Counterterrorism framework in policing
There is hardly any instance where the community may have cooperated in the aftermath of an attack
The writer is a senior police officer. He tweets @alibabakhel
Since the USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan, Pakistan is persistently confronted with the menace of extremism and terrorism. However, the post-9/11 scenario drastically changed the frequency, modus operandi and targets of terror attacks. At the same time, ambiguity regarding the mandate of the police to launch counterterrorism operations and the colonial policing model marred its efficiency, response and professionalism. In the initial phase of terrorism, the police were the worst victim of the wrath of the savages. Police installations and policemen both faced the brunt of their onslaught. By persistently targeting police lines in various cities as well as police stations, and police training institutes in Manawa and Hangu, the masterminds exposed the structural flaws present in police buildings and security protocols. Consequently, police stations were fortified with sandbags, further enhancing the gulf between the public and police.
The Afghan war brought guns and bombs into Pakistan and eroded the country’s security fabric. The free movement of refugees from Afghanistan became a source of proliferation of guns and explosives. In tackling the situation, the police lacked clarity while the ruling elite lacked the will to do so. However, in the aftermath of the APS tragedy, there does appear to be clarity in the narrative. The post-9/11 phase brought acceleration, unpredictability and innovation in the terrorists’ strategy and targets, made it difficult for the police to respond to the challenge. The only options left were reactive or fire brigade-style policing or protecting the public with their blood. From 2001 to 2009, the police lacked institutional and legal back-up, hence countering terrorism by primarily, sacrificing their lives.
Although the Police Order (PO) 2002 is a post-9/11 development, there is hardly a reference in it regarding anti-terrorism apparatus. While its Article 4 defines the duties of the police, there is no direct reference to the role of police in combating terrorism. For decades, ‘police training’ remained ignorant of the challenges posed by terrorism. Therefore, the police had to seek the army’s assistance. Challenging though terrorism may be, it provides the rare opportunity to revamp the law-enforcement apparatus. Apart from weak political manifestation, lack of vision on the part of the police leadership resulted in the lack of a legal and institutional framework for counterterrorism. Meanwhile, terrorists transitioned from using time bombs to human bombs as well as remote-controlled improvised explosive devices, and from kidnapping to extortion. Technological innovation enabled terrorists to further their missions. On the other hand, there was hardly an organised coordination and sharing of information among law-enforcement agencies.
Acceleration in terrorist attacks persuaded police chiefs to suggest to their respective provincial governments to opt for a ‘numerical model’. Such a costly recipe increased police strength but did not build up the capacity required to respond to the challenge. After 9/11, a 117 per cent increase has been recorded in the manpower of the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (K-P) police. It’s an erroneous strategy to convert the entire police force into combatants and rely only on numerical strength of the force. Since counterterrorism is a specialised task, it requires quality manpower, full of the spirit of volunteerism, to be exposed to intense training cycles.
In the present age of technology, sole dependence on human intelligence gathering cannot counter terrorism. Terrorists are using cyber space as well as utilising technology to the optimum level. In contrast, junior ranking police officials are not only averse to technology, but also lack access to technological solutions. Since terrorists frequently use technology, the employment of technology-led solutions to counter them is inevitable. Effective policing cannot be carried out without jamming devices, bulletproof vests, armoured personnel carriers, bulletproof vehicles, explosive detectors and quality weapons.
While prevention and detection are the traditional, universal functions of policing, after 9/11 these have been compromised, while the ‘security function’ has dominated. Resultantly, the police often come across as a security agency rather than as a law enforcement apparatus. Such a situation compromises policing for the common man.
Suicide bombing is another daunting challenge that can only be prevented with effective intelligence network. The police are confronted with jurisdictional and legal barriers in this regard. For instance, if the mastermind resides in another country and the suicide bomber was trained in the tribal areas and financed by another country, it is difficult for investigators to connect all the dots. However, with effective intelligence and cooperation from the community, the police can nab facilitators, handlers and financiers. But owing to acute distrust between the police and the community, there is hardly any instance where the community may have cooperated in the aftermath of an attack, with majority of the public assuming the role of silent spectators.
In the initial phase of militancy, the ruling elite did not understand the gravity of the situation, but once extremists started targeting political leaders they also realised the need for dedicated counterterrorism departments. Initially, obtaining finance for counterterrorism was difficult; but gradually, provincial governments started generous financial allocations. Here it is important that financial allocations to the police are made transparently. In the recent past, suspicious procurement deals of hardware in K-P and Sindh has tarnished the image of the police.
As stated previously, technology attracted terrorists to frequently use IEDs in Balochistan, Fata and K-P. In K-P, between 2004 and 2014, a total of 1,953 incidents of IED blasts were registered. Owing to easy availability of components like fertiliser and batteries in the market, cheaper prices and proliferation of know-how, all strengthened the hidden enemy. With the passage of time, the K-P police learnt from their failures and fatalities and thus opted for a diagnostic approach. Since 2008, the K-P police defused about 6,000 IEDs and the recent establishment of the School of Explosive Handling in Nowshera is a step in the right direction.
To establish an institutional fabric, provinces have established counterterrorism departments. However, operational and investigation wings alone will not deliver unless there is effective backup by the technical and intelligence wings. To combat terrorism, the K-P police have established a Special Combat Unit, a Rapid Response Force, an Elite Women Commandos Unit and a Canine unit.
Although during the last decade, the response and coordination of the counterterrorism apparatus of the police has improved, conviction in terror cases is also a must and requires improvement in the quality of investigation. Such ideals cannot be achieved without improvement in coordination between prosecutors, investigators, judges, lawyers and public witnesses. It is time for us to formulate a strategy to integrate counterterrorism functions within the framework of policing. However, counterterrorism should not be taken in isolation, but rather as a holistic, integrated approach.
Published in The Express Tribune, May 13th, 2016.
The Afghan war brought guns and bombs into Pakistan and eroded the country’s security fabric. The free movement of refugees from Afghanistan became a source of proliferation of guns and explosives. In tackling the situation, the police lacked clarity while the ruling elite lacked the will to do so. However, in the aftermath of the APS tragedy, there does appear to be clarity in the narrative. The post-9/11 phase brought acceleration, unpredictability and innovation in the terrorists’ strategy and targets, made it difficult for the police to respond to the challenge. The only options left were reactive or fire brigade-style policing or protecting the public with their blood. From 2001 to 2009, the police lacked institutional and legal back-up, hence countering terrorism by primarily, sacrificing their lives.
Although the Police Order (PO) 2002 is a post-9/11 development, there is hardly a reference in it regarding anti-terrorism apparatus. While its Article 4 defines the duties of the police, there is no direct reference to the role of police in combating terrorism. For decades, ‘police training’ remained ignorant of the challenges posed by terrorism. Therefore, the police had to seek the army’s assistance. Challenging though terrorism may be, it provides the rare opportunity to revamp the law-enforcement apparatus. Apart from weak political manifestation, lack of vision on the part of the police leadership resulted in the lack of a legal and institutional framework for counterterrorism. Meanwhile, terrorists transitioned from using time bombs to human bombs as well as remote-controlled improvised explosive devices, and from kidnapping to extortion. Technological innovation enabled terrorists to further their missions. On the other hand, there was hardly an organised coordination and sharing of information among law-enforcement agencies.
Acceleration in terrorist attacks persuaded police chiefs to suggest to their respective provincial governments to opt for a ‘numerical model’. Such a costly recipe increased police strength but did not build up the capacity required to respond to the challenge. After 9/11, a 117 per cent increase has been recorded in the manpower of the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (K-P) police. It’s an erroneous strategy to convert the entire police force into combatants and rely only on numerical strength of the force. Since counterterrorism is a specialised task, it requires quality manpower, full of the spirit of volunteerism, to be exposed to intense training cycles.
In the present age of technology, sole dependence on human intelligence gathering cannot counter terrorism. Terrorists are using cyber space as well as utilising technology to the optimum level. In contrast, junior ranking police officials are not only averse to technology, but also lack access to technological solutions. Since terrorists frequently use technology, the employment of technology-led solutions to counter them is inevitable. Effective policing cannot be carried out without jamming devices, bulletproof vests, armoured personnel carriers, bulletproof vehicles, explosive detectors and quality weapons.
While prevention and detection are the traditional, universal functions of policing, after 9/11 these have been compromised, while the ‘security function’ has dominated. Resultantly, the police often come across as a security agency rather than as a law enforcement apparatus. Such a situation compromises policing for the common man.
Suicide bombing is another daunting challenge that can only be prevented with effective intelligence network. The police are confronted with jurisdictional and legal barriers in this regard. For instance, if the mastermind resides in another country and the suicide bomber was trained in the tribal areas and financed by another country, it is difficult for investigators to connect all the dots. However, with effective intelligence and cooperation from the community, the police can nab facilitators, handlers and financiers. But owing to acute distrust between the police and the community, there is hardly any instance where the community may have cooperated in the aftermath of an attack, with majority of the public assuming the role of silent spectators.
In the initial phase of militancy, the ruling elite did not understand the gravity of the situation, but once extremists started targeting political leaders they also realised the need for dedicated counterterrorism departments. Initially, obtaining finance for counterterrorism was difficult; but gradually, provincial governments started generous financial allocations. Here it is important that financial allocations to the police are made transparently. In the recent past, suspicious procurement deals of hardware in K-P and Sindh has tarnished the image of the police.
As stated previously, technology attracted terrorists to frequently use IEDs in Balochistan, Fata and K-P. In K-P, between 2004 and 2014, a total of 1,953 incidents of IED blasts were registered. Owing to easy availability of components like fertiliser and batteries in the market, cheaper prices and proliferation of know-how, all strengthened the hidden enemy. With the passage of time, the K-P police learnt from their failures and fatalities and thus opted for a diagnostic approach. Since 2008, the K-P police defused about 6,000 IEDs and the recent establishment of the School of Explosive Handling in Nowshera is a step in the right direction.
To establish an institutional fabric, provinces have established counterterrorism departments. However, operational and investigation wings alone will not deliver unless there is effective backup by the technical and intelligence wings. To combat terrorism, the K-P police have established a Special Combat Unit, a Rapid Response Force, an Elite Women Commandos Unit and a Canine unit.
Although during the last decade, the response and coordination of the counterterrorism apparatus of the police has improved, conviction in terror cases is also a must and requires improvement in the quality of investigation. Such ideals cannot be achieved without improvement in coordination between prosecutors, investigators, judges, lawyers and public witnesses. It is time for us to formulate a strategy to integrate counterterrorism functions within the framework of policing. However, counterterrorism should not be taken in isolation, but rather as a holistic, integrated approach.
Published in The Express Tribune, May 13th, 2016.