Security for polio workers
Polio immunisation campaign teams will be operating in a difficult environment this summer
The writer is Assistant Inspector General of Police at the Central Police Office in Lahore
Polio immunisation campaigns are probably in the last phase of low-incidence-high-urgency cycle before the onset of summer, when the polio virus is highly active and contagious. Among the chief security concerns for these campaigns include rising sectarian warfare. Sectarian attacks have rattled the fragile security apparatus, exposing the incompetence of the local administration and the incongruities of the security infrastructure. What do these sectarian attacks mean for the summer polio immunisation campaigns?
According to reliable sources, 2013 was one of the worst years for Shias in Pakistan when more than 500 people were killed in bomb blasts, suicide attacks, targeted killings and indiscriminate firing. This means that nearly 42 Shias lost their lives on a monthly basis and 1.4 on a daily basis in 2013. In the current year, so far nearly 104 persons of the same sect have been killed, which means 2.08 persons are killed per day. The increased number of sectarian killings adds an explosive mix in the violent extremist atmosphere prevailing across the country.
Since sectarian outfits perpetrate terror through violence to achieve their myopic goals, they make it difficult for social service operators to function properly. The polio immunisation campaign teams will be operating in a difficult environment this summer where neutral action, non-partisan administrative operations and even the engagement of sectarian groups shall perhaps, decide the effectiveness of these campaigns.
To start with, polio security risk managers must enhance coordination with the local administration and the police. Each settled district must be divided into a reasonable number of polio zones, either on the basis of existing administrative units or to accommodate an irregular population density. The number of religious seminaries and places of worship must be carefully counted and evaluated. Each street should have at least two local members (one male and other female) to assist the polio immunisation campaign team workers during door-to-door visits in order to diffuse any administrative-cum-cultural barriers and reduce access problems.
Second, each police station has criminal data that indicates crime pockets in its jurisdiction. The high crime corridors should be earmarked with a relatively high security deployment. Moreover, the detection of polio cases has become synonymous with a marked probability of the presence of TTP affiliates, sympathisers or financiers. Since the TTP have rejected polio immunisation campaigns in the populations under their control, they have exposed their social capital to counterinsurgents and deployment of security must be ensured in zones of high polio detection cases.
Third, provincial civil intelligence agencies, like the special branch, must reinvigorate their social networks to generate actionable intelligence before the start of polio immunisation campaigns. All inaccessible regions must be indicated in order to make proper security arrangements for the protection of polio immunisation campaign teams. Discreet selection of experienced field officials must be made in order to coordinate and collate intelligence with all stakeholders. The deeper the intelligence penetration and broader the sweeping area, the better the security of polio workers in polio zones. To involve the federal government, the Intelligence Bureau may be deputed to countercheck the intelligence of local agencies. Army intelligence should be solicited and troops should be deployed in areas where a high probability exists of counterterror action taking place.
Fourth, each district has a sizable number of retired army and police personnel. The data of retired officials, having ages below 60-62 years, may be obtained from these organisations and a list should be maintained by local officers. These retired personnel can re-energise their personal networks and can be deployed readily owing to their understanding of security mechanisms and surveillance duties. The success of the polio immunisation campaigns hinges upon high social connectivity. If a senior Unicef command succeeds in creating a dynamic and highly-integrated social networking in the polio zones, a sizeable reduction in the number of polio cases may be observed.
Lastly, we need to engage the media properly and vigorously for initiating actions to counter violent extremism and the propaganda against polio immunisation campaigns.
Published in The Express Tribune, February 26th, 2015.
According to reliable sources, 2013 was one of the worst years for Shias in Pakistan when more than 500 people were killed in bomb blasts, suicide attacks, targeted killings and indiscriminate firing. This means that nearly 42 Shias lost their lives on a monthly basis and 1.4 on a daily basis in 2013. In the current year, so far nearly 104 persons of the same sect have been killed, which means 2.08 persons are killed per day. The increased number of sectarian killings adds an explosive mix in the violent extremist atmosphere prevailing across the country.
Since sectarian outfits perpetrate terror through violence to achieve their myopic goals, they make it difficult for social service operators to function properly. The polio immunisation campaign teams will be operating in a difficult environment this summer where neutral action, non-partisan administrative operations and even the engagement of sectarian groups shall perhaps, decide the effectiveness of these campaigns.
To start with, polio security risk managers must enhance coordination with the local administration and the police. Each settled district must be divided into a reasonable number of polio zones, either on the basis of existing administrative units or to accommodate an irregular population density. The number of religious seminaries and places of worship must be carefully counted and evaluated. Each street should have at least two local members (one male and other female) to assist the polio immunisation campaign team workers during door-to-door visits in order to diffuse any administrative-cum-cultural barriers and reduce access problems.
Second, each police station has criminal data that indicates crime pockets in its jurisdiction. The high crime corridors should be earmarked with a relatively high security deployment. Moreover, the detection of polio cases has become synonymous with a marked probability of the presence of TTP affiliates, sympathisers or financiers. Since the TTP have rejected polio immunisation campaigns in the populations under their control, they have exposed their social capital to counterinsurgents and deployment of security must be ensured in zones of high polio detection cases.
Third, provincial civil intelligence agencies, like the special branch, must reinvigorate their social networks to generate actionable intelligence before the start of polio immunisation campaigns. All inaccessible regions must be indicated in order to make proper security arrangements for the protection of polio immunisation campaign teams. Discreet selection of experienced field officials must be made in order to coordinate and collate intelligence with all stakeholders. The deeper the intelligence penetration and broader the sweeping area, the better the security of polio workers in polio zones. To involve the federal government, the Intelligence Bureau may be deputed to countercheck the intelligence of local agencies. Army intelligence should be solicited and troops should be deployed in areas where a high probability exists of counterterror action taking place.
Fourth, each district has a sizable number of retired army and police personnel. The data of retired officials, having ages below 60-62 years, may be obtained from these organisations and a list should be maintained by local officers. These retired personnel can re-energise their personal networks and can be deployed readily owing to their understanding of security mechanisms and surveillance duties. The success of the polio immunisation campaigns hinges upon high social connectivity. If a senior Unicef command succeeds in creating a dynamic and highly-integrated social networking in the polio zones, a sizeable reduction in the number of polio cases may be observed.
Lastly, we need to engage the media properly and vigorously for initiating actions to counter violent extremism and the propaganda against polio immunisation campaigns.
Published in The Express Tribune, February 26th, 2015.