The great debacle
If we show a disregard for moral values and patriotic duties, do we have the right to condemn the US on moral grounds?
Last week, I expressed the opinion that Osama bin Laden’s trial in a court of law would have been an inexhaustible source of information on the terrible chapter that began with the mass murder at the twin towers. The concept of a global war on terror has always been understood, by me, as an instrumental use of the tragedy of 9/11 for a virtual re-conquest of the greater Middle East by the West. Treating Osama as a criminal and not as a holy warrior, for which the entire Islamic world somehow became responsible, would have enabled the United States and its allies to follow a different strategy to bring him and his associates to justice. Graham Fuller, a security expert and former CIA official, once described George Bush’s assault on the region as creative chaos. The creative aspect of pre-emptive invasions died a slow and painful death. The chaos was progressively imported into Pakistan by general Pervez Musharraf as a trade-off of the US support for his dictatorship. Musharraf’s domestic and foreign policy rested on a calculated duality. He believed he could escape the consequences of a double-faced approach by sleight of hand or his penchant for plausible lies.
There is a new paradigm of regime change in our times that depends on ‘expatriates’ available in the West. In Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, pre-selected teams urged Washington to overthrow the existing order before being injected into the power structure. Pakistan was not directly invaded, but its key political and bureaucratic positions were made subject to approval by a foreign power. Evidently, Benazir Bhutto was the only politician that could have handled such deals with a robust promotion of national interest.
In such a landscape, the events in Abbottabad and many of the questions invoked by them were inevitable. The people of Pakistan are tormented by the consequences of our own decisions. Was it not Musharraf who made financial transactions, rather than moral principles, as the basis of our participation in the war on terror? Is it not true that we have signaled to Washington, more than once, that the hue and cry we raise need not constrain drone attacks and collateral damage? Should I not have believed highly informed American visitors who told me that Pakistan’s embassy in Washington has, on occasions, advised US officials to turn the screw a few more times as resistance in Islamabad, on an otherwise contested issue, was about to crumble? If we show utter disregard for timeless moral values and patriotic responsibilities, do we have the right to condemn the United States on moral grounds for the pursuit of its national interest?
On Abbottabad, we are probably about to resume our favourite game of inquiries that lead nowhere. Even if we do not prejudge them, there is little time available to us to counteract the impact of the audacious raid on the future pattern of Pakistan-US relations. It is very likely that its spectacular success would further strengthen the element of coercion in the American diplomacy vis-a-vis Pakistan. Washington will be tempted to make demands backed by the threat of unilateral action. More importantly, even the present transactional relationship may not last beyond a successful withdrawal of the bulk of US and Nato forces from Afghanistan.
Pakistan should draw up contingency plans for a serious down turn in economic relations in the not-too-distant future. Prime Minister Gilani should take a team to Beijing this week that can discuss emerging geopolitical and geoeconomic scenarios. Moscow seems to be ready for a limited, but useful, interaction — enough to lay down the foundation for a new architecture of bilateral relations. An American president may simply decide not to ignore the anti-Pakistan groundswell created by Osama bin Laden’s sojourn on its soil, especially, when he believes that several of Osama’s comrades are allegedly hidden in the woodwork. Engagement with Pakistan beyond the current critical phase of the Afghan conflict may demand conformity to a western blueprint for transforming Pakistan’s society and its national security state. Pakistan may find that parts of that blueprint are not consistent with its core national interest and that it needs more diplomatic space to safeguard it.
Published in The Express Tribune, May 17th, 2011.
There is a new paradigm of regime change in our times that depends on ‘expatriates’ available in the West. In Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, pre-selected teams urged Washington to overthrow the existing order before being injected into the power structure. Pakistan was not directly invaded, but its key political and bureaucratic positions were made subject to approval by a foreign power. Evidently, Benazir Bhutto was the only politician that could have handled such deals with a robust promotion of national interest.
In such a landscape, the events in Abbottabad and many of the questions invoked by them were inevitable. The people of Pakistan are tormented by the consequences of our own decisions. Was it not Musharraf who made financial transactions, rather than moral principles, as the basis of our participation in the war on terror? Is it not true that we have signaled to Washington, more than once, that the hue and cry we raise need not constrain drone attacks and collateral damage? Should I not have believed highly informed American visitors who told me that Pakistan’s embassy in Washington has, on occasions, advised US officials to turn the screw a few more times as resistance in Islamabad, on an otherwise contested issue, was about to crumble? If we show utter disregard for timeless moral values and patriotic responsibilities, do we have the right to condemn the United States on moral grounds for the pursuit of its national interest?
On Abbottabad, we are probably about to resume our favourite game of inquiries that lead nowhere. Even if we do not prejudge them, there is little time available to us to counteract the impact of the audacious raid on the future pattern of Pakistan-US relations. It is very likely that its spectacular success would further strengthen the element of coercion in the American diplomacy vis-a-vis Pakistan. Washington will be tempted to make demands backed by the threat of unilateral action. More importantly, even the present transactional relationship may not last beyond a successful withdrawal of the bulk of US and Nato forces from Afghanistan.
Pakistan should draw up contingency plans for a serious down turn in economic relations in the not-too-distant future. Prime Minister Gilani should take a team to Beijing this week that can discuss emerging geopolitical and geoeconomic scenarios. Moscow seems to be ready for a limited, but useful, interaction — enough to lay down the foundation for a new architecture of bilateral relations. An American president may simply decide not to ignore the anti-Pakistan groundswell created by Osama bin Laden’s sojourn on its soil, especially, when he believes that several of Osama’s comrades are allegedly hidden in the woodwork. Engagement with Pakistan beyond the current critical phase of the Afghan conflict may demand conformity to a western blueprint for transforming Pakistan’s society and its national security state. Pakistan may find that parts of that blueprint are not consistent with its core national interest and that it needs more diplomatic space to safeguard it.
Published in The Express Tribune, May 17th, 2011.