Pakistan again centre stage for Afghanistan
Having taken centre stage, Pakistan bears the onerous burden of the success of a regional solution for Afghan problem
Both Pakistan and Afghanistan seem to be working hard to set, reset, and re-reset relations. Their ‘learning-curve’ seems akin to a roller coaster ride, or do I mean a seesaw?
Before last year’s presidential elections in Afghanistan, the two countries were, at best, uneasy neighbours, despite the fact that Pakistan was strictly adhering to its declared position that Afghanistan’s future should be an Afghan problem — Afghan-led and Afghan-owned. After taking over, as president, Ashraf Ghani took the bold decision to place Pakistan centre stage, and Pakistan responded with increasing warmth. Inviting the Afghan army chief as the first foreign dignitary to the passing out parade at its military academy was Pakistan’s symbolic response. Visits by the Pakistani army chief and the DG ISI soon followed. It seemed that this fresh start towards good relations was bound to succeed. It didn’t.
While the ostensible reason was the announcement of Mullah Omar’s death, there was far more at work here. Hamid Karzai still held sway over much of Kabul’s influentials and many of them are still part of Ghani’s team. It is important here to draw attention to some facts that merit repetition for better understanding of current events. First, Kabul has never reflected the thinking of the Afghan peoples; it always was and still is an island of the Afghan elite. But it remains the centre of Afghanistan’s political stage. Second, Karzai has reason to hold a grudge against Pakistan. His father was killed by the Taliban in Quetta in 1999. Karzai has always blamed Pakistan for this. What is, however, ignored is that Karzai was among the first Afghan warlords to swear allegiance to the Taliban in early 1995. After Kabul fell, he expected greater rewards than the Taliban were prepared to offer and decided to leave them. According to the Taliban, Karzai’s cardinal sin was not his forswearing allegiance to them, but the fact that on deserting them, he sought safe haven with Ahmed Shah Masood, a sworn enemy of the Taliban.
Due to this background, Karzai’s animosity towards Pakistan and his dependence on the erstwhile members of the Northern Alliance, which the US decided to espouse after its conquest of Afghanistan, was inevitable. That Karzai should be able to infect most Kabulites with this animosity is very understandable. Pakistan had supported the Taliban even after the Afghans were becoming disillusioned of them. And no Afghan wished to be reminded that Pakistan’s support to the Taliban was because from 1994 to 1996, Afghans flocked to the Taliban banner, except in the region under the Northern Alliance.
It was this atmosphere of mutual distrust of the decade-long Karzai era, which India exploited in its desire to stoke unrest in Balochistan in particular and in Pakistan in general.
Ghani’s bold overtures to Pakistan were not welcomed by many Karzai adherents, many of whom still hold positions of influence under Ghani. His overtures also threatened to put an end to Indian designs against Pakistan.
As I pointed out in an earlier article also, had Ghani met early success, he would have continued boldly on the path he had chosen. Unfortunately, he didn’t. That provided an opportunity to Karzai and his adherents to undermine Ghani and blame Pakistan.
The attack on APS in Peshawar, targeting children, was not merely a watershed in Pakistan; it also shook the region, especially the Afghan Pakhtun, who are the same ethnicity as the Pakistani Pakhtun. Despite this event, it seemed that Karzai adherents were succeeding. But fate, and Pakistan, re-dealt the cards.
In India, people began protesting against Narendra Modi’s blatant anti-Muslim policies, which resulted in his immediate attempt to resume dialogue with Pakistan. Though it might merely be a reluctant gesture, it gave Ghani reason to rethink and, propitiously, the GHQ reached out to him again, even after his cautious censure of Operation Zarb-e-Azb only days ago, which had, according to the Afghan president, resulted in the influx of refugees in Afghanistan. Instead of a similar response reminding Ghani that Pakistan was still hosting far more Afghans than he was hosting Pakistanis, the Afghan president’s plaints were met with understanding and reassurance by the elected and military leaderships. Perhaps the mood of possible rapprochement between India and Pakistan at the Heart of Asia Conference also helped, but essentially, armed with the Pakistan governmental and military assurance, Ghani was more receptive. The fact that the Taliban, both Afghan and Pakistani, are growing weaker and the Islamic State stronger, might also be influencing decisions in both countries. However, the call for a regional solution to the prevalent insecurity by both, the Pakistani prime minister and Ghani is a welcome development.
As neighbours of Afghanistan, Iran, China and Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan should be part of the regional solution to the problem. Though not neighbouring Afghanistan, India should be included as a country with stakes in the region and a neighbour of Pakistan. The US, though extra-regional, but a country that should have an interest in creating peace in the region it is planning to leave, should also be present. As also should Russia. However, Pakistan, having been placed or, having taken cente stage, bears the onerous burden of the success of such a regional solution; unless, of course, it is visibly hijacked. This could chart the course for the future of this region.
Published in The Express Tribune, January 1st, 2016.
Before last year’s presidential elections in Afghanistan, the two countries were, at best, uneasy neighbours, despite the fact that Pakistan was strictly adhering to its declared position that Afghanistan’s future should be an Afghan problem — Afghan-led and Afghan-owned. After taking over, as president, Ashraf Ghani took the bold decision to place Pakistan centre stage, and Pakistan responded with increasing warmth. Inviting the Afghan army chief as the first foreign dignitary to the passing out parade at its military academy was Pakistan’s symbolic response. Visits by the Pakistani army chief and the DG ISI soon followed. It seemed that this fresh start towards good relations was bound to succeed. It didn’t.
While the ostensible reason was the announcement of Mullah Omar’s death, there was far more at work here. Hamid Karzai still held sway over much of Kabul’s influentials and many of them are still part of Ghani’s team. It is important here to draw attention to some facts that merit repetition for better understanding of current events. First, Kabul has never reflected the thinking of the Afghan peoples; it always was and still is an island of the Afghan elite. But it remains the centre of Afghanistan’s political stage. Second, Karzai has reason to hold a grudge against Pakistan. His father was killed by the Taliban in Quetta in 1999. Karzai has always blamed Pakistan for this. What is, however, ignored is that Karzai was among the first Afghan warlords to swear allegiance to the Taliban in early 1995. After Kabul fell, he expected greater rewards than the Taliban were prepared to offer and decided to leave them. According to the Taliban, Karzai’s cardinal sin was not his forswearing allegiance to them, but the fact that on deserting them, he sought safe haven with Ahmed Shah Masood, a sworn enemy of the Taliban.
Due to this background, Karzai’s animosity towards Pakistan and his dependence on the erstwhile members of the Northern Alliance, which the US decided to espouse after its conquest of Afghanistan, was inevitable. That Karzai should be able to infect most Kabulites with this animosity is very understandable. Pakistan had supported the Taliban even after the Afghans were becoming disillusioned of them. And no Afghan wished to be reminded that Pakistan’s support to the Taliban was because from 1994 to 1996, Afghans flocked to the Taliban banner, except in the region under the Northern Alliance.
It was this atmosphere of mutual distrust of the decade-long Karzai era, which India exploited in its desire to stoke unrest in Balochistan in particular and in Pakistan in general.
Ghani’s bold overtures to Pakistan were not welcomed by many Karzai adherents, many of whom still hold positions of influence under Ghani. His overtures also threatened to put an end to Indian designs against Pakistan.
As I pointed out in an earlier article also, had Ghani met early success, he would have continued boldly on the path he had chosen. Unfortunately, he didn’t. That provided an opportunity to Karzai and his adherents to undermine Ghani and blame Pakistan.
The attack on APS in Peshawar, targeting children, was not merely a watershed in Pakistan; it also shook the region, especially the Afghan Pakhtun, who are the same ethnicity as the Pakistani Pakhtun. Despite this event, it seemed that Karzai adherents were succeeding. But fate, and Pakistan, re-dealt the cards.
In India, people began protesting against Narendra Modi’s blatant anti-Muslim policies, which resulted in his immediate attempt to resume dialogue with Pakistan. Though it might merely be a reluctant gesture, it gave Ghani reason to rethink and, propitiously, the GHQ reached out to him again, even after his cautious censure of Operation Zarb-e-Azb only days ago, which had, according to the Afghan president, resulted in the influx of refugees in Afghanistan. Instead of a similar response reminding Ghani that Pakistan was still hosting far more Afghans than he was hosting Pakistanis, the Afghan president’s plaints were met with understanding and reassurance by the elected and military leaderships. Perhaps the mood of possible rapprochement between India and Pakistan at the Heart of Asia Conference also helped, but essentially, armed with the Pakistan governmental and military assurance, Ghani was more receptive. The fact that the Taliban, both Afghan and Pakistani, are growing weaker and the Islamic State stronger, might also be influencing decisions in both countries. However, the call for a regional solution to the prevalent insecurity by both, the Pakistani prime minister and Ghani is a welcome development.
As neighbours of Afghanistan, Iran, China and Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan should be part of the regional solution to the problem. Though not neighbouring Afghanistan, India should be included as a country with stakes in the region and a neighbour of Pakistan. The US, though extra-regional, but a country that should have an interest in creating peace in the region it is planning to leave, should also be present. As also should Russia. However, Pakistan, having been placed or, having taken cente stage, bears the onerous burden of the success of such a regional solution; unless, of course, it is visibly hijacked. This could chart the course for the future of this region.
Published in The Express Tribune, January 1st, 2016.