Year of withdrawal
US troop drawdown in Syria and Afghanistan takes many by surprise
The writer is a senior police manager/supervisor and has done his MPA from Columbia University, New York
The sudden announcement of the US troop drawdown in Syria and Afghanistan has taken many by surprise. The regional countries are closely watching the developments in the two war zones in which the United States has been waging military and intelligence wars for the last many years. The friends and foes in the regional set-up are weighing positive and negative implications of such withdrawal in the new year. There are three main scenarios which can be visualised at this point in time. These are total military with no intelligence withdrawal; total military with total intelligence withdrawal; and partial military with partial intelligence withdrawal. Let us see how these three possibilities are likely to affect the war theatre dynamics in these regions in 2019.
Interestingly, the announcement indicates military personnel de-escalation in Afghanistan and Syria, but the intelligence framework of war might not be disturbed and allowed to function with similar freedom and freehand. Over time, the reliance on intelligence warfare in Afghanistan and Syria has surpassed boots-on-ground dependence. The readily available human-war-resource, in the shape of different groups and ethnic gangs to execute the intelligence plan gathered by intelligence contractors through different channels including local operators and informers, is an excellent replacement for military presence. Therefore, a drastic reduction of the US military in Afghanistan and Syria might not impact the war theatre appreciably unless it is coupled with withdrawal of intelligence contractors as well.
In case an intelligence downsizing occurs in both theatres of war, a vacuum is likely to be created which may be taken over by militants or foreign-sponsored forces leading to a chaotic situation in which these groups start jockeying for power-gain to control as much of land mass as possible. Such a prospect may soon convert into a civil war-like situation wherein the regional countries start supporting or opposing different warring factions openly.
The Afghan Taliban have recently indicated a conditional willingness for the peace talks in which they have made three demands namely withdrawal of foreign forces from the country; release of prisoners confined in various detention centres, local or foreign, in the region; and removal of the names of Taliban leadership from the international sanctions list. Apparently, the basic stumbling block in peace talks can be divided into two parts, namely matters which are directly related to the US and its military-intelligence contractors operating in the country and issues connected with resolution of the conflict through internal rapprochement with existing ruling factions. Though the Taliban delegation refused to meet the Afghan government representatives during the recent talks in Abu Dhabi, they did not say anything about the proposal for a three-month ceasefire agreement during the peace talks.
In the second scenario, if no significant decrease in number of intelligence contractors takes place in 2019 then there is a strong likelihood that no major opening is created and the local forces might be able to maintain status quo even after withdrawal of 50 or 60 per cent of US ground forces from Afghanistan. In Syria, the intelligence contractors may keep on supporting Kurdish forces through intelligence networking and logistical support. The recent statement of the Turkish president indicates that he would fight Kurdish militia which he sees as an extension of insurgency within the borders of his country. Turkey has already been massing troops along northern Syria which is held by the Kurdish-led forces supported by the US. However, such an adventure might become costly for Turkey as there are chances that it may get bogged down in Syria due to battle-hardened Kurdish forces present in the region and the US intelligence support network to these forces in the area.
Apart from it, the option of military withdrawal of US forces from these war zones might be scuttled if an unexpected surprise event takes place in these regions or anywhere across the world including on the US soil. If such an event is a terror incident in which major causalities take place then it might force the American president to change his decision and reconsider troop drawdown afresh. There might be another possibility of military troop shifting from one place to another. The US can transfer its troops in Syria and shift them to Iraq as a temporary arrangement to bolster its presence there to monitor key developments in the region and provide military support to the Kurdish forces fighting in Syria. Such a stopgap arrangement might give necessary time and safe passage to Peshmerga forces to recede to its stronghold in northern Iraq.
The third scenario includes when the US withdraws its military forces appreciably, but a small portion of intelligence networks is reduced in these war zones. In such a plan, the US may reduce the military cost in war zones, nonetheless no appreciable change in war situation takes place in the two regions unless a major operation is conducted by a regional country either directly or indirectly with active support of one of the warring groups fighting in these regions. The Afghanistan government and its forces are still in an ambiguous state of mind as they think it unnecessary and unjust for the US to withdraw from the region in such a manner. The morale of forces would likely sap sharply owing to probable discontinuity to their financial support and lack of presence of the US forces on Afghan soil. Unless a concerted agreement is reached between the warring factions with active involvement of major regional stakeholders, an extensive withdrawal of military-intelligence contractors from Afghanistan and Syria may lead to a more uncertain situation wherein lawlessness and in-fighting abound everywhere.
Published in The Express Tribune, December 30th, 2018.
Interestingly, the announcement indicates military personnel de-escalation in Afghanistan and Syria, but the intelligence framework of war might not be disturbed and allowed to function with similar freedom and freehand. Over time, the reliance on intelligence warfare in Afghanistan and Syria has surpassed boots-on-ground dependence. The readily available human-war-resource, in the shape of different groups and ethnic gangs to execute the intelligence plan gathered by intelligence contractors through different channels including local operators and informers, is an excellent replacement for military presence. Therefore, a drastic reduction of the US military in Afghanistan and Syria might not impact the war theatre appreciably unless it is coupled with withdrawal of intelligence contractors as well.
In case an intelligence downsizing occurs in both theatres of war, a vacuum is likely to be created which may be taken over by militants or foreign-sponsored forces leading to a chaotic situation in which these groups start jockeying for power-gain to control as much of land mass as possible. Such a prospect may soon convert into a civil war-like situation wherein the regional countries start supporting or opposing different warring factions openly.
The Afghan Taliban have recently indicated a conditional willingness for the peace talks in which they have made three demands namely withdrawal of foreign forces from the country; release of prisoners confined in various detention centres, local or foreign, in the region; and removal of the names of Taliban leadership from the international sanctions list. Apparently, the basic stumbling block in peace talks can be divided into two parts, namely matters which are directly related to the US and its military-intelligence contractors operating in the country and issues connected with resolution of the conflict through internal rapprochement with existing ruling factions. Though the Taliban delegation refused to meet the Afghan government representatives during the recent talks in Abu Dhabi, they did not say anything about the proposal for a three-month ceasefire agreement during the peace talks.
In the second scenario, if no significant decrease in number of intelligence contractors takes place in 2019 then there is a strong likelihood that no major opening is created and the local forces might be able to maintain status quo even after withdrawal of 50 or 60 per cent of US ground forces from Afghanistan. In Syria, the intelligence contractors may keep on supporting Kurdish forces through intelligence networking and logistical support. The recent statement of the Turkish president indicates that he would fight Kurdish militia which he sees as an extension of insurgency within the borders of his country. Turkey has already been massing troops along northern Syria which is held by the Kurdish-led forces supported by the US. However, such an adventure might become costly for Turkey as there are chances that it may get bogged down in Syria due to battle-hardened Kurdish forces present in the region and the US intelligence support network to these forces in the area.
Apart from it, the option of military withdrawal of US forces from these war zones might be scuttled if an unexpected surprise event takes place in these regions or anywhere across the world including on the US soil. If such an event is a terror incident in which major causalities take place then it might force the American president to change his decision and reconsider troop drawdown afresh. There might be another possibility of military troop shifting from one place to another. The US can transfer its troops in Syria and shift them to Iraq as a temporary arrangement to bolster its presence there to monitor key developments in the region and provide military support to the Kurdish forces fighting in Syria. Such a stopgap arrangement might give necessary time and safe passage to Peshmerga forces to recede to its stronghold in northern Iraq.
The third scenario includes when the US withdraws its military forces appreciably, but a small portion of intelligence networks is reduced in these war zones. In such a plan, the US may reduce the military cost in war zones, nonetheless no appreciable change in war situation takes place in the two regions unless a major operation is conducted by a regional country either directly or indirectly with active support of one of the warring groups fighting in these regions. The Afghanistan government and its forces are still in an ambiguous state of mind as they think it unnecessary and unjust for the US to withdraw from the region in such a manner. The morale of forces would likely sap sharply owing to probable discontinuity to their financial support and lack of presence of the US forces on Afghan soil. Unless a concerted agreement is reached between the warring factions with active involvement of major regional stakeholders, an extensive withdrawal of military-intelligence contractors from Afghanistan and Syria may lead to a more uncertain situation wherein lawlessness and in-fighting abound everywhere.
Published in The Express Tribune, December 30th, 2018.