In my Op-ed published on 30th June, I promised to continue the political debate under two paradigms: the return of PTI being a ‘reinforcement of failure’; and the political contours of post-PTI Pakistan. The last two columns dealt with the issues. Under intellectual integrity and a desire deep down to see the 3rd option succeed (lots of ifs and buts though), a blue-print for a criticised PTI seems in order before closing this round of debate.
PTI’s limited and cited successes notwithstanding, some of its glaring shortfalls (some of its own making, some unintended and some enforced by the environment) can be summarised as economic mishandling (though the Party gets sympathy for Covid-19) and inflation (global environment, not entirely PTI’s fault); lack of diligent and coordinated team work to improve governance; obsession with chasing the corrupt, wasting precious time; avoidable rhetorical battles and useless filibustering; politics of confrontation and inability to develop working relations with other state institutions (Army included besides judiciary, media, election commission, bureaucracy, etc.) and opposition; corruption in PTI’s rank and file; reversing the earlier gains from stint in power in K-P (2013-18) like de-politicisation of police, etc.; following a suffocating administrative model by appointing youthful ‘District Coordinators’ with no experience, paralysing the state machinery; and following a less than institutional foreign policy on some critical issues.
Any assessment about PTI, based upon the recent success in the Punjab bye-polls may be premature and most analysts might regret it sooner than later, given the mercurial nature of our single event-dependent well-entrenched political culture, and its constants. PTI is not yet done with its reshaping. There is still a long way to go. Imran Khan needs support and, one hopes, he takes it and is much wiser. A dispassionate analysis of these 20 seats would be instructive. For most, whose heart and soul beat with Pakistan and its institutions (irrespective of the personalities) … a lifelong love, PTI comes ‘only’ after it fosters that love.
So, if IK wants to build from its unsuccessful earlier term in office, the Party needs to undertake serious structural, organisational and cultural changes aimed at enhancing its governance abilities. Party manifesto should include solid and actionable plans and ‘to-do lists’ post-lessons learnt analysis. The following discourse is suggestive in the earnest, without insulting anyone’s (especially the PTI gurus’) intelligence.
One. Khan’s combative style renders him unsuitable for heading a deeply polarised state and society. As suggested earlier, he may ‘consider’ becoming a ‘rahber-e-tehreek’ styled after famous people who successfully did so, and guide affairs of the state from this iconic mantle without holding a public office, leaving governance to capable, more amenable and experienced hands. In a Party with a demi-god surrounded by a periphery of lesser idols, buoyed by recent success, this might be unpalpable at the moment, but this in the long-run would help retain the Party vote bank. This is because the electorate would differentiate between IK’s persona and the Party, without making him responsible for any shortcomings of the Party’s rank and file, besides ensuring better governance.
Two. He and/or his appointee should select their ‘chief of staff’ (top-most manager of routine affairs, not to be confused with Army COAS) and core team carefully. There is no dearth of capable talent both in the serving as well as the retired bureaucracy — civil and military, corporate world, judiciary and media. For team selection, the Party should start today. If and when in power, PTI would rely on intelligence organisations for vetting such selection. A one-term Army Chief would ensure provision of best counsel. Similar team provision to the Party Chief Ministers be ensured. These core teams should have oversight and control by the federal and provincial chief executives only.
Chief Minister selection, a Party decision, should be thorough, deliberate and in keeping with ability and capacity. Crossing Party lines is not un-kosher in such talent hunt. All democracies follow this. A democratic Obama selecting a Republican Robert Gates as his Defence Secretary (2006-11) is a case in point. In our context, this cross-party selection would weaken the opposition also. There are ‘capables’ always willing to jump ship for personal benefit.
Ministries likewise be headed by the most capable; considering sitting senators, appointed and nominated persons of required calibre. Party loyalists are sometimes a lability, and PTI has paid a price for it.
Three. For critical issues and reforms, PTI needs to form ‘task forces’ again, mining through the pool of ‘recent’ retirees from the groups cited above, as talented political leadership would never be available to a new party like PTI in sufficient numbers. And the electorate would not buy any subsequent excuses for lack of performance, with an opposition always lurking in the background to take advantage of the ‘feared ineptitude’.
The Party should start a talent hunt ‘now’ rather than waste time in useless speeches and agitation. It has suffered from lack of talent more than anything else. Coming up with a ‘shadow government’ when not in power is always a better idea, as it trains and grooms party cadre and makes transition easier, rather than looking at the balance sheet of the first 100 days. For this, Party Secretariate be staffed with capable personnel, commencing work ‘now’ besides/rather than planning rallies.
Four. Following the K-P example, grass roots reforms concerning revenue, healthcare, education and police de-politicisation (correctly identified core areas) be implemented nationally. The flawed practice of appointing inexperienced ‘District Coordinators’ be done away with, allowing bureaucracy to work non-coercively. A system of bureaucratic work evaluation and audit be instituted to maintain oversight and ensure efficiency. Restrictive and road-blocking laws and statues be amended and/or scrapped.
Five. Extension in service to any four-star and other organisational heads be strictly and constitutionally forbidden. Extension leads to manipulation by both sides and takes out objectivity from the advice, decision-making and counsel by the affected official(s), leading to manipulation, overreach in authority and uncontrolled personal ambition.
Six. At the same time, IK and the Party should strongly avoid interfering in the Army’s domain. Three-stars are the constituency of a Service Chief, and falling in love with this of that three-star, undermines the principle of ‘unity of command’, irreparably damaging the military ethos. ‘No’ Service Chief will ever concede on this. One hopes the Party has learnt this valuable lesson in ‘Pakcraft’.
We continue next week…
Published in The Express Tribune, July 21st, 2022.
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