Attainability of Indo-Pacific strategy

“In the past two decades, the United States has been forced to retreat from strategy based on Primacy and Dominance to one of Deterrence.” This was first time admitted in 2018 National Defence Strategy. Succeeding review in 2022 complements this realisation, stating China as ‘most consequential strategic competitor’ or No 1 threat. This strategic shift emerged from wargames run on propagated conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific, in that, most of the simulated scenarios favoured China decisively taking over Taiwan before the US military could factor in.

Indo-Pacific is an important ingredient of ‘China Containment’ scheme. China’s pacing economy is mainly dependent upon oil supplies through the Straits of Malacca and South China Sea in this region. Choking 80% of imported crude oil (239 million metric tons annually) from the Middle East and Africa and 39% of China’s total trade at these bottlenecks can stall its roaring economy, thus impacting its ambitions.

South China Sea in the Indo-Pacific is enormously significant for all stakeholders. An estimated $3.37 trillion worth of global trade passes through it annually, accounting for a third of global maritime trade. Its seabed is estimated to hold 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 11 billion barrels of oil. According to US Geological Survey, there could be another 160 trillion cubic feet of natural gas and 12 billion barrels of oil undiscovered. The region holds 15% of the world’s fisheries.

Energy and biodiversity-rich South China Sea has been reverberating with territorial disputes involving China, Japan and other South East Asian states since 1970s. China has an uncompromising sovereign claim on large swath of the sea marked by what is called nine-dash-line. China’s claims are contested by Pacific countries and the US that encircle Spratly and Paracel Islands, and Scarborough Shoal, and are related to fishing rights, exploration of oil, natural gas, and strategic control of shipping lanes.

As China grows in power projection and economic influence, territorial disputes have pushed Asia-Pacific states towards the US for combined security, though Beijing is bilaterally settling oil exploration or fishing rights disputes in the region. China has bolstered diplomatic and economic engagements with Pacific Islands (Melanesia, Micronesia and Polynesia), and has become a major player in the region, troublesome for US military presence over these islands.

The US political and economic engagement with ASEAN, Pacific Islands, Australia and India preceding ‘Asia-Pivot’ is pretexted on Free & Open Indo-Pacific and security to South East Asian countries amidst territorial disputes. The US has $940 billion FDI and $1.9 trillion mutual trade in the region. A huge portion of US military in the shape of largest air force of the world and sizeable Pacific fleet is deployed under the US Indo-Pacific Command in a number of South East Asian countries, Japan, Australia and Pacific Island states, which help host nations in capabilities buildup. On Taiwan’s defence, the US does not have a formal security commitment, but deals through 1979 Taiwan Relations Act require provision of defensive capabilities to Taiwan only. American posturing towards Taiwan’s defence remains strategically ambiguous.

To militarily limit China in the Indo-Pacific, the US has fomented regional alliances. Trilateral security pact AUKUS (Australia, UK, and US) would help Australia in nuclear-powered submarines acquisition and military capability enhancements. QUAD (US, India, Australia and Japan) purposed to hedge China’s influence in the region as evident from frequent joint naval curriculum being exercised for two years.

India, for her large naval force, has been assigned ‘Net Security Provider’ role from West Indian Ocean to the South China Sea, a move to contain China, equally detrimental to maritime security of South Asian states, including Pakistan. To support this, Andaman and Nicobar Tri-Service Command has been set up in the South. Indo-US Strategic defence relationship was formalised in 1995. In 2005, ‘New Framework for India-US Defense’ was signed warranting military engagements, defence technology sharing, and establishment of framework on maritime security cooperation. Same was renewed for 10 years in 2015 with ‘Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean Region’.

In response, China has fielded world’s largest navy that has recently commissioned advanced aircraft carrier Fujian, capable of rivaling US Nimitz class. Also, China has consolidated A2/AD (Anti Access/Area Denial) capability through anti-ship cruise and ballistic missile variants capable of killing aircraft carriers and onshore military installations in the Asia-Pacific. This would certainly inhibit the US in contesting China in her immediate area (Taiwan) and impact US deployments in South East Asian countries and the Pacific Islands. China’s test of nuclear-capable hypersonic missile in August 2021 establishes China’s superiority in this regime.

Militarily, the US is not envisaged to confront China with power parity in the Indo-Pacific, and the economic interdependency. Not the military power alone, China is propelled high because of economic growth poised to place her economy on top by 2028. The China-US trade last year surged by 28.7% to $755.6 billion, and China’s low cost commodities form lifeline of US consumer market. Thriving economy affords China in investing in regional economies and integrating those through BRI, to which CPEC is also a part. Strategically, BRI helps China diversify energy supply and trade routes amidst South China Sea imperatives.

On Indo-Pacific, the nastiest miscalculation remains India militarily confronting China. Not militarily credible to contain China – evident from the Galwan Valley crisis and aerial skirmishes with Pakistan in 2019 – India has a track record of letting the US down as also witnessed in case of Russian oil import amidst global sanctions. Against the US desire, India would not sacrifice dividends of intertwined economies. The fact that CPEC affords China an opening to Indian Ocean affords India a deceitful narrative of US encirclement by Pakistan and China, and Pakistan being hostile to US interests.

In this part of the Indo-Pacific strategy hinging upon India, while the US is unable to contain China, it would certainly nurture India as regional hegemon soaked in Hindutva blend of radicalism, which is detrimental to the existence of minorities domestically as well as peace and stability in South Asia – exactly what the US ended upon accomplishing earlier. Interestingly, the US would continue to pursue this despite realising its outcome, until postmortems of failures detail losses incurred by affected nations and the US itself, like what happened in the Middle East and Afghanistan in the last two decades.

Published in The Express Tribune, July 2^nd, 2022.

Like Opinion & Editorial on Facebook, follow @ETOpEd on Twitter to receive all updates on all our daily pieces.