Understanding megaprojects
The kernel is to counter the typical dictatorial top-down approach with an inclusive bottom-up strategy
The writer is a civil servant holding a PhD in Economic Planning from Massey University, New Zealand
Why most megaprojects in Pakistan are not completed in time is a question requiring a well-coalesced understanding of the nature and psychology of megaprojects. The management of megaprojects is inherently complex, rather risky, because of the involvement of denigrating externalities associated with their planning, preparation, and execution. There are a number of demurring examples showing how various economic, social, administrative, and political factors desiccated the execution pace of megaprojects in Pakistan. The recent media reports, for instance, suggest that work on several megaprojects in Lahore, including the three billion rupee Orange Line metro train’s at-grade work, has come to a halt owing to either non-payment to contractors or other administrative issues. The eight billion rupee project of constructing sports complexes in all National Assembly constituencies in Lahore and the Rs3.5 billion Lahore Development Authority (LDA) City Housing Scheme have also reportedly witnessed similar decelerations in their work pace.
The history of megaprojects planning in Pakistan is full of quixotic over-optimism cobbled with a capricious understanding of the actual cost of the project. There has always been an aggrandising gap between a megaproject’s cost on paper and the actual cost incurred by the national exchequer and masses. Despite a lapse of decades, the affected people of the Tarbela Dam project have not been compensated till today. Similarly, the perfunctory Nandipur Power Project has been termed as an unprecedented model of mismanagement, incompetence and corruption by the analysts owing mainly to the underestimation of its costs and overestimation of benefits by successive governments. A pristine forensic investigation into the state-of-the-art Pakistan Kidney and Liver Institute and Research Centre, Lahore, blamed the former chief minister’s over-optimism as the root cause of mismanagement, misuse of public money, award of contracts and weak controls over the multi-billion rupee project. The Peshawar Bus Rapid Transit Project has also experienced duping underestimation of actual costs and completion time by the planners and decision makers. These are just a few examples as the list of procrastinated projects in Pakistan goes on and on. As common people are the real victims of the delays in public sector megaprojects, there is a need to winnow the anatomy of such projects in the light of credible international research.
The management of megaprojects is a highly specialised field. An analytical opprobrium of the risks involved in megaprojects requires a holistic understanding of the components of knowledge that must be incorporated in decisions by politicians and decision makers. Professor Bent Flyvbjerg of Oxford University, according to the university website, is the most cited scholar in the world in megaproject planning and management. He identifies four main factors — terming them as “sublimes” — which exponentially increase a project’s cost and completion time: technological, political, economic and aesthetic. “Technological sublime”, originally credited to KT Frick, refers to the rapture technologists and engineers get from constructing huge scale projects seeing rich opportunities in them for pushing the boundaries of technology. This includes, but is not limited to, the longest bridge, the fastest aircraft, the largest dam, the tallest building, or the first of anything. However, it is a risk trap in which most projects are caught. “Political sublime” is the rapture politicians and rulers get from constructing monuments for their political causes. The visibility of such monuments may result in their political superiority over their opponents. This factor may play a significant role in their re-election in the polls. This is another planning lacuna and risk trap faced by most megaprojects. “Economic sublime”, being the third risk trap, is the pleasure derived by businessmen in making huge amounts of money and jobs off megaprojects. Some of the beneficiaries of economic sublime are contractors, engineers, landowners, developers, bankers, lawyers and so on. “Aesthetic sublime”, finally, is associated with appreciating good designs and large scale beautiful megaprojects. Some projects get the governmental approvals merely because of being highly aesthetic in nature irrespective of their disproportionately high costs. This is the fourth risk trap in the planning and management of megaprojects.
Based on this research, what lessons Pakistan can learn from the previous and ongoing delays in the execution of megaprojects and what is the way forward for planning and management of future megaprojects? Here it is suggested to plan megaprojects in four phases, namely: initiation, preparation, participation and continuation. All four phases are to be thematically driven by the principle of collective wisdom. The initiation stage can be termed as the strategic stage. Here it is pivotal to meaningfully and honestly engage all concerned stakeholders briefing them with the pros and cons of the project. Even asking the fundamental question of “whether the project be built or not?” should not be avoided. Pakistan’s vibrant social media can effectively be used for this purpose. The political leadership must acknowledge the power of collective wisdom and practical knowledge at this stage. There are no “right” or “wrong” type solutions in megaproject management. The solutions are always flexible depending on the context in which a megaproject is built. Some planners may argue that engaging stakeholders at the initiation stage may discourage the kick-starting of the project but the argument may be a component of “technological sublime”. Engaging the stakeholders at the initial strategic stage can fix the project’s cost and completion time challenges in the future.
At the preparation stage, the design of the project should be discussed with the stakeholders, politicians, technocrats and bureaucrats handling the project. This practice will pave the way for micro level consultations with the concerned stakeholders at the “participation stage” where collective decisions should be taken through dialogue and negotiations. A robust questionnaire may be drafted to seek community feedback. New Zealand, for example, used different methods of public consultation in advancing its massive roads infrastructure — called Roads of National Significance. The New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA) prepared brochures and postcards, conducted individual meetings and EXPOs, set up an information center, website, a project phone line and feedback form and used the newspaper and radio for advertising purposes. The LDA and other implementing agencies may also devise similar methods for meaningful and honest public consultation. This stage will witness a diverse cacophony of feedback, some “for” and some “against” a megaproject. This feedback can be transformed into thematic areas as per the requirements of the project. These eclectic areas supported by the majority may be implemented at this stage as was done by the NZTA. If these stages are handled tactfully, the fourth stage of “continuation” — meant at continuing with the project — will be a much easier phase eventually resulting in the success of the project. The kernel is to counter typical dictatorial top-down approach with an inclusive bottom-up strategy in planning and implementing megaprojects in Pakistan.
Published in The Express Tribune, January 2nd, 2020.
The history of megaprojects planning in Pakistan is full of quixotic over-optimism cobbled with a capricious understanding of the actual cost of the project. There has always been an aggrandising gap between a megaproject’s cost on paper and the actual cost incurred by the national exchequer and masses. Despite a lapse of decades, the affected people of the Tarbela Dam project have not been compensated till today. Similarly, the perfunctory Nandipur Power Project has been termed as an unprecedented model of mismanagement, incompetence and corruption by the analysts owing mainly to the underestimation of its costs and overestimation of benefits by successive governments. A pristine forensic investigation into the state-of-the-art Pakistan Kidney and Liver Institute and Research Centre, Lahore, blamed the former chief minister’s over-optimism as the root cause of mismanagement, misuse of public money, award of contracts and weak controls over the multi-billion rupee project. The Peshawar Bus Rapid Transit Project has also experienced duping underestimation of actual costs and completion time by the planners and decision makers. These are just a few examples as the list of procrastinated projects in Pakistan goes on and on. As common people are the real victims of the delays in public sector megaprojects, there is a need to winnow the anatomy of such projects in the light of credible international research.
The management of megaprojects is a highly specialised field. An analytical opprobrium of the risks involved in megaprojects requires a holistic understanding of the components of knowledge that must be incorporated in decisions by politicians and decision makers. Professor Bent Flyvbjerg of Oxford University, according to the university website, is the most cited scholar in the world in megaproject planning and management. He identifies four main factors — terming them as “sublimes” — which exponentially increase a project’s cost and completion time: technological, political, economic and aesthetic. “Technological sublime”, originally credited to KT Frick, refers to the rapture technologists and engineers get from constructing huge scale projects seeing rich opportunities in them for pushing the boundaries of technology. This includes, but is not limited to, the longest bridge, the fastest aircraft, the largest dam, the tallest building, or the first of anything. However, it is a risk trap in which most projects are caught. “Political sublime” is the rapture politicians and rulers get from constructing monuments for their political causes. The visibility of such monuments may result in their political superiority over their opponents. This factor may play a significant role in their re-election in the polls. This is another planning lacuna and risk trap faced by most megaprojects. “Economic sublime”, being the third risk trap, is the pleasure derived by businessmen in making huge amounts of money and jobs off megaprojects. Some of the beneficiaries of economic sublime are contractors, engineers, landowners, developers, bankers, lawyers and so on. “Aesthetic sublime”, finally, is associated with appreciating good designs and large scale beautiful megaprojects. Some projects get the governmental approvals merely because of being highly aesthetic in nature irrespective of their disproportionately high costs. This is the fourth risk trap in the planning and management of megaprojects.
Based on this research, what lessons Pakistan can learn from the previous and ongoing delays in the execution of megaprojects and what is the way forward for planning and management of future megaprojects? Here it is suggested to plan megaprojects in four phases, namely: initiation, preparation, participation and continuation. All four phases are to be thematically driven by the principle of collective wisdom. The initiation stage can be termed as the strategic stage. Here it is pivotal to meaningfully and honestly engage all concerned stakeholders briefing them with the pros and cons of the project. Even asking the fundamental question of “whether the project be built or not?” should not be avoided. Pakistan’s vibrant social media can effectively be used for this purpose. The political leadership must acknowledge the power of collective wisdom and practical knowledge at this stage. There are no “right” or “wrong” type solutions in megaproject management. The solutions are always flexible depending on the context in which a megaproject is built. Some planners may argue that engaging stakeholders at the initiation stage may discourage the kick-starting of the project but the argument may be a component of “technological sublime”. Engaging the stakeholders at the initial strategic stage can fix the project’s cost and completion time challenges in the future.
At the preparation stage, the design of the project should be discussed with the stakeholders, politicians, technocrats and bureaucrats handling the project. This practice will pave the way for micro level consultations with the concerned stakeholders at the “participation stage” where collective decisions should be taken through dialogue and negotiations. A robust questionnaire may be drafted to seek community feedback. New Zealand, for example, used different methods of public consultation in advancing its massive roads infrastructure — called Roads of National Significance. The New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA) prepared brochures and postcards, conducted individual meetings and EXPOs, set up an information center, website, a project phone line and feedback form and used the newspaper and radio for advertising purposes. The LDA and other implementing agencies may also devise similar methods for meaningful and honest public consultation. This stage will witness a diverse cacophony of feedback, some “for” and some “against” a megaproject. This feedback can be transformed into thematic areas as per the requirements of the project. These eclectic areas supported by the majority may be implemented at this stage as was done by the NZTA. If these stages are handled tactfully, the fourth stage of “continuation” — meant at continuing with the project — will be a much easier phase eventually resulting in the success of the project. The kernel is to counter typical dictatorial top-down approach with an inclusive bottom-up strategy in planning and implementing megaprojects in Pakistan.
Published in The Express Tribune, January 2nd, 2020.