Implementation of K-P police ordinance
To utilise the energies of the community, Public Liaison Councils (PLC) are to be constituted under the KPPO
The writer tweets @alibabakhel
“Writing laws is easy, but governing is difficult.”
Leo Tolstoy
The quality of a law speaks of the intentions of the drafters and its implementation depicts the worth of its implementers. Promulgation of the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Police Ordinance (KPPO) 2016 is reflective of the nobel intent to transform the police from the edifice of its colonial past to a public-friendly service. While promulgation of Police Order (PO) 2002 was an attempt to democratise the police, the hasty amendments made to it deformed this law. It incorporated public safety and democratic accountability but the fabric it defined for public safety was never made fully operational. The concept of public safety at national, provincial and district tiers was defined but either the composition of safety commissions was kept incomplete or these remained dormant.
Eyes are now focused on the implementation of the KPPO. Those who derive inspiration from history and craft their opinions on the basis of past experience are unsure about its effective implementation, however, pragmatic circles pin great hopes on the law’s Section 144, which provides for the appointment of an Implementation Commissioner (IC) to oversee the enforcement of this law and convert it into reality. The IC has a gigantic role to play and by employing his experience he may be able to remove the irritants in its implementation. The provincial goverment must, therefore, appoint an IC without much delay.
The first thing the IC should do is to coordinate with the provincial government over the law’s financial and administrative implications. Since the Police Act of 1861 and PO 2002 were federal laws, their provincial ownership and implementation always remained weak. The KPPO is the first police law tailored by a province in accordance with local needs. Resultantly, political ownership is its real strength, but its implementation will be the real test. The KPPO necessitates the police department to work out administrative, procedural and hierarchical changes. The police management will also have to devise capacity-building and training programmes. However, when it comes to notifying and making new bodies like public safety commissions and scrutiny committees, this area falls under the ambit of the provincial government.
Incorporating internal accountability and public complaint sections, the KPPO envisages the central police office (CPO) to function through 13 different branches. Hence it is the responsibility of the provincial police to immediately restructure the CPO. After promulgation of PO 2002, the Frontier police was the pioneering force that established the Enquiries and Inspection Unit (EIU). However, we soon saw the EIU being converted into a parking lot for officers who were not required in the field. To win public trust, the police needs to establish internal accountability and public complaint cells, which are transparent and and have feedback mechanism.
Section 7(2) defines the ranks structure for the police. The Pakistani police primarily consists of 12 ranks and from a public perspective has a very long chain of command. In this chain, constables and head constables are in the majority. Without empowerment and capacity building of constables, the image of the police cannot be changed. The situation warrants reduction in the number of constables and an increase in the number of officers of ASI rank.
To reduce administrative discretion of the IG, Section 9 requires the constitution of the Police Policy Board, which aims at bringing more transparency and collective wisdom when it comes to policymaking. While the concept of functional specialisation was introduced in PO 2002, it was never implemented in toto. Section 12 of KPPO encourages functional specialisation.
The present challenges of an increased crime rate and militancy warrant a transition from the numerical model of policing to functional specialisation.
For effective implementation of any police law, it is important to have clearly defined police rules. Police Rules 1934 primarily catered for the needs of Police Act of 1861. To make the KPPO instantly operational, it will be more practical to amend Police Rules 1934 as the drafting of new rules may take years.
To utilise the energies of the community, Public Liaison Councils (PLC) are to be constituted under the KPPO. Around 70 per cent of PLC members will be selected from village councils. The PLCs have been empowered to issue warnings for violation of the Amplifier Act, monitor the activities of released convicts, check tenant acknowledgement receipts and verify credentials of tenants. Keeping in view the mistrust between the public and police, the effective utilisation of the PLCs seems like a gigantic task. It is therefore important to undertake capacity-building exercises that truly empower members of PLCs and address the trust deficit between the police and the public.
The KPPO also calls for the constitution of Provincial Public Safety Commission (PPSC). To make the 13-member PPSC functional, the speaker of the K-P Assembly has to nominate four members of the assembly and eight independent members are to be recommended by the Provincial Scrutiny Committee. In a similar vein, the 15-member Capital City District Public Safety Commission is to be made operational by the Nazim of the capital city district through the nomination of six members of the district council and nine are to be recommended by the District Scrutiny Committee. Apart from nominations by the speaker and the Nazim, the government should also notify the working of the scrutiny committees.
The scrutiny committee for the PPSC should consist of the chief justice of the Peshawar High Court, the chief commissioner of the Ehtesab Commission and the chairman of the Public Service Commission. The scrutiny committee for the capital city could consist of a high court judge, Nazim of the district government, a civil servant and a nominee of the government who should not be in government service.
To reduce burden on courts and resolve issues of a petty nature, the concept of Dispute Resolution Councils (DRC) at different levels has been incorporated in the KPPO. The efficacy of the DRCs can be enhanced by allocating finances for these and building the capacity of their members.
For better coordination among different actors of the criminal justice system, the idea of a Criminal Justice Coordination Committee (CJCC) at the district level has been borrowed from PO 2002. The CJCCs have been functional since 2002 but these have primarily remained in administrative mode instead of providing effective coordination among the different entities of the criminal justice system. To make the CJCCs more effective, a provincial criminal coordination committee should be set up.
Undoubtedly, legislation alone cannot bring change. Collective will of all stakeholders is needed to make the KPPO a success. Otherwise, we will remain stuck with a regressive colonial legacy.
Published in The Express Tribune, September 2nd, 2016.
Leo Tolstoy
The quality of a law speaks of the intentions of the drafters and its implementation depicts the worth of its implementers. Promulgation of the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Police Ordinance (KPPO) 2016 is reflective of the nobel intent to transform the police from the edifice of its colonial past to a public-friendly service. While promulgation of Police Order (PO) 2002 was an attempt to democratise the police, the hasty amendments made to it deformed this law. It incorporated public safety and democratic accountability but the fabric it defined for public safety was never made fully operational. The concept of public safety at national, provincial and district tiers was defined but either the composition of safety commissions was kept incomplete or these remained dormant.
Eyes are now focused on the implementation of the KPPO. Those who derive inspiration from history and craft their opinions on the basis of past experience are unsure about its effective implementation, however, pragmatic circles pin great hopes on the law’s Section 144, which provides for the appointment of an Implementation Commissioner (IC) to oversee the enforcement of this law and convert it into reality. The IC has a gigantic role to play and by employing his experience he may be able to remove the irritants in its implementation. The provincial goverment must, therefore, appoint an IC without much delay.
The first thing the IC should do is to coordinate with the provincial government over the law’s financial and administrative implications. Since the Police Act of 1861 and PO 2002 were federal laws, their provincial ownership and implementation always remained weak. The KPPO is the first police law tailored by a province in accordance with local needs. Resultantly, political ownership is its real strength, but its implementation will be the real test. The KPPO necessitates the police department to work out administrative, procedural and hierarchical changes. The police management will also have to devise capacity-building and training programmes. However, when it comes to notifying and making new bodies like public safety commissions and scrutiny committees, this area falls under the ambit of the provincial government.
Incorporating internal accountability and public complaint sections, the KPPO envisages the central police office (CPO) to function through 13 different branches. Hence it is the responsibility of the provincial police to immediately restructure the CPO. After promulgation of PO 2002, the Frontier police was the pioneering force that established the Enquiries and Inspection Unit (EIU). However, we soon saw the EIU being converted into a parking lot for officers who were not required in the field. To win public trust, the police needs to establish internal accountability and public complaint cells, which are transparent and and have feedback mechanism.
Section 7(2) defines the ranks structure for the police. The Pakistani police primarily consists of 12 ranks and from a public perspective has a very long chain of command. In this chain, constables and head constables are in the majority. Without empowerment and capacity building of constables, the image of the police cannot be changed. The situation warrants reduction in the number of constables and an increase in the number of officers of ASI rank.
To reduce administrative discretion of the IG, Section 9 requires the constitution of the Police Policy Board, which aims at bringing more transparency and collective wisdom when it comes to policymaking. While the concept of functional specialisation was introduced in PO 2002, it was never implemented in toto. Section 12 of KPPO encourages functional specialisation.
The present challenges of an increased crime rate and militancy warrant a transition from the numerical model of policing to functional specialisation.
For effective implementation of any police law, it is important to have clearly defined police rules. Police Rules 1934 primarily catered for the needs of Police Act of 1861. To make the KPPO instantly operational, it will be more practical to amend Police Rules 1934 as the drafting of new rules may take years.
To utilise the energies of the community, Public Liaison Councils (PLC) are to be constituted under the KPPO. Around 70 per cent of PLC members will be selected from village councils. The PLCs have been empowered to issue warnings for violation of the Amplifier Act, monitor the activities of released convicts, check tenant acknowledgement receipts and verify credentials of tenants. Keeping in view the mistrust between the public and police, the effective utilisation of the PLCs seems like a gigantic task. It is therefore important to undertake capacity-building exercises that truly empower members of PLCs and address the trust deficit between the police and the public.
The KPPO also calls for the constitution of Provincial Public Safety Commission (PPSC). To make the 13-member PPSC functional, the speaker of the K-P Assembly has to nominate four members of the assembly and eight independent members are to be recommended by the Provincial Scrutiny Committee. In a similar vein, the 15-member Capital City District Public Safety Commission is to be made operational by the Nazim of the capital city district through the nomination of six members of the district council and nine are to be recommended by the District Scrutiny Committee. Apart from nominations by the speaker and the Nazim, the government should also notify the working of the scrutiny committees.
The scrutiny committee for the PPSC should consist of the chief justice of the Peshawar High Court, the chief commissioner of the Ehtesab Commission and the chairman of the Public Service Commission. The scrutiny committee for the capital city could consist of a high court judge, Nazim of the district government, a civil servant and a nominee of the government who should not be in government service.
To reduce burden on courts and resolve issues of a petty nature, the concept of Dispute Resolution Councils (DRC) at different levels has been incorporated in the KPPO. The efficacy of the DRCs can be enhanced by allocating finances for these and building the capacity of their members.
For better coordination among different actors of the criminal justice system, the idea of a Criminal Justice Coordination Committee (CJCC) at the district level has been borrowed from PO 2002. The CJCCs have been functional since 2002 but these have primarily remained in administrative mode instead of providing effective coordination among the different entities of the criminal justice system. To make the CJCCs more effective, a provincial criminal coordination committee should be set up.
Undoubtedly, legislation alone cannot bring change. Collective will of all stakeholders is needed to make the KPPO a success. Otherwise, we will remain stuck with a regressive colonial legacy.
Published in The Express Tribune, September 2nd, 2016.