The rising tensions between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban

Despite the rising tensions between the Afghan Taliban and Pakistan, many anti-Taliban Afghans are still skeptical as to how the Taliban can have disagreements with Pakistan. The skeptics believe that given the support that the Taliban have received from different quarters in Pakistan since their inception in 1994, it is highly unlikely for the Taliban to be able to express opposition to Pakistan. Taken at face value, the skeptics’ point of view may seem sound and logical. That being said, the skeptics either lack or fail to demonstrate a genuine understanding of the Afghan character as well as hard historical facts.

Firstly, when it comes to politics, based on my long association with my fellow Afghans, the Afghan character is unpredictable, and thus Afghans can be most unreliable. Although in our region, the English have a reputation (or rather notoriety) for being cunning and unreliable, Afghans can match and even beat them at these traits. When their interests dictate, Afghans, including the Taliban, make and break alliances, and switch sides, without showing the slightest guilt. In fact, the Taliban’s rapid capturing of Afghanistan last year had more to do with local powerbrokers’ switching sides and allying themselves with the Taliban than mere battlefield prowess and achievements.

Sandwiched between two major European powers — the British in India and the Russians in Central Asia — in the 19^th and 20^th centuries, and driven by eternal tribal, ethnic, and religious jealousies, Afghans have developed a resilient, albeit untrustworthy and constantly-changing, character to survive against uneven odds. The English writer Stephen Wheeler observed in the late 19^th century:

“To the Afghan mind, perhaps, skillful [sic] diplomacy consists mainly in changing sides at the right moment.”

Secondly, historically, Afghans have shown ‘obedience’ to foreigners only insofar as it suited the former’s interest. On the surface, the perception may be that Afghans are subservient to foreigners. Afghans, however, bide their time, trying to make the most out of their association with foreigners, while also waiting for the right opportunity to turn against, or at least dump, their foreign supporters. The Taliban, who are believed to have received support from Pakistan, are no exception to this general rule in Afghan politics.

Despite going through three phases (1994-2001, 2001-2021, and 2021-present), generally speaking, Taliban-Pakistan relations have neither been cordial nor based on mutual understanding. From 1994 to 2001, when the Taliban were first in power, despite being on life support from Pakistan, the Taliban — like the Mujahideen before them — did little to further Pakistan’s interest in Afghanistan, except keeping the so-called Northern Alliance, whom Pakistan believed to be under Indian influence, away from the Pakistani border.

The examples below will show the Taliban’s defiance of Pakistan at the highest level before they were toppled by the United States (US) in 2001. First, despite repeated invitations from Pakistan, the former Taliban leader Mulla Mohammad Omar refused to visit Pakistan; he even turned down a Pakistani offer to go to Umrah through Pakistan. Second, Omar also turned down General Pervez Musharraf’s plea not to destroy the Bamiyan Buddha statues, which the Taliban blew up in March 2001. Third, Omar refused to listen to Pakistan to hand over Osama bin Laden either to Saudi Arabia or the US.

The Taliban did as they pleased, while Pakistan kept on providing them with essential supplies. In addition, recruits from Pakistani madrassas helped provide the Taliban with the manpower they needed to run their war machine. The Taliban and their families also used to visit Pakistan regularly for medical treatment and vacations. Pakistan had essentially turned into the Taliban’s strategic depth, without receiving any substantial return on its investment.

From 2001 to 2021, when the Taliban were in the insurgency mode, Pakistan sheltered them with various objectives in mind, but chiefly to use them as leverage in any post-US settlement in Afghanistan. The Taliban, however, availed themselves of the opportunity to take shelter in Pakistan to avoid total destruction at America’s hands. Both the Taliban’s and Pakistan’s interest converged on the fact that the Taliban should survive, and later play a (decisive) role in Afghanistan. But that was also where both sides’ convergence of interest ended.

Despite the Taliban leaders spending a long time in Pakistan, and some of them still keeping their families behind in Pakistan, they are no fans, leave alone puppets, of Pakistan. Mulla Abdus Salam Zaeef — one of Mulla Omar’s closest confidants, a founding member of the Taliban, and the Taliban’s former ambassador to Pakistan — has summarised in his memoir, My Life with the Taliban, what the Taliban think of Pakistan:

“Pakistan, which plays a key role in Asia, is so famous for treachery that it is said they can get milk from a bull. They have two tongues in one mouth, and two faces on one head so they can speak everybody’s language; they use everybody, deceive everybody. They deceive the Arabs under the guise of Islamic nuclear power, saying that they are defending Islam and Islamic countries. They milk America and Europe in the alliance against terrorism, and they have been deceiving Pakistani and other Muslims around the world in the name of the Kashmiri jihad. But behind the curtain, they have been betraying everyone.”

From coming back to power in August 2021 to present, the Taliban have once again acted as they have wanted. The Taliban have refused to listen to Pakistan to form a so-called ‘inclusive’ government. More importantly, to Pakistan’s disappointment and annoyance, the Taliban have refused to expel or crack down on the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) members in Afghanistan. No wonder last year in July, Pakistan’s Army Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa told Pakistani lawmakers that the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban were “two faces of the same coin”. In all fairness, the Afghan Taliban are many things: ignorant, semi-literate, extremist, terrorist, and misogynist. But they, especially the Qandahari Taliban, are no one’s puppets. They did not fight a 20-year insurgency against the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to become Pakistan’s puppets.

Since both Pakistan and the Taliban lack a comprehensive mutual understanding, and many still perceive the Taliban as Pakistan’s pawns, as rulers the Taliban will do everything in their power to demonstrate their independence. The Taliban will continue to shelter TTP fighters in Afghanistan and turn a blind eye to what the TTP does in Pakistan; although on the surface, the Taliban will give assurances that Afghan soil will not be used against Pakistan.

Finally, one has to understand, especially in Pakistan, that regardless of who is in power in Afghanistan — since Afghanistan-Pakistan relations at state level have generally been tense since Pakistan’s inception in 1947 and that since successive Afghan governments have fueled anti-Pakistan sentiments — it is very unlikely that a pro-Pakistan government will emerge any time soon in Afghanistan.

Any Afghan government tilting toward Pakistan runs the risk of committing political suicide at home. Once again, the Taliban are no exception to that rule. The Taliban may have come to power by force, but to win hearts and minds, they need to emulate former Afghan governments’ anti-Pakistan rhetoric. In fact, it is not unlikely for the Taliban to move closer to India, following in the footsteps of the Mujahideen in the 1990s, especially if Pakistan conducts more air raids into Afghan territory, or allows the US to use its airspace to do so. Hence, India may have an opportunity to capitalise on the current Afghanistan-Pakistan tensions.