Case for a contingency plan

The successful evacuation of the vast majority of Pakistanis from Yemen is a matter of considerable satisfaction. Clearly, the evacuees are happy to be safely out of the war-torn country. After all, nothing is more important than life. And the government is in a ‘job-well-done’ mood. However, as television cameras and public focus moves away, these families are now confronted with anxiety about their livelihoods. The individuals and families who have been airlifted had jobs or businesses in Yemen, which they have left behind. They have arrived with just a few suitcases, leaving behind their movable household and business durables — goods in their stores, furniture, cars, refrigerators, etc. Some were long-term residents and possess immovable property. All of these have been abandoned in the rush to just get out. And, given the outlook in Yemen, it is likely that all will be lost.

Back in Pakistan, they are asset-deprived and unemployed. And, given the employment situation in Pakistan, it is likely to be a severely uphill task for them to find gainful placement. Many may need to find rented accommodation, children will need to be admitted to schools, and so on; however, where will the money for house rent and tuition fees come from? An assessment needs to be made of the economic status of the returnees and, those found in need, provided some financial assistance to enable them to tide over for at least one year.

The plight of Pakistani families with respect to the Yemeni crisis raises the curtain on other possible crises of a similar nature and of a larger scale. A thousand or so families arriving in ‘refugee’ status may not qualify as a national crisis; however, a million families landing in Pakistan in similar circumstances will certainly be catastrophic. Contingency planning may be in order — and urgently — to prepare for such an eventuality. Such possibilities are at this point of time entirely hypothetical; however, that is what contingency planning is all about.

More than one scenario and direction of the current crisis can be imagined. One scenario is that the Saudi enterprise in Yemen will succeed, with the Houthis defeated and the Hadi regime restored. This scenario will restore stability, howsoever temporarily, in this part of the Middle East. In the event, King Salman’s writ within the Kingdom will be strengthened. There is, however, another possible scenario. Yemen has seen multiple civil wars since the 1960s; however, the current crisis may not end soon and as neatly as hoped.

This is indicated by the fact that the Houthis managed to launch a large-scale attack and capture parts of Aden, despite more than a week of intense Saudi aerial bombardment. Moreover, to the extent that Houthi power is checkmated, the space vacated is being filled by al Qaeda; which, for the first time, has taken over a city in Yemen. Yemen is now a three-pronged theatre of war and there is a consensus of opinion that the Saudi-led coalition will have to deploy ground forces to achieve the twin objectives of defeating the Houthis and al Qaeda and restoring President Hadi to power. Moreover, given that the Yemeni army faction loyal to the ousted president is in tatters, coalition forces will have to remain in Yemen to prop up the Hadi regime.

The Houthis, even if defeated, will retain the military capability to continue to fight in guerrilla mode for an extended period and the terrain is suitable for such warfare. And al Qaeda will also flex its military muscle. The Saudi-led coalition, thus, faces the danger of being bogged down in a quagmire, with mounting casualties and financial outlays and no successful end in sight.

One outcome of this situation may be a spillover of the war beyond Yemen. Apart from Houthi operations inside Saudi Arabia, al Qaeda is a hydra-headed snake that can pop up in parts of the Kingdom. In the event that the Yemen war appears to be getting out of control, rival claimants to the Saudi throne will feel emboldened enough to mount a challenge, leading to political instability in the Kingdom — and elsewhere. The Arab coalition that Saudi Arabia has put together will also begin to sag.

How this instability across the Arabian peninsula will play out is difficult to imagine. One possibility is that businesses may begin to shut down and expatriate labour forced to leave. There are over two million Pakistani workers in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf and if even a quarter of them begin to return, the impact of the reverse mass exodus on the Pakistani economy will be dire. Foreign remittances — so critical to Pakistan’s balance of payments — will plummet, devaluing the rupee, and many thousands of returnees will be seeking compensation and jobs Thus, the imperative for a contingency plan.

Published in The Express Tribune, April 10^th,  2015.

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