Force good but not a lasting option

In a dangerous escalation, both Afghanistan and Pakistan engaged in rocket, artillery and drone attacks across the border from February 24th to 26th. Both sides accused each other of "unprovoked firing" as the initiating factor for the latest attacks. However, for Pakistan, the TTP safe havens remain a persistent concern and serve as the justification for kinetic strikes against these shelters.

Pakistan launched the attacks against the Afghan Taliban in response to "unprovoked firing" from across the border in various locations along the border in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa's Chitral, Khyber, Mohmand, Kurram and Bajaur sectors late Thursday, February 26th. Pakistan Air Force (PAF) conducted airstrikes targeting military installations in Kabul, Kandahar and Paktia. Afghan Chief of Army Staff Fasihuddin Fitrat ordered end to "retaliatory operations against Pakistani military posts".

The recent surge in violence in border regions, particularly in Bajaur, Chitral, Khyber, Mohmand, Kurram, Tirah Valley, Khuzdar, Mastung and Zhob, appears to be the latest trigger for the Operation Ghazab Lil Haq.

Hard data, including cross-border attacks, involvement of nationals, satellite imagery and intelligence, supports Pakistan's claims that TTP, BLA and ISKP have intensified their activities, utilising Afghanistan as their operational and training base.

In contrast, Kabul's strategy seems to be one of denial and allegations. In multiple interviews with local and foreign media outlets, Zabihullah Mujahid, spokesperson for the Islamic Emirate, ruled out TTP presence in Afghanistan. Security challenges are Pakistan's internal issues, and it must address them independently, Mujahid has reiterated repeatedly.

Mujahid also appears to conflate certain Baloch militant groups with ISIS/ISKP to deflect Pakistan's assertion regarding the TTP's presence in Afghanistan. "Regrettably, instead of suppressing ISIS, Pakistan has provided safe havens for them in areas such as Mastung in Balochistan and locations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa."

Mujahid also seeks help from regional countries but this is where Kabul's dichotomous predicament begins.

Firstly, the February 2026 UN Security Council Monitoring Team report explicitly rejects Taliban claims and describes what many member states refer to as a "permissive environment" – a haven or operational base for multiple terrorist organizations that continue to pose regional and international threats.

Secondly, most regional nations — Pakistan, Iran, Uzbekistan and Russia — are demonstrably apprehensive about "terrorist sanctuaries" in Afghanistan.

The Russian Foreign Ministry assessment report reckons up to 23,000 local and foreign militants currently operate in Ghazni, Laghman, Kunar, Nangarhar, Nuristan and Parwan, with up to 7,000 and 3,000 members of the TTP and ISKP, respectively. The Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement continues to pose a concern for China, which demands assurances that anti-Chinese militant groups will not stay on or operate from Afghan territory.

Al-Qaeda primarily utilises Afghanistan as a host for training camps and establishes connections with various terrorist and extremist structures to expand its influence in the region.

Similarly, Pakistan accuses Kabul of failing to control TTP sanctuaries. The convergence of regional concerns is striking. The ISKP remains active and capable of high-profile attacks.

Thirdly, the Taliban regime remains under intense international scrutiny for the numerous decrees that UN human rights chief Volker Turk and others consider as a means to "further crush rights and freedoms, particularly for women".

Turk told media in Geneva that "a decree signed by Taliban supreme leader Hibatullah Akhundzada last month 'defines several crimes and punishments that contravene Afghanistan's international legal obligations'."

Mujahid promptly dismissed these reports as "unsubstantiated".

Fourth, the undeniable surge in Afghanistan-related violence underscores the futility of relying solely on military offensives to quell geopolitically-driven militancy. While occasional hard action may be necessary, the subsequent phase after a cooling down period presents even greater challenges. Diplomacy alone cannot erase the hatred that has been sown, as exemplified by the families of the 17 individuals who reportedly lost their lives in the Pakistani strike pursuing a Nangarhar target.

The Taliban's reticence and Pakistan's insistence on conclusive action against TTP have brought both nations to the precipice of war, which promises more attrition than repair or containment. Until the Taliban demonstrate their commitment through tangible actions, skepticism regarding their intentions will persist. Will they seek recognition and stability as a sovereign state, or are they once again prepared to serve as a haven in a world of competing power struggles?

Therefore, while the pursuit of terrorist safe havens across the border is a necessary step, a long-term approach that prioritises dispassionate rationality is equally crucial. Military interventions may provide a temporary respite, but long-term relief necessitates a mitigation strategy rather than military confrontations.

That is why, while Pakistan pursues terrorist safe havens across the border, its long-term interests also demand a dispassionate rational approach. Use of force may only offer a brief mid-term respite. Lasting relief requires a mitigation strategy, not military outing.

Until the Taliban move from statements to verifiable actions, skepticism of their intent will endure. A hard choice faces the regime: does it as a sovereign and respectable state seek global recognition and stability, or is it ready to jeopardise those ambitions by serving — willingly or otherwise — once again as a sanctuary in a world of competing power struggles?