Power politics in the Middle East
Middle Eastern states often seek outside support for their internal, regional agendas
The writer is an independent political and defence analyst. He is also the author of several books, monographs and articles on Pakistan and South Asian affairs
The internal strife in Yemen, and Saudi Arabia’s military intervention there, is the latest episode in the political history of the Middle East, which has been marked by internal revolts, intra-region conflicts, one state resorting to military intervention or supporting dissident groups in another state. As a matter of fact, partnerships and rivalries are not permanent in the Middle East. Ever since the advent of the modern state system in the region in the aftermath of the First World War, regional politics have been shaped mainly by dynastic rivalries, mutual jealousies, state competition, ideological non-congruence and the desire of some states to command the region. Middle Eastern states have been vulnerable to penetration and intervention by extra-regional states like the US, European countries and Russia (the Soviet Union) either because the Middle Eastern states seek outside support for their internal and regional agendas or the extra-regional states exploit these conflicts to their advantage.
Saudi Arabia has been one of the principal players in the region because of its economic clout and the capacity to back its diplomacy with financial generosity. However, it pursued a noiseless and status quo-oriented diplomacy, preferring to buy off support rather than using military power. It has traditionally maintained cordial and cooperative interaction with the US, with the exception of periodic strains in relations after September 2001 in the context of global terrorism issues and US policies in the region. Like Saudi Arabia, Iran has always expressed regional self-importance. The former Shah of Iran wanted to build himself up as the godfather of the region with US help. The Saudi dynasty had strong reservations about the former Shah’s regional agenda but both were under the US umbrella, which moderated their jealousies.
The rise of the Islamic revolutionary Iran, which adopted an anti-monarchy and anti-US disposition from the beginning in 1979, was a disconcerting development for conservative monarchical Arab states. The ideology of radical revolution was viewed as a major threat by Arab monarchies because Iran made no secret of its desire to export its revolutionary ideas into the conservative and status quo-oriented Middle East. Its ideological appeal was somewhat defused because it got bogged down in a host of problems with the US that bolstered the conservative Arab states in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) also diverted Iran’s energies from making ideological inroads into the Arab Middle East. All Arab kingdoms supported Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in his war against Iran. However, Iran managed to push back Iraq’s assault. It took Iran almost a decade to recover from the impact of this war.
A number of developments in the first decade of the 21st century helped Iran return to the regional fold as an active player. The post-Saddam government in Iraq, established under the aegis of the US, gradually developed close interactions with Iran. Other important developments that caused polarisation in the Middle East included the split in the Palestinian movement in 2007 between Hamas and Fatah/PLO resulting in the former taking control of Gaza and the rise of the Hezbollah movement in Lebanon as an effective counterforce to Israel. Several Middle Eastern countries faced internal turmoil in the wake of what was described as the Arab spring (2011 onwards). As the internal turmoil lingered on in some Arab states, displacing internal political balance among diverse political, religious and tribal forces, neighbouring states began to interfere to support their preferred party. Libya, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen became battlegrounds for competing Middle Eastern states and interests.
The Yemen crisis is an offshoot of the Arab spring that dislodged the authoritarian government of Ali Abdullah Saleh in February 2012. However, Yemen could not return to internal peace because al Qaeda made strong inroads into the country resulting in the US employing drone attacks to flush out al Qaeda and other militants. Internally, the new government led by President Hadi was unable to accommodate diverse tribal interests and faced a major revolt, spearheaded by the Houthi tribe and its allies. As the outside powers pushed their agendas in Yemen, the Saudis found it difficult to stay quiet as they shared a long border with Yemen and maintained historical interest in supporting pro-Saudi groups. The air raids initiated by Saudi Arabia in Yemen on March 26, with the support of other conservative monarchies are part of the Saudi regional power agenda. Saudi Arabia’s military intervention is a major departure from its policy of avoiding open military activity in neighbouring states. Limited military help was provided to Bahrain in March 2011 to counter anti-government political activists. However, in Yemen’s case, the military intervention is more blatant and it is expected to expand in scope. Ground troops are likely to be inducted at a later stage unless diplomacy becomes active to defuse the situation.
The new strident Saudi policy can be explained with reference to the change of regime with the assumption of the throne by King Salman on January 23. The new king and his close advisers want to demonstrate the assertive profile of Saudi Arabia in the region, especially in opposition to Iran that is blamed for providing funding and arms to the Houthis and their allies. The new Saudi regime has made no secret of its opposition to the US-Iran nuclear framework agreement because this can initiate the process of withdrawal of American and UN sanctions against Iran. Yemen is the launching of Saudi Arabia’s assertive regional role. However, there is little prospect of the Saudi agenda succeeding in an enduring manner in Yemen. The civil strife in Yemen will accentuate, fracturing it further. The only beneficiaries of the chaos are going to be al Qaeda and the Islamic State. Pakistan should advocate a diplomatic solution of the crisis and help Saudi Arabia pull out of Yemen instead of sending its troops to Saudi Arabia. This will only append Pakistan to the current Saudi power game in the Middle East.
Published in The Express Tribune, April 6th, 2015.
Saudi Arabia has been one of the principal players in the region because of its economic clout and the capacity to back its diplomacy with financial generosity. However, it pursued a noiseless and status quo-oriented diplomacy, preferring to buy off support rather than using military power. It has traditionally maintained cordial and cooperative interaction with the US, with the exception of periodic strains in relations after September 2001 in the context of global terrorism issues and US policies in the region. Like Saudi Arabia, Iran has always expressed regional self-importance. The former Shah of Iran wanted to build himself up as the godfather of the region with US help. The Saudi dynasty had strong reservations about the former Shah’s regional agenda but both were under the US umbrella, which moderated their jealousies.
The rise of the Islamic revolutionary Iran, which adopted an anti-monarchy and anti-US disposition from the beginning in 1979, was a disconcerting development for conservative monarchical Arab states. The ideology of radical revolution was viewed as a major threat by Arab monarchies because Iran made no secret of its desire to export its revolutionary ideas into the conservative and status quo-oriented Middle East. Its ideological appeal was somewhat defused because it got bogged down in a host of problems with the US that bolstered the conservative Arab states in the Middle East. Furthermore, the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) also diverted Iran’s energies from making ideological inroads into the Arab Middle East. All Arab kingdoms supported Iraq’s Saddam Hussein in his war against Iran. However, Iran managed to push back Iraq’s assault. It took Iran almost a decade to recover from the impact of this war.
A number of developments in the first decade of the 21st century helped Iran return to the regional fold as an active player. The post-Saddam government in Iraq, established under the aegis of the US, gradually developed close interactions with Iran. Other important developments that caused polarisation in the Middle East included the split in the Palestinian movement in 2007 between Hamas and Fatah/PLO resulting in the former taking control of Gaza and the rise of the Hezbollah movement in Lebanon as an effective counterforce to Israel. Several Middle Eastern countries faced internal turmoil in the wake of what was described as the Arab spring (2011 onwards). As the internal turmoil lingered on in some Arab states, displacing internal political balance among diverse political, religious and tribal forces, neighbouring states began to interfere to support their preferred party. Libya, Syria, Bahrain and Yemen became battlegrounds for competing Middle Eastern states and interests.
The Yemen crisis is an offshoot of the Arab spring that dislodged the authoritarian government of Ali Abdullah Saleh in February 2012. However, Yemen could not return to internal peace because al Qaeda made strong inroads into the country resulting in the US employing drone attacks to flush out al Qaeda and other militants. Internally, the new government led by President Hadi was unable to accommodate diverse tribal interests and faced a major revolt, spearheaded by the Houthi tribe and its allies. As the outside powers pushed their agendas in Yemen, the Saudis found it difficult to stay quiet as they shared a long border with Yemen and maintained historical interest in supporting pro-Saudi groups. The air raids initiated by Saudi Arabia in Yemen on March 26, with the support of other conservative monarchies are part of the Saudi regional power agenda. Saudi Arabia’s military intervention is a major departure from its policy of avoiding open military activity in neighbouring states. Limited military help was provided to Bahrain in March 2011 to counter anti-government political activists. However, in Yemen’s case, the military intervention is more blatant and it is expected to expand in scope. Ground troops are likely to be inducted at a later stage unless diplomacy becomes active to defuse the situation.
The new strident Saudi policy can be explained with reference to the change of regime with the assumption of the throne by King Salman on January 23. The new king and his close advisers want to demonstrate the assertive profile of Saudi Arabia in the region, especially in opposition to Iran that is blamed for providing funding and arms to the Houthis and their allies. The new Saudi regime has made no secret of its opposition to the US-Iran nuclear framework agreement because this can initiate the process of withdrawal of American and UN sanctions against Iran. Yemen is the launching of Saudi Arabia’s assertive regional role. However, there is little prospect of the Saudi agenda succeeding in an enduring manner in Yemen. The civil strife in Yemen will accentuate, fracturing it further. The only beneficiaries of the chaos are going to be al Qaeda and the Islamic State. Pakistan should advocate a diplomatic solution of the crisis and help Saudi Arabia pull out of Yemen instead of sending its troops to Saudi Arabia. This will only append Pakistan to the current Saudi power game in the Middle East.
Published in The Express Tribune, April 6th, 2015.