Folly of the Afghan presidential election 2019
Marred in violence, instability and opposition
I start by sincerely congratulating Afghanistan on successfully conducting the fourth Afghan election since it was invaded by the US in 2001, regardless of it being an entirely folly exercise. The first round of the Afghan presidential election took place on 28 September 2019. Preliminary results are expected to roll in from October 19 onwards while the official results will be declared by the Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan (IECA) on November 7. As Afghanistan conducts its election based on the two-round system similar to countries such as France and Turkey, if none of the 18 candidates secure more than 50% of the total vote, a second round is held between the top two candidates. According to data released by the IECA, as many as 2,597 out of 4,905 polling centres received 1,051,998 voters out of a total of 9,665,745 registered voters. The election commission still awaits reports from the remaining 2,308 polling centres. Nobody knows how many people are living in Afghanistan as there has not been any census in the war-torn country since 1979. However, UN estimates indicate that Afghanistan has a total population of over 38 million. It is expected that the total voter turnout would be less than 25% at most. This shows that voter turnout this year has been at a historic low compared to the last three elections, in terms of the real number and absolute percentage. It can therefore be extrapolated that this election is nothing shy of a no-confidence motion not just against the incumbent President, Ashraf Ghani, but also on the legitimacy of the electoral system and the current framework of the Afghan state. As such this casts a dark shadow of doubt over the credibility of the election process.
Former Afghan president Hamid Karzai described the logic of having an election in Afghanistan at this time as “asking a heart patient to run a marathon”. Karzai has been arguing against the rationality of conducting elections this year. In an interview with the Associated Press, he warned this election “has all the potential and possibilities to lead the country further down to the abyss of crisis and insecurity and divisions... We cannot conduct elections in a country that is going through a foreign-imposed conflict. We are in a war of foreign objectives and interests. It isn’t our conflict. We are only dying in it”. This statement was not welcomed by President Ghani, who insisted on conducting an election despite the risk it posed. Apparently his only purpose is to use an election victory to prove his mandate to use as a bargaining chip when negotiating a peace deal with the Taliban and US. As the 2004 Afghan Constitution imposes a limit of two terms on the presidency, this would be Ghani’s last term in office if he manages to win the election. Term limits were honoured by president Karzai which barred him from running in the 2014 election. This perhaps protects Afghanistan from electing a dictatorial president as the incumbent is aware they can only serve for a maximum of 10 years before having to vacate the presidential palace.
President Ghani owes his gratitude to US President Donald Trump for abruptly calling off the US-Taliban peace talks as had there been even a draft agreement between the Taliban and US, this heavily flawed election would have never taken place. We must remember the Afghan Presidency is a constitutional office, and if the Afghan state is dissolved in favour of an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, then what happens to the Constitution? A constitution needs a state to survive. However, a state does not need any constitution for its raison d’être therefore if the Afghan state perishes then along goes the Constitution and the constitutional offices and institutions including the President’s Office.
As the Taliban are now stronger than ever since 2001, controlling almost 60% of Afghan territory and capturing more every day, it is capable of hijacking the 2019 election by issuing death threats, which it has done. Thus explaining the abysmally low voter turnout, as few would be willing to risk their lives to elect a president of a republic on the verge of dissolution. Moreover, even if a president is elected based on his capacity to govern, he would be nothing more than the Mayor of Kabul.
Karzai rightly pointed out that this election is going to further strike divisions in the Afghan society. It is worth recalling the chaos that erupted in the aftermath of the disputed 2014 presidential elections which were allegedly rigged. In the first round, Abdullah Abdullah secured 45% of the popular vote while Ghani was polled 31.56%. As no candidate managed to secure more than 50% votes, a second round was held between the two which was won by President Ghani. Abdullah, a major candidate and important political figure in Afghanistan refused to concede defeat, resulting in a deal between the two mediated by then US secretary of state, John Kerry. This led to the formation of a National Unity Government and the position of Chief Executive of Afghanistan. This was in fact a power-sharing agreement between the two. Yet for the past five years, they have not seen eye to eye on many issues.
The 2019 election is Abdullah’s third bid for the presidency, making him a seasoned player. It is likely we could see a replay of the 2014 dispute between Ghani and Abdullah, but on a greater scale given the stakes are higher than before. Already, both have declared themselves victors. There is also a strong possibility of a reversal of roles where Ghani would assume the office of the chief executive while Abdullah would be elected president. In any case, either would be unwilling to accept defeat. Also as this would be Ghani’s last term as president if he wins, Abdullah would by far be the leading presidential candidate in the next election if the Islamic Republic still exists.
If political wisdom can prevail in Afghanistan then President Ghani should realise the folly of conducting an election at such a sensitive time. This only displays his utter disregard for the value of human life of his own fellow countrymen and women. National unity among the political elite is a critical factor to achieve democracy in a country — something Afghanistan has lost all hope of. In a paper titled, “The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns” published in the American Sociological Review (1989), John Higley and Michael G Burton wrote that “Stable democratic regimes depend heavily on the “consensual unity” of national elites. So long as elites remain disunified, political regimes are unstable, a condition which makes democratic transitions and democratic breakdowns merely temporary oscillations in the forms unstable regimes take.” This can be applied to Afghanistan’s case. As long as divisions between the political elite grow deeper, the lesser the chance of a peaceful solution in Afghanistan.
Published in The Express Tribune, October 12th, 2019.
Former Afghan president Hamid Karzai described the logic of having an election in Afghanistan at this time as “asking a heart patient to run a marathon”. Karzai has been arguing against the rationality of conducting elections this year. In an interview with the Associated Press, he warned this election “has all the potential and possibilities to lead the country further down to the abyss of crisis and insecurity and divisions... We cannot conduct elections in a country that is going through a foreign-imposed conflict. We are in a war of foreign objectives and interests. It isn’t our conflict. We are only dying in it”. This statement was not welcomed by President Ghani, who insisted on conducting an election despite the risk it posed. Apparently his only purpose is to use an election victory to prove his mandate to use as a bargaining chip when negotiating a peace deal with the Taliban and US. As the 2004 Afghan Constitution imposes a limit of two terms on the presidency, this would be Ghani’s last term in office if he manages to win the election. Term limits were honoured by president Karzai which barred him from running in the 2014 election. This perhaps protects Afghanistan from electing a dictatorial president as the incumbent is aware they can only serve for a maximum of 10 years before having to vacate the presidential palace.
President Ghani owes his gratitude to US President Donald Trump for abruptly calling off the US-Taliban peace talks as had there been even a draft agreement between the Taliban and US, this heavily flawed election would have never taken place. We must remember the Afghan Presidency is a constitutional office, and if the Afghan state is dissolved in favour of an Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, then what happens to the Constitution? A constitution needs a state to survive. However, a state does not need any constitution for its raison d’être therefore if the Afghan state perishes then along goes the Constitution and the constitutional offices and institutions including the President’s Office.
As the Taliban are now stronger than ever since 2001, controlling almost 60% of Afghan territory and capturing more every day, it is capable of hijacking the 2019 election by issuing death threats, which it has done. Thus explaining the abysmally low voter turnout, as few would be willing to risk their lives to elect a president of a republic on the verge of dissolution. Moreover, even if a president is elected based on his capacity to govern, he would be nothing more than the Mayor of Kabul.
Karzai rightly pointed out that this election is going to further strike divisions in the Afghan society. It is worth recalling the chaos that erupted in the aftermath of the disputed 2014 presidential elections which were allegedly rigged. In the first round, Abdullah Abdullah secured 45% of the popular vote while Ghani was polled 31.56%. As no candidate managed to secure more than 50% votes, a second round was held between the two which was won by President Ghani. Abdullah, a major candidate and important political figure in Afghanistan refused to concede defeat, resulting in a deal between the two mediated by then US secretary of state, John Kerry. This led to the formation of a National Unity Government and the position of Chief Executive of Afghanistan. This was in fact a power-sharing agreement between the two. Yet for the past five years, they have not seen eye to eye on many issues.
The 2019 election is Abdullah’s third bid for the presidency, making him a seasoned player. It is likely we could see a replay of the 2014 dispute between Ghani and Abdullah, but on a greater scale given the stakes are higher than before. Already, both have declared themselves victors. There is also a strong possibility of a reversal of roles where Ghani would assume the office of the chief executive while Abdullah would be elected president. In any case, either would be unwilling to accept defeat. Also as this would be Ghani’s last term as president if he wins, Abdullah would by far be the leading presidential candidate in the next election if the Islamic Republic still exists.
If political wisdom can prevail in Afghanistan then President Ghani should realise the folly of conducting an election at such a sensitive time. This only displays his utter disregard for the value of human life of his own fellow countrymen and women. National unity among the political elite is a critical factor to achieve democracy in a country — something Afghanistan has lost all hope of. In a paper titled, “The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns” published in the American Sociological Review (1989), John Higley and Michael G Burton wrote that “Stable democratic regimes depend heavily on the “consensual unity” of national elites. So long as elites remain disunified, political regimes are unstable, a condition which makes democratic transitions and democratic breakdowns merely temporary oscillations in the forms unstable regimes take.” This can be applied to Afghanistan’s case. As long as divisions between the political elite grow deeper, the lesser the chance of a peaceful solution in Afghanistan.
Published in The Express Tribune, October 12th, 2019.