Spoilers of Afghan peace
Sustainability of the Afghan peace hinges upon consistent monitoring by all stakeholders
The writer is a Senior Police Manager and Supervisor. He is a Fulbright scholar and an MPA from Columbia University, NY. He can be reached at choasayden@yahoo.com
The Afghan peace agreement has finally been signed between the US and the Taliban, in Qatar, last week. The indication of such a concurrence was probably clear once Pakistan committed to it wholeheartedly with positive signs of a working understanding with the US at the beginning of 2019. A sort of equilibrium has been achieved among the principal stakeholders though, many secondary and tertiary players are still trying to disrupt the peace process. These spoilers have been categorised in three distinct groups in terms of their power, outreach and capacity.
The first group comprises elements that are at the helm of affairs in Kabul and wield some influence in the region. These spoilers can raise objections to the timelines agreed upon between the US and the Taliban. Already, President Ashraf Ghani is voicing his concern about the release of 5,000 Taliban prisoners in March 2020. This may extend the timelines and drag the process through months if not years. It may have two effects on the Taliban and its affiliates. First, it can frustrate them beyond the limit and produce disgruntled groups among the rank and file of the Taliban dispensation. Second, it may delay or disrupt the intra-Afghan dialogue, thus making it immensely difficult to translate the peace modalities into practice through negotiations scheduled to be held by March 10, 2020. These spoilers can have the capacity to trigger violence within the country especially in areas under Taliban control. Any major incident targeting the US human or material assets may cause a considerable dent to the recent peace overtures.
The second group of Afghan peace spoilers constitutes elements that have established their fiefdoms within the country and have considerable or minimal political representation in Kabul. These lords of local territories maintain control and exert maximum influence over the tribes living in their territorial jurisdictions. They have a wide range of militia at their disposal which operates in a rent-seeking mode and prey on the whims of their local tribal leaders. Such militias determine their loyalties in terms of financial, tribal and logistical assistance and support. These spoilers can, therefore, choose to aide their political supporters in Kabul and create chaos in the country. They have an extraordinary influence over their territory and they can make life very difficult for the Taliban. The latter can pacify this group of spoilers through an act of intimidation, a gesture of mutual cooperation, or extending an olive branch of political space in the future political setup of Kabul. But these spoilers have a high probability of uncertainty attached with them and can easily switch sides according to the changing environment and ground realities. However, with the militia muscle under their sleeves, they can easily align anti-Taliban forces to wrest the initiative from them and lure their fighters into shadowboxing. This may trigger a fresh wave of violence wherein neighbouring countries can also participate and resultantly, peace prospects remain as elusive as before.
The last group involves the countries surrounding or falling in geographical proximity to Afghanistan. These countries can exert their influence through multiple means such as monetary support to a group or equipping fighters with requisite weapons, initiating community projects to make inroads into the local population for community support, or maintaining the presence of field operators on ground. The US can deter these states from disrupting the peace agreement, provided it maintains its intelligence presence in the country even after limiting its military personnel in the region.
The sustainability of the Afghan peace, therefore, hinges upon consistent monitoring by all stakeholders, the presence of US intelligence in the region and sincerity of purpose on part of the US and the Taliban.
The first group comprises elements that are at the helm of affairs in Kabul and wield some influence in the region. These spoilers can raise objections to the timelines agreed upon between the US and the Taliban. Already, President Ashraf Ghani is voicing his concern about the release of 5,000 Taliban prisoners in March 2020. This may extend the timelines and drag the process through months if not years. It may have two effects on the Taliban and its affiliates. First, it can frustrate them beyond the limit and produce disgruntled groups among the rank and file of the Taliban dispensation. Second, it may delay or disrupt the intra-Afghan dialogue, thus making it immensely difficult to translate the peace modalities into practice through negotiations scheduled to be held by March 10, 2020. These spoilers can have the capacity to trigger violence within the country especially in areas under Taliban control. Any major incident targeting the US human or material assets may cause a considerable dent to the recent peace overtures.
The second group of Afghan peace spoilers constitutes elements that have established their fiefdoms within the country and have considerable or minimal political representation in Kabul. These lords of local territories maintain control and exert maximum influence over the tribes living in their territorial jurisdictions. They have a wide range of militia at their disposal which operates in a rent-seeking mode and prey on the whims of their local tribal leaders. Such militias determine their loyalties in terms of financial, tribal and logistical assistance and support. These spoilers can, therefore, choose to aide their political supporters in Kabul and create chaos in the country. They have an extraordinary influence over their territory and they can make life very difficult for the Taliban. The latter can pacify this group of spoilers through an act of intimidation, a gesture of mutual cooperation, or extending an olive branch of political space in the future political setup of Kabul. But these spoilers have a high probability of uncertainty attached with them and can easily switch sides according to the changing environment and ground realities. However, with the militia muscle under their sleeves, they can easily align anti-Taliban forces to wrest the initiative from them and lure their fighters into shadowboxing. This may trigger a fresh wave of violence wherein neighbouring countries can also participate and resultantly, peace prospects remain as elusive as before.
The last group involves the countries surrounding or falling in geographical proximity to Afghanistan. These countries can exert their influence through multiple means such as monetary support to a group or equipping fighters with requisite weapons, initiating community projects to make inroads into the local population for community support, or maintaining the presence of field operators on ground. The US can deter these states from disrupting the peace agreement, provided it maintains its intelligence presence in the country even after limiting its military personnel in the region.
The sustainability of the Afghan peace, therefore, hinges upon consistent monitoring by all stakeholders, the presence of US intelligence in the region and sincerity of purpose on part of the US and the Taliban.