A non-aligned Pakistan

I recently wrote an article on the diplomatic snub in Riyadh and how Pakistan’s foreign policy needs a fundamental rethink based on regional cooperation, trade and non-alignment from a sectarian standpoint. In particular, I highlighted the need for revisiting Pakistan’s close alliance with Saudi Arabia, particularly at a time where Saudi Arabia is leading what is clearly an anti-Iran coalition under the guise of a ‘Muslim Nato’.

A lot of people pointed out that this was a nice thought but unrealistic in practice, because Islamabad doesn’t have all that much room to manoeuvre in terms of its alignment with Riyadh. Listed below are the main arguments I have heard for remaining in this military alliance and staying closely aligned with Saudi Arabia, along with counter-arguments for each point.

Remittances: People pointed out that the lion’s share of remittances to Pakistan from the Middle East comes from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, not Iran — and that by virtue of the two-million-plus Pakistani guest workers in the country, the Saudis are in a position to coerce Pakistan economically.



If the Saudis choose to expel Pakistani workers then remittances will fall, there’s no getting around that. But data seems to suggest that this threat isn’t as serious as one would think. As Sameer Lalwani outlines in a piece featured on War on the Rocks, despite Saudi Arabia threatening retaliation for Pakistan’s refusal to send troops to Yemen, remittances from the region actually grew by 9 per cent relative to the previous year in the six months following the decision. So, this threat of economic coercion is largely a bluff, until it isn’t — at which point there’s not much Pakistan can do anyway. Falling oil prices and dramatically shifting internal political realities in Saudi Arabia are likely to render reduced number of foreign workers; an inevitability in any case.

Trade: Nearly the entirety of foreign aid or ‘gifts’ to Pakistan from the Middle East come from Saudi Arabia and we have an important trade relationship with them.

It’s true that the Saudis have provided financial assistance (on the best of terms) to Pakistan at crucial times. But this assistance has been predicated on personal relationships and expectations of fealty and favours. Regardless of how much the Saudis may have gifted Pakistani governments their clerical establishment has simultaneously exported sectarianism aggressively in Pakistan for decades resulting in the widespread pervasion of extremist ideology. Ultimately the cost of the latter has far outweighed the benefit of the former. As far as trade is concerned, Pakistan actually runs a large trade deficit with Saudi Arabia through its import of oil. This is oil that can be acquired from other countries like Iran at competitive costs, with the added benefit of the potential for larger exports to offset trade deficits.

The enemy of my enemy is my friend: It is better for Pakistan to align with the Saudis and Emiratis, particularly as the Iranians become friendlier with India.

Iran has a lot more to gain by way of trade and inclusion in CPEC than it does by aligning with India. A recalibration of relations can be ushered in through inclusion of Tehran within CPEC, the completion of the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline, increased military collaboration against militant groups hostile to both countries and the fostering of closer ties through mass student exchange programmes and aggressive promotion of inter-country tourism and trade. Most importantly, a pullback from the Saudi-led coalition would help calm Iranian fears of Pakistani backing of a Saudi-led anti-Iran agenda.



However, this would require some genuine resets on Iran’s end as well. They would need to stop providing India with cover for espionage activities against Pakistan (remember Kulbhushan Jadhav), would need to direct the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to cease recruitment of Pakistanis to fight for Iranian proxies in Syria and embrace the idea of a more open border. Such a two-way shift would require honest engagement and extensive dialogue way beyond what we’ve seen between the two countries at both a diplomatic and military levels. Ultimately, it is only logical for the two to become friendlier owing to their geographical proximity, shared cultural and linguistic backgrounds.

Last but not least, the success of CPEC is predicated on the larger viability and success of OBOR, which in turn requires a stable Iran and Central Asia. Pakistan has more to gain from OBOR than it does from Saudi-led military misadventure. Similarly, Iran has more to gain from inclusion in CPEC than it does from aligning strongly with India.

Better to have a seat at the table: Saudi Arabia is leading the ‘Muslim Nato’ and it would be better for Pakistan to have a seat at the table rather than not have one at all.

The Saudi-led bloc of Muslim states is already falling apart, less than three weeks after the summit in Riyadh. The growing concern over the blocs’ intense animosity towards Iran is fuelling fears that Saudis and the Emiratis are inflaming the sectarian divide. Already, this has led to a breakdown in relations between Qatar and the other Arab states. Saudi Defence Minister Mohammad bin Salman has clearly stated that he “intends to take the war to Iran.” This posturing represents the closest the Muslim world has been to the precipice of major internal conflict in hundreds of years and Pakistan would be wise to stay as far out of it as possible.

Although Islamabad was wise enough to stay out of Yemen, it is not enough. As the only nuclear Muslim country, Pakistan has a unique relevance on the international stage. It would have global consequences. For example, if Pakistan was to take a public position of non-alignment and become the standard bearer for other Muslim nations by choosing to reject and thereby, protest the now global sectarian conflict that Iran, the Saudis and the Emiratis are all guilty of escalating. This would, of course, entail a complete withdrawal from the alliance and a reaffirmation of use of force only in the defence of Pakistan’s own borders and sovereignty. Given the danger of mass sectarian spillover violence in Pakistan, this is both the morally admirable and strategically prudent choice.

Overall, the criticisms levelled against non-alignment and rethinking of our foreign policy strike me as more of an apology for Pakistan’s current Saudi-leaning alignment than anything else. A passive and reactive foreign policy will never match up to a coherent and proactive foreign policy that is borne out of a pursuit for forming new regional orders and achieving long-term strategic superiority.

Published in The Express Tribune, June 9^th, 2017.

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