The TTP conundrum — positions and solutions

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Sometimes the story needs to be retold, and the positions re-stated, as the audience changes, the stakeholders are overtaken by events, and the actors involved have other points of foci. Hence the TTP conundrum needs a restatement from Afghan and Pakistani standpoints to clear the mist and retain focus.

From Afghanistan's standpoint, the TTP issue has underwent from outright denial, to it being a Pakistani problem, to IEA's presumed inability, unwillingness or both, to address Pakistan's concerns. For a long time, IEA denied the presence of TTP militants in eastern Afghanistan's loya Paktia enclave. Pakistani dossiers on TTP presence shared at the highest level with Kabul, notwithstanding. However, behind the scene the hosts of TTP, the venerated Haqqanis of greater Khowst, realising the burdensome legacy of TTP and its spoiler potential for the critical Pak-Afghan bilateralism, pressed for negotiated settlement. Hence the botched 2022 parleys in Kabul under the previous military and ISI leadership, that were bound to fail. TTP's five or so demands besides being an over-ask amounted to a TTP state within Pakistan.

Denial about (TTP) presence, that was untenable, changed to refusal of militants using Afghan soil against Pakistan. Again, irrefutable intelligence-sharing by Islamabad led to some soul-searching in Kabul, especially when it was presented as violation of the 2020 Doha Agreement with the US; and Pakistan's 'inherent right of self-defense' under Article 51, Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The three instances of trans-frontier strikes by Pakistan demonstrated Pakistan's unremitting resolve. The savvy leadership of IEA realised the military asymmetry, and the economic and politico-diplomatic price that Kabul risked by continued confrontation with Pakistan, its only 'indispensable interlocutor'.

That brought the impasse to a situation of quasi helplessness, where Kabul did not want to accept its 'covert inability and overt unwillingness' to act against TTP. Expecting aggressive IEA action against TTP after August 2021 take-over was, in any case, Pakistan's wishful thinking. Recently this 'inability-unwillingness' paradox has forced Afghan interlocutors to 'concede the TTP problem', as reported in the press this week.

From Pakistan's standpoint, solution must be based upon and emanate from this 'inability-unwillingness conundrum' of Kabul. Supplementary arguments to this iteration, as often stated, are: a) the division within IEA over any forcible ejection of TTP; b) the TTP hosting being in line with Afghan Islamic hamiyyat (fraternity) and Pashtunwali injunctions; c) TTP becoming Haqqani militia, a 'force-in-being', useful during 'potential' internecine Afghan conflict; d) TTP emerging as a 'default leverage' against Pakistan, however ill-considered and damaging it to Kabul itself; and, d) the TTP by extension becoming IEA's 'negative relevance' with the West Plus.

The above discussion boils down to the following doable actions for both sides, so that the situation stands diffused, positive bilateralism is revived, and unintentional or forced escalation is avoided.

First, the Haqqanis need to rein in the TTP from attacks using the Afghan soil or former FATA, besides other acts of omission and commission. TTP's criminal behaviour, to remain financially viable, needs immediate attention. This single CBM during first half of 2025 'might' lead to Pakistan's change of heart in the second half, to allow a semblance of negotiations. Haqqanis meanwhile can plead with Qandahar to divert some US funds to feed their TTP guests.

Second, TTP would do well to undertake nanawatee - unconditional forgiveness - from Pakistan, their mother state, which under Pashtu lar (way) cannot be refused. Reports suggest that TTP lodgment on Afghan soil is not without logistic, economic, political, socio-anthropological and psychological problems. Living in a foreign land in subservient status has its own disdainful downsides for the mainly Pashtun TTP rank and file.

Third, Pakistan needs to classify TTP in Black, Grey or White categories, to use the intelligence parlance. Each group entails different process and response. 'White', mostly the gullible and misguided elements without any criminal baggage, needs to be dealt with first. Speedy disposal and consequent repatriation would lessen TTP's burdensome paradox for Haqqanis, as 'White' presumably constitutes majority. However, their release into Pakistani society to follow deliberate screening, conduct assurances and police reporting mechanisms.

'Grey' with criminal background to undergo punishment under Pakistani or tribal laws (Pashtunwali, Turizoona, Islamzoona, etc), or Sharia, and are released after undergoing punishments awarded. Their release also follows the above cited safeguards.

It is the 'Black' cadre that is problematic. They have blood on their hands and even if they are somehow forgiven (impossible), they would be neutralised on return to their villages to settle scores, given the feuds from their criminal past. They should better remain on the Afghan soil like the Arab and other non-Afghan militants from the early Jihads. IEA should disperse them, move them away from border and keep a vigilant eye on them for any likely collusion with IS-K, for example.

Fourth, Pakistan should financially help Kabul as mutually agreed, ironically paying for this nemesis. However unpleasant it might appear, TTP's otherwise criminal scavenging and living off land is a bigger evil. Haqqanis are also in an intractable bind, and Pakistan needs to help these long-time assets by providing them a way out from their self-created predicament. And a mechanism with verifiable benchmarks needs to be established to evaluate Pakistani largesse resulting into lasting peace.

Fifth, knee-jerk reactions like border closures be avoided by Islamabad, as it harms population on both sides. Likewise fence raises some genuine Afghan concerns that need to be addressed. Reinforcing people-to-people and business-to-business contacts reduces operational space for India and Iran.

Sixth, the rhetoric needs to be reined in especially on Afghan side. Emotions-laden denunciations by Afghan leaders of the stature of Abbas Stanikzai, a graduate of Indian Military Academy, during the recent saga of Wakhan Corridor, is never beneficial. Likewise learning wrong military, diplomatic lessons by some unschooled IEA leaders from their 'Pakistan-engineered' victories (not really victories) against foreign powers with peripheral interests, is also misleadingly unhelpful. Such acrimony goes down in institutional memory, and Pakistan has more storage than interim IEA.

Neighbours can nowhere afford mutual hostility. It is time to give peace a chance. TTP anomaly feeds conspiracy theories. It is time to stand up, be counted and counted upon.