategies with this reality. Because in a world where minerals define power, geography determines access. And in that equation, Pakistan sits at a point that is too critical to ignore, yet too important to approach with hesitation.