Militants in Karachi
Without enough information, public has little idea about who we are fighting or the actual success of the action.
After another police-led operation killed seven alleged militants in Karachi on September 18, questions arise about the scope and scale of the state’s battle against the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Vastly outnumbered in fighters, weapons and capital, it made little sense for the TTP to stay and fight the military in Operation Zarb-e-Azb. Predictably, most militants have fled to either Afghanistan, (where may even find safe haven granted by sections of the Afghan government) or in urban hubs like Karachi. ‘Fund-raising’ activities like kidnapping, extortion rackets, smuggling and the drug trade are all conducted in Karachi as well. In the meantime, they’ve also made considerable efforts to control territory, targeting policemen, political parties, and ordinary citizens in the process. It was inevitable that the fight in Fata would spill over elsewhere, and it already has had lethal consequences for Karachi’s already violence-plagued citizens.
What is to be done? Evidently Zarb-e-Azb, though ostensibly effective, is a limited approach. Counterterrorism activities need to be expanded to include urban centres as well. To an extent, that has been the case in the sustained Karachi operation, but it needs better organisation. One hopes for better coordination between the military and law-enforcement agencies (LEA) to target escaping TTP militants, and cut their financial supplies as well. This does not necessarily mean more military action, but it requires better intelligence gathering and communication.
A word also needs to be said about transparency, of which there has been very little in both Zarb-e-Azb and the Karachi operation. Without enough — or independently verified — information, the public has little idea about who we are fighting or the actual success — otherwise — of the action. Frequent protests from families of alleged ‘miscreants’ claiming their innocence, and a failure to present those arrested in court makes it imperative that the LEAs come clean about who they target, how, and what happens to them once they are in custody.
Published in The Express Tribune, September 19th, 2014.
What is to be done? Evidently Zarb-e-Azb, though ostensibly effective, is a limited approach. Counterterrorism activities need to be expanded to include urban centres as well. To an extent, that has been the case in the sustained Karachi operation, but it needs better organisation. One hopes for better coordination between the military and law-enforcement agencies (LEA) to target escaping TTP militants, and cut their financial supplies as well. This does not necessarily mean more military action, but it requires better intelligence gathering and communication.
A word also needs to be said about transparency, of which there has been very little in both Zarb-e-Azb and the Karachi operation. Without enough — or independently verified — information, the public has little idea about who we are fighting or the actual success — otherwise — of the action. Frequent protests from families of alleged ‘miscreants’ claiming their innocence, and a failure to present those arrested in court makes it imperative that the LEAs come clean about who they target, how, and what happens to them once they are in custody.
Published in The Express Tribune, September 19th, 2014.