So what happened in Saudia?
Various people on various platforms are claiming inside knowledge of the hushed conversations between the royals and the brothers, and their claims may yet have a ring of truth but for all practical purposes it is better to judge the conversations by the actions that have followed the Saudi sojourn. Of the two participants from Pakistan one has said and done nothing that may offer some hint. But the elder brother has gone on the offensive since his return. So what gives?
They say actions speak louder than words. Mian the Elder’s actions since his return say two things about whatever transpired in Saudia: a) The king and the prince did not press upon Nawaz Sharif to abandon his harsh line against the judiciary and the establishment; or b) They did and he refused to listen to them. Both options have significant ramifications for the politics of a land dominated by men and women constantly looking at Riyadh for confirmations or validations of one kind or the other.
Option ‘a’ suggests the king and the prince are fine with whatever the Sharifs are doing as long as it does not affect the overall relationship between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. From the Saudi perspective this relationship is factored on multi-tiered linkages: the GHQ, regional dynamics including Afghanistan, Iran, India, the nuclear prowess, Sunni-Wahabi bloc, and of course the huge Pakistani labour force in the holy land. The royals may have ‘counselled’ the Sharifs or given them their perspective or perhaps even offered to ‘mediate’ in some way or the other and the Sharifs may have reciprocated by bringing the royals up to speed with their game plan within the circle of trust that they enjoy. In such a scenario, no ultimatums would have been given and no commitments made — more like an FYI type of soiree between men of power.
Option ‘b’ suggests something a bit more radical: Mian the Elder breaking ranks with his former patrons and barrelling ahead with his rebellious campaign against his disqualification. This option assumes that conventional wisdom is indeed true — that the Saudi royals cautioned Sharif against adopting an aggressive stand and advised him to find a median way that does not upset the existing applecart. If this be so, and if Mian the Elder had agreed to the Saudi counsel, he would have softened his approach. The fact that he seems to have done exactly the opposite suggests that he has disregarded the advice of the king and the prince.
Let’s return to option ‘a’ for a bit and further decipher its meaning. The assumption that the Saudi royals have not pressed Mian the Elder to abandon his present course of action means that despite having leverage with all key stakeholders in Pakistan, including the Sharifs, the Saudi royals at this moment have no interest in using this leverage in favour of or against any of the Pakistani stakeholders — at least not to any decisive extent. And Mian the Elder fishing for a new NRO? The reports make little sense because going into self-exile has been an option laid on his table from the day of his disqualification. In other words, Mian the Elder will continue his relentless aggressive campaign against his ouster as will his daughter, Maryam, who is utilising every platform to drive home the point that the entire system is lined up against them and behind ‘Khan the ladla’ as she terms him. Saturday’s jalsa at Kot Momin once again saw fiery speeches from both father and daughter signifying the shape of things to come.
Option ‘b’, on the other hand, underscores a new radicalisation of the Nawaz-Maryam duo in which conventional wisdom may have been abandoned in favour of political scorched-earth policy. If Sharif the Elder is not listening to the Saudis, he sure as hell is not going to listen to anyone else in Rawalpindi, Islamabad or Lahore. If that be true we are looking at a slash-and-burn campaign by him and his daughter in the weeks and months ahead — a campaign that will take pot shots at anyone and everyone in a bid to frame the current political landscape as ‘Nawaz vs the Rest’.
Is the latest round of political instability in Balochistan an acceptance by all concerned that the ‘total war’ scenario is upon us? The sudden vote-of-no-confidence being moved against PLM-N Chief Minister Sanaullah Zehri followed by a spate of resignations has taken everyone by surprise. But there is clearly a method to this madness. In a house of 65, if 33 members line up against the CM, it’s curtains for Mr Zehri. But if the Balochistan assembly ends up being dissolved, it’s curtains for the March Senate elections. And that in turn is curtains for the PML-N’s legislative majority in the Upper House which the party desperately wants in order to have the freedom to make laws if it forms the next government or block laws if it does not.
After his disqualification, Nawaz Sharif was expected to roll over and play dead. He didn’t. After his ouster, his party was supposed to splinter and fracture. It didn’t. After the ouster the Sharif family was predicted to split between the Nawaz and Shehbaz branches. It didn’t. After the ouster the Hudaibiya case was widely accepted to be reopened. It didn’t.
The best laid plans tend to go awry the moment they smash into reality. What is happening in Pakistan is defying all conventional wisdom. Things are way off the script. Stakeholders are carving out a new reality on a daily basis and triggering consequences that have no predictable patterns — not unlike the unpredictable consequences of the actions and policies of one Mohammad bin Salman in the holy land.
Any wonder then what happens in Saudia stays in Saudia? For now.
Published in The Express Tribune, January 7th, 2018.
Like Opinion & Editorial on Facebook, follow @ETOpEd on Twitter to receive all updates on all our daily pieces.
COMMENTS
Comments are moderated and generally will be posted if they are on-topic and not abusive.
For more information, please see our Comments FAQ