Death of Al-Zawahiri, Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan

Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri was killed in Kabul in a CIA drone strike, as announced by President Joe Biden. The Egyptian-born, al-Zawahiri had led al-Qaeda since 2011, after its founder Osama bin Laden was killed in Abbottabad, Pakistan. The deceased surgeon carried a $25 million bounty and was accused of coordinating the September 11, 2001, attacks.

He was located through his family by intelligence earlier this year. CIA’s MQ-9 Reaper drone reportedly fired two Hellfire (R9X) missiles, killing Al-Zawahiri on his balcony in the Sherpur area of Kabul, a diplomatic enclave populated now by many Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) leaders/others. Taliban chief spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid confirmed the strike.

The IEA denounced it as “violation of international principles”. Whereas, the US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken stated al-Zawahiri’s presence in Kabul “grossly violated the Doha Agreement and repeated assurances to the world that they [IEA] would not allow Afghan territory to be used by terrorists to threaten the security of other countries”. The fact that al-Zawahiri lived almost openly in a well-populated area of Kabul, apparently with IEA permission and connivance has far-reaching implications for the IEA, al-Qaeda and Pakistan.

I covered Doha Agreement on April 30, 2020, “Afghanistan Future of the Past”, published here: https://tribune.com.pk/story/2210114/afghanistan-future-past. The three-part agreement contained a preamble and confidential annexes, not made public.

The preamble comprised four points; (a) guarantees/enforcement mechanisms by the Taliban to prevent the use of Afghan soil against the US/allies; (b) timeline for withdrawal of all foreign forces; (c) commencement of intra-Afghan dialogue; and (d) discussions for a permanent/comprehensive ceasefire and Afghanistan’s future political roadmap (power-sharing).

In part two, the Taliban committed to preventing any group or individual, including al-Qaeda, from using Afghan soil to threaten the US and its allies; sending a clear message to this effect; not to cooperate with or host such groups or individuals; and prevent them from recruitment, training, and fundraising.

The Taliban also undertook to deal with “those seeking asylum or residence in Afghanistan according to international migration law” ensuring such persons were not a threat to the US/allies; avoiding provision of visas, passports, travel documents/legal papers to suspects for entering Afghanistan. Whether al-Zawahiri under this clause qualified for asylum seems questionable given al-Qaeda’s continued operations worldwide, latest being a deadly attack on Mali’s main military base in July this year by an al-Qaeda affiliated armed group.

On the other hand, the agreement bound the US to review and remove “US sanctions and other restrictions” against the Taliban and to start diplomatic engagement with other UNSC members for this purpose. The US and its allies also committed to refrain from threats or use of force against the “territorial integrity or political independence of Afghanistan” or interference in its domestic affairs. The US also agreed to seek economic assistance for Afghanistan’s reconstruction.

Sadly, the US also has been wanting in compliance to its commitment under the deal, besides illegally holding off US$9 billion in Afghan money, from transferring to a cash-strapped Afghanistan in times of critical needs and wants. In sum, the Doha Agreement is still a ‘partially-complied but valid’ document, that can be used by the US to impose any punitive measures on the IEA.

As far as IEA is concerned, it is sad they have not learnt any lessons from shielding and hosting al-Qaeda the first time around, that led to their removal from power, the subsequent jihad and miseries suffered by the hapless Afghans throughout the two decades of foreign occupation (2001-2021).

A closer introspection of Taliban movement is revealing. It was founded, mentored and nurtured by the Qandahar-based ideologues, believing in puritanical view of Islam. They still ideologically dominate the IEA. Support and asylum to al-Qaeda fits well within their worldview, which is singularly focused on their interpretation of Islamic fraternity.

Without discussing the right or wrong of this approach, and from a purely academic point of view, ‘Qandahari Shura’ will not concede to any action, injunction and/or option opposed to ‘their’ understanding and interpretation of Islam. They can be considered hardliners. Pakistan’s Mufti Taqi Usmani leading an Ulema delegation for parleys with Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) reportedly travelled to Qandahar, to plead with this Shura and Moulvi Haibatullah Akhundzada, the IEA spiritual head, the case for girls’ education in Afghanistan.

The other northern group, the ‘Khostwal’ Haqqanis are the battle-hardened component ‘under’ the puritanical Qandahari Shura. They are pragmatists like most soldiers are, flexible to a certain degree and comparatively environment-savvy. Their alma-mater, Darul Uloom Haqqania (hence the nom de guerre -Haqqani) is in Akora Khattak, Pakistan and JUI faction led by the deceased Maulana Samiullah (JUI-S) remains their strongest supporter, ideologically and operationally. Haqqanis’ battle-alliance with the outlawed TTP has implications for the peace process underway in Kabul, that would be discussed next week.

As far as Pakistan is concerned. The CIA strike raises important questions since the US Military ‘ostensibly’ does not retain any ground/sea-based ‘over-the-horizon’ capability to fire drones in the area/region. CIA, however, has discreet presence within the region. Here too, Central Asian placing of CIA drones is not possible because of Russian war in Ukraine. US base in Qatar seems plausible; but the CIA-operated MQ-9 Reaper (ER) with 1850 kilometres range cannot make a return trip from Al-Udeid Airforce Base near Doha to Kabul. Therefore, either it was a one-way suicide mission with drone auto-destructed over hills or some unknown discreet CIA capability/system.

For HUMINT (human-intelligence), the CIA could depend upon an array of its sleeper sources in Kabul from the occupation days to track, identify, and home on to al-Zawahiri. If indeed Pakistan was helpful (over-passage), it would have military, security, economic and political implications. There are reportedly secret overtures by Imran Khan also to mend fences with the US, after his careless barbs. US-Pakistan relations in the counter-terrorism context still remain critically important to both countries, especially since the fight with remnants of al-Qaeda and ISIK (Da’esh) is not over. Besides TTP, Afghanistan still carries a lot of interesting debris from the Jihad days. Pakistan’s military remains sensitive to the situation like any professional force would.

Taliban ascent to power owing to Pakistan’s overt/covert backing, and our continuing support to IEA constitutes Pakistan’s ‘positive leverage’. This leverage should continue to be used in steering IEA towards mutually beneficial policies and outcomes.

 

Published in The Express Tribune, August 4^th, 2022.

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