N Waziristan operation — a wrong approach
People are disorganised and a village of 2,000 people can become helpless in the presence of 15 well-equipped Taliban.
An Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) press release of June 10 as well as subsequent media reports suggest that a private lashkar may be raised to drive out anti-Pakistan elements and foreigners from North Waziristan Agency. Notwithstanding the fact that the constitution explicitly forbids the use of private armies or militias, this is the wrong approach to a very real problem.
It is now evident that the Pakistan Army has decided not to launch a full scale operation in the agency and that action against the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan and foreigners will be taken by civilians, with the army in a supporting role. This is the South Waziristan formula where Maulvi Nazir drove out the Tajiks and Uzbeks, with the army providing artillery support. The irony in this is that the place from where Ilyas Kashmiri was killed recently in a drone attack is believed to be under Maulvi Nazir.
Moving on, the formation of a lashkar has certain basic flaws which need to be addressed before undertaking this particular operation. Backed by the government, lashkars are headed by notables of the area. A 5,000-strong lashkar may consist of 20 to 30 notables. The bulk of the lashkars consists of peasants, daily wagers and poor people. The mission given to them is also vague so it cannot provide the kind of support against terrorists that the army may require. Furthermore, civilians are not trained nor meant to fight battles. In Pashtun society, an individual may prove to be very brave provided the enemy is known, but fighting collectively against an unknown and unidentified enemy is a completely different ball game.
Sustaining lashkars for a prolonged period becomes a burden because those who are part of it are giving up their daily livelihood for it. With no monetary support from the government, lashkars soon lose their initial enthusiasm and start thinning out. That is when the Taliban takes opportunity to strike at the leaders, demoralising the force further.
Fear is the main cause for people’s non-cooperation with these civilian forces. For instance, in every village, people know who among them is part of the Taliban, but they do not point them out because of fear that the Taliban will kill them. The general public is disorganised and a village of say 2,000 people can become helpless in the presence of 15 well-equipped Taliban. A related concept of village defence committees was tried but without any visible success and the reason was again this factor of fear of Taliban among the local population.
With these existing realities, expecting the people of the area to achieve this enormous objective — in which so far the US has failed in Afghanistan and which the Pakistan Army is struggling to achieve — will be asking too much. If the civilians could do it, this problem would not have become so big in the first place. The locals have lived and seen their area slipping out of the hands of the government. And they have seen their elders being ruthlessly killed by the Taliban. So how can one expect them to now take on the Taliban?
In any case, with reports of negotiations going on with the Taliban at all levels by the Afghan, Pakistani and US governments, why would a local go after the Taliban, knowing that after the success of the negotiations there will be no guarantee of his safety? All said, when the task of driving out militants and foreigners from North Waziristan is successful, where are these people to go to? To another agency, or to another settled area?
Will another lashkar be formed in that area then? In Pashtu they say, ‘don’t do shuff shuff, say shuftaloo’, which means do not take half measures, if you have to do something, do it properly. If we feel we have a problem in North Waziristan, which no doubt we have, then why resort to what are clearly is half measures?
Published in The Express Tribune, June 15th, 2011.
It is now evident that the Pakistan Army has decided not to launch a full scale operation in the agency and that action against the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan and foreigners will be taken by civilians, with the army in a supporting role. This is the South Waziristan formula where Maulvi Nazir drove out the Tajiks and Uzbeks, with the army providing artillery support. The irony in this is that the place from where Ilyas Kashmiri was killed recently in a drone attack is believed to be under Maulvi Nazir.
Moving on, the formation of a lashkar has certain basic flaws which need to be addressed before undertaking this particular operation. Backed by the government, lashkars are headed by notables of the area. A 5,000-strong lashkar may consist of 20 to 30 notables. The bulk of the lashkars consists of peasants, daily wagers and poor people. The mission given to them is also vague so it cannot provide the kind of support against terrorists that the army may require. Furthermore, civilians are not trained nor meant to fight battles. In Pashtun society, an individual may prove to be very brave provided the enemy is known, but fighting collectively against an unknown and unidentified enemy is a completely different ball game.
Sustaining lashkars for a prolonged period becomes a burden because those who are part of it are giving up their daily livelihood for it. With no monetary support from the government, lashkars soon lose their initial enthusiasm and start thinning out. That is when the Taliban takes opportunity to strike at the leaders, demoralising the force further.
Fear is the main cause for people’s non-cooperation with these civilian forces. For instance, in every village, people know who among them is part of the Taliban, but they do not point them out because of fear that the Taliban will kill them. The general public is disorganised and a village of say 2,000 people can become helpless in the presence of 15 well-equipped Taliban. A related concept of village defence committees was tried but without any visible success and the reason was again this factor of fear of Taliban among the local population.
With these existing realities, expecting the people of the area to achieve this enormous objective — in which so far the US has failed in Afghanistan and which the Pakistan Army is struggling to achieve — will be asking too much. If the civilians could do it, this problem would not have become so big in the first place. The locals have lived and seen their area slipping out of the hands of the government. And they have seen their elders being ruthlessly killed by the Taliban. So how can one expect them to now take on the Taliban?
In any case, with reports of negotiations going on with the Taliban at all levels by the Afghan, Pakistani and US governments, why would a local go after the Taliban, knowing that after the success of the negotiations there will be no guarantee of his safety? All said, when the task of driving out militants and foreigners from North Waziristan is successful, where are these people to go to? To another agency, or to another settled area?
Will another lashkar be formed in that area then? In Pashtu they say, ‘don’t do shuff shuff, say shuftaloo’, which means do not take half measures, if you have to do something, do it properly. If we feel we have a problem in North Waziristan, which no doubt we have, then why resort to what are clearly is half measures?
Published in The Express Tribune, June 15th, 2011.