Russian strategy and the Ukraine crisis
The writer is a retired major general and has an interest in International Relations and Political Sociology. He can be reached at tayyarinam@hotmail.com and tweets @20_Inam
I was on Moskva (Moscow) River cruise when I glimpsed the statue of Peter the Great (1672-1725), marveling at the fact that the Bolsheviks left it standing. Famous for adopting the European model to guide Russia out of its revolt-infested peasantry and poverty-dominated countryside, he led Russia with distinction towards greatness. Consolidation of Russian navy is among his many achievements.
Russia, despite its size and resources, has historically struggled to grow more food for its population due to its inhospitable weather and terrain, besides keeping a lid on popular discontent. Bolsheviks and later the communists — through their ‘collective-farming’ and centralised state economy — were able to overcome both, making the erstwhile USSR one of the most powerful military-economic alliance systems. However, its European borders and buffer, and its soft Central Asian underbelly have remained at the core of Russia’s grand strategic conundrum.
Russia, by compulsion, staunchly defends its erstwhile ‘USSR sphere of influence’. This includes its former landmass in Eastern Europe (where it asserts itself commensurately west to east; more in the east, closer to home); the Central Asia (where it cedes no influence); the Baltics (where it cedes influence marginally); the Middle East (where it ensures strong alliances and reliable partnership (like with the Assad regime in Syria and with Iran); the Asia-Pacific (revival of strong ties with China while portraying Japan as the US surrogate); and beyond.
Russia under President Putin — as expected of his KGB and nationalist credentials — vies for revival of its lost glory, forcing similar retreat on the US from Europe, geoeconomics permitting, that the US forced upon the erstwhile USSR in the 1990s. Under its policy of revival and reassertion from the Middle East to Eastern Europe and from Syria to Afghanistan; Russia tore Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, apparently ‘to extricate the deposed Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych’, but in fact to block Ukraine’s attempts to join NATO, perceived by Russia as an extension of the US. And Russia will use coercion in all forms to ensure that Ukraine remains pliant and firmly planted in the Russian orbit. Russian shadow over Poland looms large.
Ms Fiona Hill recounts in The New York Times when President Putin tersely told US President George Bush during 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania, “George, you have to understand that Ukraine is not even a country. Part of its territory is in Eastern Europe and the greater part was given to us [Russia].”
NATO had promised Ukraine and Georgia ‘eventual’ membership of the alliance, seen by Russia as provocative intervention in its sphere of influence. Russia, consequently invaded Georgia in 2008; annexed Crimea in 2014; and the armed insurrection/civil war it started in Ukraine’s southeastern Donbas region through its proxies, rages to this day.
The timing of the present three-sided Russian deployment around Ukraine is telling. Sensing an opportunity, Russia — analysts feel — wants to evict the US from Europe, as the US is fractured at home and in retreat from abroad after the Afghan defeat; and Europe especially Germany the European bulwark is not hawkish enough against Russia, fearing trade loss and the Russian gas blockade in cold winters. And unlike President Biden, Mr Putin is also not restrained by a virulent press, an opposition from within his party/country or any elections (Putin is likely to be re-elected in 2024). Putin’s assertiveness in Russian’s ‘near abroad’ is supported by majority Russians, as revival of Russia’s past status. And in Russian reckoning, the additional financial sanctions (to those already factored in) will be hard for some NATO allies to apply.
So, in parleys between the two sides, as reported, Russia/her proxies have challenged American bases in Japan, the US role in Asia-Pacific and America’s position in Europe, hinting at redeployment of hypersonic missiles to Cuba and Venezuela, revisiting the 1960s.
Militarily, Russia has deployed over 110,000 troops alongside tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery guns and combat logistics, besides commensurate air power. UK’s intelligence estimates put Russian deployment on Ukrainian borders at 60 battle groups, a third of its total available force. Russian deployment rings Ukraine from northeast, east and southeast, with more punch packed in the eastern troops, poised towards Ukrainian capital Kiev.
A Russian force of several thousand has moved to Belarus in the north/northwest to conduct a joint military exercise ‘Allied Resolve’ (10-20 February). And Russia has deployed the advanced Su-35 fighter planes, air-defence systems, munitions and medical support, ostensibly for the exercise. Elsewhere non-deployment of medical resources is interpreted by experts as non-imminence of the invasion. Belarus might also acquiesce to the Russian nuclear deployment, as its leader, Alexander Lukashenko is an ally of President Putin. Russia is also holding the worldwide naval drills shortly, from the Atlantic to the Pacific with 10,000 troops, over 140 ships/support vessels and 60 aircraft.
President Putin had endorsed Russia’s ‘nuclear deterrent policy’ in June 2020, allowing use of nuclear weapons, in response ‘to a conventional strike’, if it targets Russia’s ‘critical government and military infrastructure’… threatening the very existence of state. He is also on record to hint at nuclear retaliation, not caring about the world if Russia does not exist, consequent to US/NATO nuclear attack(s).
So, it looks Russia has locked Europe and put the US on defensive, through a game of territorial ‘chipping-away’, incorporating coercive deployment, war games, drills and propaganda. Russian demands include ‘ironclad guarantees’ that Ukraine and no other former Soviet republic will become NATO member. That NATO will vacate positions taken after 1997. And the US will wind up its deployment in Europe including nuclear missiles.
In military parlance, capability plus intention equals threat. In this case, capability is on the ground, and as it is said, intentions can change overnight, therefore, threat looms large for a war in Ukraine, unless Russia is given some tangible face-saving. Given the US/NATO situation and its inability/unwillingness to risk a conflict over Ukraine, no serious riposte — other than sanctions and arming of Ukrainian forces, etc — is expected from the West. Russian officials on the other hand have hinted that Moscow doesn’t “need peace at any cost” in Europe. Some Russian hawks have even suggested pre-emptive strike against NATO, to convey Russian seriousness.
Therefore, if past is any guide, Mr Putin will walk away laughing this time around too.
Published in The Express Tribune, February 3rd, 2022.
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