Lessons learned from the stalled Afghan peace talks
The US and Nato will remain those external actors whose exit is inevitable
Cargo planes at the international airport in Kabul, Afghanistan. PHOTO: AFP
In the coming few days two major meet-ups are going to take place in Beijing and Moscow in order to build upon the impetus generated by the United States (US)-Taliban meeting in Islamabad in early October and explore the prospects of kick-starting the stalled peace process with the Taliban. Though peace talks remain suspended for the time being, President Trump’s tweet in September provided an opportunity to the warring sides to look back at the nearly year-long process of negotiations and learn from the shortcomings and mistakes that were committed by each side.
First and foremost, both the US and Taliban held nine rounds of intensive negotiations to arrive at a “peace agreement”. However, the end product resembled more like a “withdrawal agreement” rather than a comprehensive peace plan. Therefore, any future re-engagement of the warring sides should build on the spirit of bringing sustainable peace to the war-torn country. A peace sensitive process should address the root causes of the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan and offer a framework that could effectively address them.
Second, any success of the future negotiations depends upon one core factor: the ownership of the process should lie with the Afghan state and society. The previous engagement between the US and the Taliban excluded the Afghan government from partaking in the deliberations, which was akin to delegitimising the latter. The Afghan peace process would have more chances of success if it is Afghan-led and Afghan-owned.
Third, any reconciliation process cannot bring the desired results if it lacks the elements of commitment and sense of ownership by all the warring parties, peace brokers and the Afghan people upon whom the reconciliation agreement will apply. In the case of Afghanistan, everyone seemed to be zealously pursuing their narrow vested interests. The US seemed to be in a rush to withdraw with a minimum possible role in the future. The Taliban seemed to be rushing towards declaring a quick victory. The Afghan government seemed to be waiting for the collapse of the talks or any subsequent deal. The Afghan people seemed worried about the return of a triumphant Taliban who could nullify the gains made by the country in the past 18 years.
The collapse of such a process was inevitable. There is a need for the Afghans to “own” the whole process by adopting a few simple steps. First of all, any post-election Afghan government needs to be a part and parcel of the negotiation process. The US should put the ball in the Taliban’s court by not agreeing to the Taliban’s demand of resumption of negotiations if the Afghan government is not part of the parleys.
Second, the US along with Russia, China, Pakistan and Iran should facilitate the resumption of dialogue between the Afghan government and Taliban. The issue of foreign troops’ withdrawal, counterterrorism commitments, comprehensive ceasefire and intra-Afghan dialogue should be discussed among the US, Taliban and the Afghan government initially but later on, the process should be picked up by the Afghans only along with the Taliban. Any agreement reached to this effect would help the withdrawal of foreign forces and a smooth transitioning to an intra-Afghan dialogue. Such a process would have more credibility and a sense of ownership among the Afghans.
The current quagmire in Afghanistan is primarily an intra-Afghan conflict, based on divergent ideologies and worldly outlook. The US and Nato are external actors whose exit is inevitable. However, their presence since 2001 has made them an important stakeholder in the conflict. That is why any US withdrawal should carry a general approval of the Afghan masses and should be based on a solid roadmap that could take Afghanistan towards sustainable peace.
Published in The Express Tribune, October 26th, 2019.
First and foremost, both the US and Taliban held nine rounds of intensive negotiations to arrive at a “peace agreement”. However, the end product resembled more like a “withdrawal agreement” rather than a comprehensive peace plan. Therefore, any future re-engagement of the warring sides should build on the spirit of bringing sustainable peace to the war-torn country. A peace sensitive process should address the root causes of the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan and offer a framework that could effectively address them.
Second, any success of the future negotiations depends upon one core factor: the ownership of the process should lie with the Afghan state and society. The previous engagement between the US and the Taliban excluded the Afghan government from partaking in the deliberations, which was akin to delegitimising the latter. The Afghan peace process would have more chances of success if it is Afghan-led and Afghan-owned.
Third, any reconciliation process cannot bring the desired results if it lacks the elements of commitment and sense of ownership by all the warring parties, peace brokers and the Afghan people upon whom the reconciliation agreement will apply. In the case of Afghanistan, everyone seemed to be zealously pursuing their narrow vested interests. The US seemed to be in a rush to withdraw with a minimum possible role in the future. The Taliban seemed to be rushing towards declaring a quick victory. The Afghan government seemed to be waiting for the collapse of the talks or any subsequent deal. The Afghan people seemed worried about the return of a triumphant Taliban who could nullify the gains made by the country in the past 18 years.
The collapse of such a process was inevitable. There is a need for the Afghans to “own” the whole process by adopting a few simple steps. First of all, any post-election Afghan government needs to be a part and parcel of the negotiation process. The US should put the ball in the Taliban’s court by not agreeing to the Taliban’s demand of resumption of negotiations if the Afghan government is not part of the parleys.
Second, the US along with Russia, China, Pakistan and Iran should facilitate the resumption of dialogue between the Afghan government and Taliban. The issue of foreign troops’ withdrawal, counterterrorism commitments, comprehensive ceasefire and intra-Afghan dialogue should be discussed among the US, Taliban and the Afghan government initially but later on, the process should be picked up by the Afghans only along with the Taliban. Any agreement reached to this effect would help the withdrawal of foreign forces and a smooth transitioning to an intra-Afghan dialogue. Such a process would have more credibility and a sense of ownership among the Afghans.
The current quagmire in Afghanistan is primarily an intra-Afghan conflict, based on divergent ideologies and worldly outlook. The US and Nato are external actors whose exit is inevitable. However, their presence since 2001 has made them an important stakeholder in the conflict. That is why any US withdrawal should carry a general approval of the Afghan masses and should be based on a solid roadmap that could take Afghanistan towards sustainable peace.
Published in The Express Tribune, October 26th, 2019.