Why joining the Saudi coalition is a bad idea
Pakistan should play the role of a bridge by mediating between Iran & Saudi Arabia with assistance from Turkey & China
The writer is an Associate Research Fellow at the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Singapore. He tweets @basit.researcher
The blunt Saudi demand from Pakistan to join the Saudi-led coalition against the Iranian-backed Houthi uprising in Yemen has put Pakistan in a catch-22 situation. Any decision from Pakistan to join the Saudi coalition will have long-term reprehensible political, economic and security repercussions for the country.
To put things in context, the balance of power is shifting in the Middle East after the successful conclusion of the US-Iran nuclear deal. The Saudi air strikes in Yemen close to the Iran-US nuclear deal is not a coincidence. So the conflict in Yemen is the start of a wider regional tussle in the Middle East between Saudi Arabia and Iran for influence and hegemony.
Politically, Pakistan is not in a position to say ‘no’ to the Saudis but militarily, it can ill-afford to commit its troops for the conflict in Yemen. Pakistani security forces are over-occupied with a multitude of internal and external security challenges, so our plate is full. At this juncture, jumping into the Middle Eastern geopolitical morass is fraught with dangers. Pakistan should not join the Saudi coalition for the following six reasons.
First, given the pressing domestic and regional situation, getting sucked into the Iranian-Saudi proxy war can be detrimental to Pakistan’s fight against home-grown terrorism. Now that the security situation is gradually stabilising after more than a decade of violence, moving troops to the Middle East will be a fatal mistake.
Second, committing Pakistani troops to the Saudis in return for financial assistance will certainly come with a caveat of allowing Saudi-backed groups to preach their radical interpretation of faith in Pakistan without any check.
Third, the decision to join the Saudi coalition will antagonise Iran, which shares a 900-kilometre-long porous border with Pakistan. This decision can increase sectarian tensions in the country, resulting in another episode of a Saudi-Iranian proxy war on our soil. Four, any sectarian rift in Pakistan will provide an ideal opening to the Islamic State (IS)-affiliated groups in the region to exploit our sectarian fault lines to gain a foothold in the country. The anti-Iran militant groups like the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jundallah can also join hands with the IS in such a situation.
Five, Iran can potentially undermine Pakistani interests in Afghanistan. It can extend support to anti-Pakistan groups and forces, especially the Baloch separatist groups. Iran and Pakistan are already locked in an active geo-economic competition to unlock the mineral riches of landlocked Central Asian states via Afghanistan. Pakistan has constructed a deep-sea port in Balochistan with Chinese assistance while Iran is developing the Chabahar port with Indian help.
Finally, the lifting of US sanctions on Iran as a result of the nuclear deal opens up a way for the energy-starved Pakistan to fulfil its soaring energy demands by importing gas from Iran, which is the quickest and cheapest way of overcoming the chronic energy crisis in our country. If Pakistan joins the Saudi coalition, as per the 2012 Iran-Pakistan-gas pipeline agreement, Iran can use the option of imposing penalties on Pakistan.
Rather than burning its fingers in the Middle Eastern geopolitical fire, Pakistan should play the role of a bridge by mediating between Iran and Saudi Arabia with assistance from Turkey and China. In the 1970s, during the heyday of the Cold War, Pakistan acted as a bridge in bringing China and the US closer. Pakistan helped facilitate then US secretary of state Henry Kissinger’s secret visit to China, which paved the way for US president Richard Nixon’s visit to that country in 1972. In the given situation, Pakistan can play the same role when no other Muslim country is making any serious efforts to find a peaceful solution to this problem through diplomacy. One also hopes that Pakistan has learnt its lessons from 30 years of jihadi misadventures in Afghanistan and Indian-occupied Kashmir.
Published in The Express Tribune, April 8th, 2015.
To put things in context, the balance of power is shifting in the Middle East after the successful conclusion of the US-Iran nuclear deal. The Saudi air strikes in Yemen close to the Iran-US nuclear deal is not a coincidence. So the conflict in Yemen is the start of a wider regional tussle in the Middle East between Saudi Arabia and Iran for influence and hegemony.
Politically, Pakistan is not in a position to say ‘no’ to the Saudis but militarily, it can ill-afford to commit its troops for the conflict in Yemen. Pakistani security forces are over-occupied with a multitude of internal and external security challenges, so our plate is full. At this juncture, jumping into the Middle Eastern geopolitical morass is fraught with dangers. Pakistan should not join the Saudi coalition for the following six reasons.
First, given the pressing domestic and regional situation, getting sucked into the Iranian-Saudi proxy war can be detrimental to Pakistan’s fight against home-grown terrorism. Now that the security situation is gradually stabilising after more than a decade of violence, moving troops to the Middle East will be a fatal mistake.
Second, committing Pakistani troops to the Saudis in return for financial assistance will certainly come with a caveat of allowing Saudi-backed groups to preach their radical interpretation of faith in Pakistan without any check.
Third, the decision to join the Saudi coalition will antagonise Iran, which shares a 900-kilometre-long porous border with Pakistan. This decision can increase sectarian tensions in the country, resulting in another episode of a Saudi-Iranian proxy war on our soil. Four, any sectarian rift in Pakistan will provide an ideal opening to the Islamic State (IS)-affiliated groups in the region to exploit our sectarian fault lines to gain a foothold in the country. The anti-Iran militant groups like the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Jundallah can also join hands with the IS in such a situation.
Five, Iran can potentially undermine Pakistani interests in Afghanistan. It can extend support to anti-Pakistan groups and forces, especially the Baloch separatist groups. Iran and Pakistan are already locked in an active geo-economic competition to unlock the mineral riches of landlocked Central Asian states via Afghanistan. Pakistan has constructed a deep-sea port in Balochistan with Chinese assistance while Iran is developing the Chabahar port with Indian help.
Finally, the lifting of US sanctions on Iran as a result of the nuclear deal opens up a way for the energy-starved Pakistan to fulfil its soaring energy demands by importing gas from Iran, which is the quickest and cheapest way of overcoming the chronic energy crisis in our country. If Pakistan joins the Saudi coalition, as per the 2012 Iran-Pakistan-gas pipeline agreement, Iran can use the option of imposing penalties on Pakistan.
Rather than burning its fingers in the Middle Eastern geopolitical fire, Pakistan should play the role of a bridge by mediating between Iran and Saudi Arabia with assistance from Turkey and China. In the 1970s, during the heyday of the Cold War, Pakistan acted as a bridge in bringing China and the US closer. Pakistan helped facilitate then US secretary of state Henry Kissinger’s secret visit to China, which paved the way for US president Richard Nixon’s visit to that country in 1972. In the given situation, Pakistan can play the same role when no other Muslim country is making any serious efforts to find a peaceful solution to this problem through diplomacy. One also hopes that Pakistan has learnt its lessons from 30 years of jihadi misadventures in Afghanistan and Indian-occupied Kashmir.
Published in The Express Tribune, April 8th, 2015.